Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
For Maria Lissette Bucio, Petitioner: Quin Denvir, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Offices of Quin Denvir, Davis, CA.
For Deborah K. Johnson, Warden, Respondent: Robert M Snider, CAAG - Office of Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Hon. Jay C. Gandhi, United States Magistrate Judge.
I .
BACKGROUND
On March 24, 2011, a jury convicted Maria Lissette Bucio (" Petitioner") of first degree murder and second degree robbery, and further found true that the murder was committed during the robbery. (Lodg. No. 3 at 1-2, 4-6.) For her crimes, Petitioner was sentenced to state imprisonment for twenty-five years to life. (Lodge. No. 4 at 1.)
Petitioner appealed, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a reasoned decision, and the California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodg. Nos. 5-10.) The instant Petition was filed on June 27, 2014. [Dkt. No. 1.]
The Court has reviewed the record, and the evidence is accurately summarized in the California Court of Appeal's decision on direct review, which is attached as Exhibit A. (Lodg. No. 8); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (facts presumed correct). The Court discusses facts below as are pertinent to habeas relief.
II .
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Petitioner asserts a single ground for relief, which fails on this record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) (" AEDPA"); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge violated her rights under the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). (Pet. at 5, 10-29.)
As a rule, under Batson, the movant must first establish a prima facie case of the prosecutor's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Then, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. Id. at 97-98. Finally, the court must determine whether the movant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98.
To establish a prima facie case, Petitioner must prove that: (1) the removed prospective juror is a member of a cognizable group, (2) the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror, and (3) " the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference" that the challenge was motivated by race or gender. Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96).
Here, for the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the totality of the circumstances do not raise an inference that the prosecutor's challenge was prejudicially motivated. See id.; Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1999) (" [T]he striking of only one prospective juror with discriminatory purpose violates the Constitution. However, the striking of one juror of a cognizable racial group does not by itself raise an inference of discriminatory purpose . . . Instead, the trial court must consider the totality of relevant circumstances.") (citations omitted).
The Court concludes that Petitioner has satisfied the first two steps of the Batson prima facie test: (1) prospective juror S.A. was an African-American and, therefore, from a cognizable group; and (2) the prosecutor used a peremptory strike against S.A. ( See RT at 742); see also Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1047-48. Thus, the Court will limit its inquiry to the third step, that is, whether the relevant circumstances raise a reasonable inference that the prosecutor challenged S.A. on the basis of race.
By way of background, during voir dire, prospective juror S.A. informed the court that she had recently been mistreated by a police officer in an incident that had greatly distressed her. (Lodg. No. 1, Reporter's Transcript (" RT") at 714-19.) Additionally, S.A. told the court that she did not bring a citizen complaint against that officer, even though S.A.'s own mother worked in the police office's internal affairs division and several officers encouraged S.A. to complain. (Id. at 717-18.) With this information in hand, the prosecutor moved to strike S.A. from the jury, citing two convincing, race-neutral explanations for her use of the peremptory challenge.
First, the prosecutor expressed concerns about S.A.'s " recent" interaction with law enforcement, the memory of which still " shook up" S.A. and made her " visibly upset." (Id. at 743, 745.) Understandably, such a traumatic experience could color, even subconsciously, a juror's perception of both officer testimony and the criminal justice system as a whole. ( See id. at 714-19.) And the prosecutor explicitly told the court that she did not want a juror that had " any preconceived notions about how officers behave." (Id. at 745.) As cogently explained by the Court of Appeal, S.A.'s " negative feelings about law enforcement" alone were " sufficient" to justify the prosecutor's peremptory challenge. (Ex. A at 6.)
Second, the prosecutor was troubled " that [S.A.] would give any officer any pass on his blatantly inappropriate misconduct, " and told the trial court that she did " not want [a juror] who [would] give anybody a pass for misconduct, whether that be an officer, a civilian[, ] or another individual." (RT at 743-45 (emphasis added).) As noted by the Court of Appeal, anybody could include Petitioner, who the prosecutor clearly would not want to get " a pass" at trial. (Ex. A at 6.)
Upon consideration of these explanations, the trial court found that the prosecutor exercised her peremptory challenge for " group-neutral reasons" that were " genuine" and" not pretextu[]al." (RT at 746-48.) That finding is entitled to substantial deference. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339-40, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).
Additionally, the Court notes that Petitioner is Hispanic, while S.A. is African-American. ( See RT at 748); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (" Racial identity between the defendant and the excused person . . . may provide one of the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has occurred.").
Thus, on this record, the Court cannot find either a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent or an unreasonable application of Batson. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
Accordingly, Petitioner's claim does not merit federal habeas relief.
III.
RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; (2) directing that Judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice; and (3) denying a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).