Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9017.
July 12, 2006.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Stephanie Joannides, Judge. Trial Court No. 3AN-99-210 CR.
Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, Anchorage, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
B.S., age sixteen, was arrested for exposing himself to and sexually assaulting a five-year-old girl, A.D. The police took B.S. to the police station to interview him. At B.S.'s request, the police contacted B.S.'s mother. She was present when the police read him his Miranda rights and questioned him. B.S. did not consult with his mother before or during the interrogation. B.S. made inculpatory statements during the interview. He later filed a motion to suppress these statements on the ground that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, given his diminished intelligence, the fact that the police had not informed his mother of the charges that they were investigating, and the fact that the police had not offered B.S. the opportunity to consult privately with his mother. The superior court denied B.S.'s motion to suppress his statements. B.S. appeals. We affirm the superior court's ruling because we conclude that the police satisfied their duty to honor B.S.'s Fifth Amendment rights.
Factual and procedural background
Sixteen-year-old B.S. was arrested upon suspicion that he had exposed himself to and sexually assaulted A.D., age five. B.S. was taken to the police station and was interviewed by Detective David Parker. The interview took place in a room that was approximately seven by six feet.
Detective Parker asked B.S. if he would like to have a parent present during the interview. B.S. stated that he wanted his mother present. With B.S.'s assistance, Detective Parker contacted B.S.'s mother, Edna S. They then waited for her to arrive.
Once Ms. S. arrived at the police station and was escorted to the interview room, Detective Parker read Miranda warnings to B.S. In his mother's presence, B.S. indicated that he understood his Miranda rights and that he was willing to talk to the detective. During the ensuing interview, B.S. admitted to having been with A.D. He admitted that A.D. and he had pulled their pants down and exposed themselves to each other. B.S. stated that A.D. told him to look at her and to touch her. She wanted to know whether his private parts looked like hers. B.S. stated that when he pulled his pants down his penis was erect. A.D. did not touch him, but she looked at his penis. B.S. denied ever penetrating A.D. with his penis or any other object, stating that the only contact between the two, when A.D.'s pants were off, was when he briefly touched her lower leg. B.S. repeatedly denied that any sexual contact took place between himself and A.D. He stated that the only other contact between himself and A.D. occurred when he had carried A.D., at which time both were fully clothed. B.S. stated that he had carried A.D. so that her legs would not be scratched by the brush. A.D. left when she heard her mother calling.
At this point, Detective Parker decided to take a break from the interview to consult with Detective Allen, who was interviewing A.D. Ms. S. left the interview room to get some food from her car. When Ms. S. returned from the parking lot, the door to the interrogation room was closed. An officer present outside the interrogation room informed Ms. S. that Detective Parker had a few questions for B.S. that he needed to ask B.S. in private. Ms. S. testified that she believed she could not to go back into the room until she was invited, so she sat down outside the room and had a snack and waited for the door to be opened.
While Ms. S. was out of the room, Detective Parker asked B.S. if he was willing to talk with him without his mother present. B.S. agreed. Detective Parker asked B.S. if he remembered the rights that he had warned B.S. about earlier. He told him that they were still in effect. B.S. acknowledged this and agreed to continue the conversation. During this conversation, in response to leading questions, B.S. admitted that while A.D. had sat on his lap, he had an erection but that both his and A.D.'s pants were up at the time, and that A.D. was sitting on his leg at the time. After these admissions, Detective Parker opened the door and allowed Ms. S. to rejoin them. Detective Parker proceeded with questions regarding the contact between B.S. and A.D., and B.S. admitted that A.D.'s buttocks or leg may have touched or "bumped" his penis, through his clothing, while she was on his lap.
At no time during the interview did Ms. S. intervene to clarify or attempt to invoke B.S.'s rights, to inquire what charges B.S. faced, or to speak to B.S. privately. During the interview, Detective Parker offered B.S. a glass of water and allowed him to use the restroom. B.S. was given snacks and allowed to listen to music during the breaks in questioning. The interview lasted approximately three hours. However, the actual period of time he was actively questioned was approximately forty-five minutes.
The State filed a petition asking the court to adjudicate B.S. a delinquent minor. The major charges against B.S. were sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, assault in the fourth degree, and indecent exposure.
B.S. filed a motion to suppress the statements that he made to Detective Parker. B.S. argued that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that the admissions that he made during the interview were involuntary. He claimed that Detective Parker manipulated and coerced him into answering the interview questions. B.S. emphasized his young age and lack of experience with the criminal justice system and the circumstances surrounding the interview, including the length of the interrogation. He claimed that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because he was not offered the opportunity to consult with his mother before being questioned and because his mother was not advised of the nature of the allegations against him. He also pointed out that his mother was excluded from a part of the interrogation.
Superior Court Judge Stephanie Joannides conducted several evidentiary hearings based on B.S.'s motion to suppress. During these hearings, Detective Parker described the circumstances surrounding the interview and his interactions with B.S. A juvenile probation officer, Sandra Bonacker, testified about B.S.'s prior juvenile offenses (a controlled substance offense in April 1999, a shoplifting incident in January 2002, and another shoplifting incident in April 2002 that involved misconduct involving weapons — possession of a fishing filet knife).
B.S. offered the testimony of Dr. Michael Rose, a psychologist. Dr. Rose had conducted psychological tests on B.S. One of these was an IQ test (the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children) and the other was a test to assess B.S.'s understanding and appreciation of his Miranda rights. Based on the results of these tests, Dr. Rose concluded that B.S. was mildly retarded. He concluded that B.S. was capable of making a voluntary confession. But under the circumstances of this case, Dr. Rose concluded that B.S. had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and had not made a voluntary confession.
Judge Joannides granted B.S.'s motion to suppress in part. She first reviewed the circumstances surrounding the interview. She considered B.S.'s age and intelligence, the length of the questioning, B.S.'s prior experience with law enforcement, his mental state, and the extent to which his mother had been present during the interview. Judge Joannides expressed concern because the police did not inform Ms. S. of the nature of the allegations against B.S. and did not offer her a chance to speak privately with B.S. before he waived his Miranda rights and was interviewed. But she ultimately concluded that Alaska law did not require the police to offer this type of parental notice and consultation unless the minor or the minor's parent asked. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Judge Joannides found that B.S. had voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights. But she suppressed the statements that B.S. made when the police questioned him while his mother was absent. Judge Joannides concluded that B.S. had requested his mother's presence and it was improper for the police to question him without her being present. (The State has not challenged this ruling on appeal.)
A jury found B.S. guilty of indecent exposure and sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. B.S. now appeals, claiming that Judge Joannides erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Why we uphold Judge Joannides's decision
B.S. claims on appeal that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. In particular, B.S. points out that he was not allowed to consult privately with his mother before deciding whether to waive his constitutional rights and that the police did not inform his mother of the potential charges against him. B.S. cites to law from other jurisdictions that require a juvenile to be given an opportunity to consult privately with a parent or interested adult who is informed of the nature of the alleged offense before the juvenile can knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. But in Quick v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a juvenile could waive his Miranda rights without the guidance of an adult. The court pointed out that some jurisdictions had adopted a per se rule that did not allow a juvenile to waive his Miranda rights unless a fully informed adult was present at the interrogation. But the court specifically rejected a per se rule, instead adopting a "totality of the circumstances test" in which the age of the defendant is an important but not decisive factor in determining whether the juvenile has waived his Miranda rights:
599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
The mere fact that a person is under the age of majority does not automatically render him incapable of making a knowing and voluntary waiver. The surrounding circumstances must be considered in each case to determine whether a particular juvenile had sufficient knowledge and maturity to make a reasoned decision. Among the factors to be considered are age, intelligence, length of the questioning, education, prior experience with law enforcement officers, mental state at the time of the waiver, and whether there has been any prior opportunity to consult with a parent, guardian, or attorney.
Id. at 719-20 (footnotes omitted).
The court went on to address whether the juvenile must be able to consult with an adult before he waives his Miranda rights:
It is unquestionably a better practice to see to it that a juvenile consults with an adult before he waives his Miranda rights, but at least in those cases where it has not been requested, we decline to adopt a rule requiring such consultation. The state has always had the burden of proof to show that a waiver was knowing and voluntary. Where a juvenile is concerned, the burden on the state is even heavier than it would be with an adult. We believe that the careful scrutiny to be afforded an unsupervised waiver is sufficient to ensure that the rights of a juvenile suspect will be safeguarded.
Id.
The supreme court decided Quick in 1979. In 1993, in State v. J.R.N., the supreme court reaffirmed its earlier Quick decision. In J.R.N., the defendant was arrested on a murder charge. By statute and rule, the police were required to immediately notify J.R.N.'s parents of his detention. Prior to questioning J.R.N., the police asked him if he wanted his parents notified. J.R.N. stated he did not want his parents notified, waived his Miranda rights, and confessed to the murder. J.R.N. moved to suppress his statement on the ground that the police violated the statute and rule by not notifying his parents. This court ordered J.R.N.'s confession suppressed based upon the violation of the statute and rule. The supreme court reversed.
861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993).
Id. at 581.
Former AS 47.10.140(b) (repealed, see ch. 59, § 55, SLA 1996). For current law see AS 47.12.250.
While Delinquency Rule 7 was in effect at the time of J.R.N.'s interrogation, the legislature has since repealed it, effective July 1, 1998. See ch. 107, § 53, SLA 1998.
J.R.N., 861 P.2d at 579.
Id.
In reversing this court, the supreme court held that J.R.N. was capable of waiving his right to have his parents notified. The court also found that J.R.N. had no standing to assert any violation of his parents' right to notification. The court based its decision on Quick. The court noted that it had earlier declined to follow jurisdictions that prohibited a juvenile from waiving his Miranda rights unless a fully informed adult was present. The supreme court pointed out that a juvenile was able to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his constitutional right to counsel. The court stated that these constitutional rights were legally of a higher order than the statutory right of parental notification. The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent to hold that a juvenile may waive constitutional rights but could not waive the additional statutory right.
Id. at 580 n. 6.
Id. at 581.
The supreme court has therefore specifically declined to follow those jurisdictions that hold that a juvenile is unable to waive his Miranda rights unless he has been able to consult with a parent who is informed of the charges that the police are investigating. Under the prior supreme court decisions, the superior court and reviewing courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding an interrogation. And in weighing the totality of the circumstances, courts should consider whether the juvenile was able to consult with an informed adult before waiving his Miranda rights.
In determining whether B.S. knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, the superior court was required to apply the totality of the circumstances test as set forth in Quick. And, on review, this court is required to exercise its independent judgment concerning B.S.'s mental state and its legal significance. Judge Joannides made extensive findings following the evidentiary hearings on B.S.'s motion to suppress. Judge Joannides noted that while B.S. was sixteen years old at the time of the interrogation, Dr. Rose's testimony indicated that B.S.'s mental age ranged from between eleven to thirteen years of age. Based upon B.S.'s medical records and Dr. Rose's testimony, she concluded that B.S. was much less sophisticated than most sixteen-year-olds. Judge Joannides stated that she was concerned about B.S.'s intelligence level with regard to whether he could waive his Miranda rights. But she concluded that, under Alaska law, B.S.'s intelligence level, standing alone, did not warrant suppression of his statements.
State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987).
Judge Joannides also considered the length of the interview. She found that the amount of time that had elapsed during the interrogation was approximately three hours. But she found that the amount of time that the police actually interrogated B.S. was approximately forty-five minutes. Judge Joannides considered B.S.'s prior contacts with the police. She found that, although B.S. had three prior instances of contact with the police, the charges did not appear to have been serious. She concluded that B.S. was not a sophisticated juvenile based on his prior experience with law enforcement officers.
Judge Joannides next addressed B.S.'s mental state at the time he made the admissions. Based upon the video tape of the interrogation, Judge Joannides found that, although B.S. appeared tired, he appeared to be reasonably comfortable. She noted that the police offered B.S. water and food during the interview and that there was no evidence that B.S. was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Judge Joannides concluded that Detective Parker had interrogated B.S. in a conversational and non-threatening tone. And she found that the detective had not made any threats or offered or implied any inducements of leniency. She recognized that Detective Parker admitted that he had engaged in a variety of interrogation techniques designed to elicit responses from B.S., but concluded that the method of interrogation was not unduly coercive.
Judge Joannides also considered the interaction between B.S. and his mother. She noted that B.S.'s mother had been present during the interrogation. B.S.'s mother was not informed of the charges that the police were investigating, and she was not offered an opportunity to consult privately with B.S. However, Judge Joannides noted that the Alaska Supreme Court had not adopted a per se rule requiring a minor to consult with an informed parent before waiving his Miranda rights. Ultimately, Judge Joannides concluded that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the fact that the police did not affirmatively offer B.S. the opportunity to privately consult with his mother did not prevent him from knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights. Based upon that conclusion, Judge Joannides denied B.S.'s motion to suppress his statements up until the point when his mother left the interrogation room. She suppressed the statements that B.S. made when his mother was not present.
Based upon our independent review of the record, we affirm Judge Joannides's decision that B.S.'s statements to Detective Parker were voluntary and that B.S. knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The record supports Judge Joannides's conclusion that B.S.'s age, intelligence, and education did not prevent him from making a voluntary statement and making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. B.S. asserted his right to have his mother present, and his mother was present during the interview. Although the police did not directly inform B.S.'s mother about the charges that B.S. faced, the nature of those charges was apparent from the interview. It appears that B.S. understood and was able to intelligently respond to Detective Parker's questions. B.S.'s answers were deliberate and responsive to the questioning. B.S. corrected Detective Parker on several occasions where the detective either misstated B.S.'s response or the sequence of events. B.S. repeatedly denied any sexual contact with A.D.B.S. appears to have been able to reconstruct the sequence of events in a detailed and sensible manner. We conclude that B.S.'s statements to Detective Parker were voluntary and that B.S. knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. We accordingly affirm Judge Joannides's decision denying B.S.'s motion to suppress.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.