Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Super., Ct. No. 351352 Roger Beauchesne, Judge.
Laurence Butler, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
The Law Office of Jeremy C. Cook, Jr. and Jeremy C. Cook, Jr. for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HILL, J.
Appellant challenges the judgment against him, which quieted title to a 50 percent interest in a parcel of real property in respondent and required respondent to pay $5,000 to appellant for improvements he made and for loss of his personal property. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent is appellant’s mother. Her complaint against appellant alleged one cause of action to quiet title to a residence on Uranus Drive in Ceres and one cause of action seeking a determination that appellant held the Uranus Drive property in constructive trust for her. In the first cause of action, she alleged that she and her former husband, Patrick Butler, owned the Uranus Drive property, although Patrick retained possession of it pursuant to a judgment of dissolution. In 1999, appellant’s name was placed on the title to respondent’s real property on Romeo Lane in Turlock in order to facilitate financing; appellant never paid any consideration for placing his name on the title. In October 2003, appellant offered to trade his interest in the Romeo Lane property for plaintiff’s interest in the Uranus Drive property. In December 2003, respondent signed and delivered to appellant a deed to the Uranus Drive property, but intentionally made the legal description of the property incorrect because she did not intend to transfer title to appellant. She asserted there was no effective transfer of her interest in the Uranus Drive property to appellant, and any alleged transfer was unsupported by consideration.
In the second cause of action, respondent alleged that appellant was abusive to her and refused to cooperate in refinancing the Romeo Lane property, which she needed to do because of financial difficulties. Due to his undue influence, in December 2003, respondent “may have transferred” her interest in the Uranus Drive property to appellant; she would not have done so but for his undue influence. Therefore, appellant held title to that property as constructive trustee for respondent’s benefit.
In his answer, appellant alleged that he was a surety for respondent on the Romeo Lane property, obtained a 50 percent ownership interest in that property, and exchanged it for a 50 percent interest in the Uranus Drive property. Appellant alleged he resided in the Romeo Lane property for seven months, gave appellant money to apply to its purchase, and made repairs and improvements to the property. He alleged respondent used “undue influence and duress” to obtain his interest in the Romeo Lane property, apparently by holding appellant’s personal property and refusing to return it unless he quitclaimed the Romeo Lane property to her.
After a two-day court trial, the court entered judgment for respondent, quieting her title to the Uranus Drive property, determining that the conveyance from respondent to appellant was void, and ordering respondent to pay appellant $5,000 for improvements he made (apparently to the Romeo Lane property) and for loss of his personal property. The judgment also required respondent to transfer any of appellant’s personal property remaining in her possession to appellant. After judgment was entered, appellant moved the court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court denied the motion as untimely.
The court erroneously signed two judgments, one submitted by respondent and one submitted by appellant. It subsequently entered an order stating that the judgment submitted by respondent “conform[ed] to the [court’s] findings as stated on the record after trial and accurately reflect[ed] the court’s decision on the issues after trial.” It declared that judgment to be the final judgment of the court, and vacated the judgment submitted by appellant.
DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts that “[t]he trial court grossly misinterpited [sic] the evidence submitted to the court and erred in finding that the Grant Deed Martha Butler conveyed to Laurence A. Butler is void” because there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of lack of consideration or undue influence and appellant established his defenses of estoppel and unclean hands. Thus, appellant’s challenges to the judgment depend upon the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support the judgment. “[W]here the appellant fails to produce a complete record of oral trial proceedings, a challenge based on the claim of evidence insufficiency will not be heard. [Citation.]” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 987.) “Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error. [Citation.] The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter's transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 992.)
Appellant did not provide this court with a reporter’s transcript of the trial. Consequently, the court has no basis on which to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. The court must presume the judgment to be correct and adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Appellant seems to contend that the portion of the judgment awarding him $5,000 for improvements he made to the Romeo Lane property (and for his personal property) is inconsistent with the portion quieting title to the Uranus Drive property in respondent and concluding that appellant never owned any interest in that property; he contends the award indicates he held some interest in the Romeo Lane property; therefore the exchange for the Uranus Drive property could not have been lacking in consideration. The award for improvements did not indicate the trial court found appellant held an interest in the Uranus Drive property, however.
The law recognizes that a “good faith improver” of another’s real property, that is, “[a] person who makes an improvement to land in good faith and under the erroneous belief, because of a mistake of law or fact, that he is the owner of the land,” may have a claim for reimbursement for the improvements made. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.1, 871.3, 871.5; Powell v. Mayo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 994, 997-998.) The court may “effect such an adjustment of the rights, equities, and interests of the good faith improver, the owner of the land, and other interested parties … as is consistent with substantial justice to the parties under the circumstances of the particular case. The relief granted shall protect the owner of the land upon which the improvement was constructed against any pecuniary loss but shall avoid, insofar as possible, enriching him unjustly at the expense of the good faith improver.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.5.) Thus, a party does not acquire an interest in land simply by making improvements to the land of another. An award reimbursing appellant for improvements he made to the real property on Romeo Lane is consistent with a good faith but erroneous belief by appellant that he held an interest in the Romeo Lane property. It is not inconsistent with a finding that appellant owned no interest in that property and therefore gave no consideration to respondent in exchange for her interest in the Uranus Drive property.
In any event, lack of consideration flowing to respondent in the property exchange was not the only theory alleged in the complaint for voiding the conveyance or quieting respondent’s title. There is no statement of decision indicating on which theory the trial court granted judgment. Because of the absence of a reporter’s transcript, appellant has not demonstrated that the judgment is unsupported by the evidence on each theory advanced by respondent.
Appellant has not established any error in the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HARRIS, Acting P.J., DAWSON, J.