Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ. Charles J. Koosed, Judge, Super. Ct. No. RIJ113491
Patricia Nance for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Petitioner B.S. (Mother) is the mother of 15-year-old M.S., 13-year-old A.S., four-year-old S.S., and one-year-old Se.S. Mother filed this writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging an order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing as to the children. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that she had been provided with reasonable reunification services and finding that the children should not be returned to her care as a substantial risk of detriment did not exist. For the reasons provided below, we reject Mother’s challenge and deny her petition.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The children came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in December 2006 after Mother gave birth to Se. and had tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Mother had a long history of abusing methamphetamine and continued to deny any current usage even when confronted with positive test results. Mother also had a lengthy prior child welfare history concerning her older children dating back to October 2002 for general neglect and caretaker absence/incapacity. She had failed to ensure the children attended school and had been sent to the school board for her two older children’s continual absence and tardiness. In addition, she had failed to treat A. for severe head lice for the previous four years. The children were removed from Mother’s care and placed in a foster home.
On December 13, 2006, a petition was filed on behalf of the children pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support).
The children were formally removed from Mother’s custody at the detention hearing. The court authorized placement of the children in Mother’s care once Mother had been in her in-patient drug program for 30 days and was in compliance with her case plan. Mother was provided with supervised visits with her children and services pending the jurisdictional hearing.
In a jurisdictional/dispositional report, DPSS recommended that the allegation in the petition be found true and that Mother be provided with reunification services. The social worker noted Mother had an extensive substance abuse problem, which she had failed to address through treatment. Mother had admitted to using methamphetamine two days prior to DPSS involvement and also admitted to using the day her children were taken into protective custody. It appeared as though Mother did not understand the affects of drug use on children and her ability to parent her children while on drugs. Mother also admitted to being diagnosed with depression and anxiety and admitted that she had stopped taking the prescribed medication.
Pending a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Mother had been attending individual and group sessions to address her substance abuse problems. It was reported Mother was an active participant in the group sessions and continued to test clean for drugs. However, Mother had failed to enroll in the sober living program due to finances, and there was concern about her current living situation, as there were people in the house who were using drugs. Mother stated she was in the process of looking for employment and was moving out of the home. Mother had participated in a medication evaluation and was diagnosed with bipolar I (most recently, depression) and prescribed an antidepressant.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on May 16, 2007. The court found the allegations in the petition true as amended and declared the children dependents of the court. The children, who had different fathers, were not determined to be a sibling set. Mother was provided with reunification services, which required Mother to complete general counseling, psychotropic medication monitoring, a parenting course and an in-patient substance abuse program and to randomly drug test. Mother was also provided with supervised visits with her children.
By August 2007, Mother had moved out of her home and was renting a room from a friend of her mother’s in Corona. In addition, she had secured employment and had been working at a craft store for about four months and was said to be a good employee. She was actively participating in her substance abuse program, drug testing with negative results, and attending general counseling. However, a warrants check revealed Mother had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants, had missed a recent drug test in August, had been dropped from her parenting program for failing to show up for orientation, and had been taken off her prescribed medication for failing to attend her appointments.
In addition, M., Mother’s eldest child, reported that he was fearful of returning home and had refused to see his mother and grandmother. He liked the stability of his placement and only sought to visit his siblings and maternal grandfather. A., Mother’s eldest daughter, likewise liked the stability of her placement and was fearful of returning to her mother’s lifestyle. However, she had agreed to attend conjoint therapy with her mother but had expressed that she wanted what was best for herself and had also refused to attend visits with Mother. M. and A. reported that Mother continually spoke negatively about their placement, and they felt guilty for being happy in their foster homes. They also reported that Mother did not ask about their well-being and only spoke about her problems. M. has since agreed to attend visitation as long as they were appropriately monitored.
By January 25, 2008, the social worker recommended terminating Mother’s services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Mother moved back into the maternal grandmother’s home, the home from which the children had been removed and in which the maternal uncle, who sold and used drugs, resided. Mother stated she was attempting to find a new home and was planning on marrying S.’s father upon his release from prison. Mother still had not cleared her outstanding warrants, but she continued to be employed by the craft store, earning minimum wage. Further, she continued to participate in her substance abuse program, test negative for drugs with the exception of two occasions, attend her general counseling sessions, take her prescribed medication, and complete a parenting education program.
However, M. reported that his mother had not changed, that he did not want to return to her care, and that he did not want his siblings returned to her care either. In fact, M. wrote a letter indicating he did not want to return to Mother’s care and believed his Mother was merely participating in services to get the children back. M. was very attached to his foster mother and had worked very hard to return to her home after temporarily being placed with his sisters. A. also continued to state that she was fearful of being returned to Mother’s care and that she was comfortable in her placement and liked the stability. She too wrote a letter noting she did not want to return to Mother’s care, as she believed her Mother was back on drugs; she wanted to stay with her foster family, who cared about her and her schooling. Her conjoint therapy sessions were stopped after A. continued to cry during the therapy. S. stated she liked visiting with her mother and father but that she would only stay overnight at their homes if her older sister, A., stayed with her.
Though Mother regularly visited her children, the social worker noted that she continued to make her two older children cry during visitation by “badgering them about issues such as appearance and sexual activities.” Moreover, Mother had little or no interaction with her two younger children during the visits and focused her time with the older children. Because of these actions by Mother, the older children continued to request no visit with her. The social worker opined that Mother did not show that she had benefitted from her parenting program as evidenced by her continual neglect of the two younger children, who were one and three years old at the time, and her asking the older children to take care of the younger ones. The social worker also opined Mother had not taken responsibility for her actions and had failed to benefit from her services as evidenced by her failure to complete substance abuse treatment, her unstable living environment, the quality and her limited visitation, and her failure to address her warrants. The social worker also noted that Mother had tested positive for opiates on October 31, 2007, and had admitted to using methamphetamine in August 2007.
On February 6, 2008, the court requested an addendum report on Mother’s progress with services and visitation. The court also authorized DPSS to assist Mother financially with housing. The social worker reported that Mother continued with her services and had begun attending a second parenting course. In regard to housing, Mother had requested that the paternal grandfather be allowed to reside with her but was informed that he would need to clear a live scan prior to assistance with rent. In regard to visitation, M. and A. had refused to visit with Mother or contact her on the telephone, and when she visited the two younger children, she spent time with one while neglecting the other instead of engaging both children. She appeared not to know how to redirect the children when they began to fight. In addition, S. stated she did not want to visit with Mother or return to her care, and, at one visit, S. pretended she was sick so she could “go home.” At another, she became irritated with Mother.
The contested 12-month review hearing was held on March 19, 2008. At that time, the court found that DPSS had provided Mother with reasonable reunification services and that Mother’s participation had been adequate but incomplete. The court continued Mother’s services, finding that a substantial probability the children would be returned to Mother’s care within six months existed. The court ordered conjoint counseling between the two older children and Mother and “play therapy” for S.
By the 18-month review hearing, Mother still had not benefitted from her services, despite her participation in and completion of a substance abuse program and continued negative drug testing. She continued to reside in the home of the maternal grandmother, who recently had been arrested for possession of controlled substances and where the maternal uncle, who also used and sold drugs, still resided. In addition, Mother had failed to clear her outstanding warrants. M.’s grades in school began to drop, and his therapist reported that he was parentified over his siblings and internalized the issues surrounding this case. In addition, M. attempted conjoint therapy with Mother, but Mother was not receptive to therapy and was in denial, and the therapist cancelled the conjoint therapy, finding it unbeneficial to the child. Moreover, Mother had caused stress on M. by stating and arguing with M. on whether the children will be returned to her care. A.’s grades also slighted dropped from a 3.5 grade point average due to having this case “on her mind.” A. was also parentified, and her conjoint therapy sessions with Mother were also cancelled after Mother continued to bad-mouth the foster mother and the social worker, make inappropriate remarks concerning the case, and attempt to change A.’s mind about returning to her care. The administrator reported that Mother did not appear to show any remorse and was just taking steps to get the children back. He opined Mother had not benefitted from services. M. and A. did not understand why the court continued to “force[]” them be with Mother when they were focused on having a better life. S. had also refused to visit Mother or talk to her on the telephone; she desired to remain in her foster home. Mother had reacted by hanging up on S. when S. stated she did not want to talk to Mother and by ignoring S. during visitation. Se. was also bonded to her foster family. Mother had cancelled four of the nine visits with the younger two children and had missed the majority of her telephone calls with S. For the most part, Mother’s visits with her children had not gone well. On May 29, 2008, after an upsetting visit with Se., Mother followed the caregiver of Se., with Se. and two other adults in the car, onto the freeway, where she tailgated the caregiver’s car, cut in front of it and slammed on her brakes, and otherwise drove recklessly, almost causing an accident. In addition, after two parenting courses, Mother still did not know how to redirect Se.’s negative behavior.
The contested 18-month-review hearing was held on June 25, 2008. At that hearing, Mother testified and admitted that she had been receiving and participating in services and visitation from the inception of the case. She further stated that she had recently taken steps to clear her outstanding warrants and had recently moved into a two-bedroom apartment with her father, who had passed a criminal background check. Mother denied the negative statements made against her in the social worker’s June 11 report. M. testified that he did not want to be returned to Mother and did not want his sisters returned, either, as he felt Mother would revert back to her old ways after they were returned to her care. M. further stated that though he believed Mother had changed in some ways, i.e., by maintaining employment, taking classes, and staying sober, he also felt she was still unstable as evidenced by her “jumping from house to house.” M. also noted that he did not trust Mother and did not feel further therapy sessions would build a better bond. After the court considered the admitted social worker’s reports; testimony from the social worker, Mother, father of S., M., and the foster parent of S.; and arguments from counsel, it found that reasonable services had been provided to Mother and the extent of progress by Mother had been adequate but incomplete. The court also found that Mother had not benefitted from her services and that there was a substantial risk of detriment to the children if they were returned to Mother’s care. The court then terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Reasonableness of Services
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that DPSS had offered reasonable reunification services and that she had not benefitted. We disagree.
We review the correctness of an order pursuant to section 366.21 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) That standard requires us to determine whether there is “reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged . . . .” (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) In reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services, we “recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) A court-ordered reunification plan must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each family and designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
The record in this case, set out above, reveals the services offered were reasonable -- they were tailored to fit the circumstances and to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding -- and Mother consented to them. The record shows that Mother was provided with an array of referrals for each of her case plan requirements. In fact, as Mother admitted at trial, she participated in services and completed most aspects of her case plan. The problem here was not that the services offered were unreasonable but that Mother failed to progress and benefit from the services provided. As the record reveals, Mother still had issues with her parenting abilities to the point that the children, including S., did not want to see her or speak to her on the telephone. In addition, she had problems maintaining consistent visitation, and when she did attend, she tended to pay attention to one child while ignoring the other. Moreover, Mother as recently as May 29, 2008, dangerously and recklessly followed S.’s caretaker while S. was in the car. She also had issues in the conjoint therapy sessions with A. and M. and with finding adequate housing for four children. As the court pointed out, “She has a two-bedroom apartment for four children [and two adults]. That’s just not going to work.” After receiving services for 18 months, Mother still had not progressed to the point where the children could safely be returned to her care.
Substantial evidence reveals that DCS provided Mother with reasonable reunification services. Further, the services offered were reasonably geared to overcoming the problems that caused the dependency and were appropriate under the circumstances. (See In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424-425; In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 417.) The problem is not that inadequate services were offered, but that Mother failed to benefit from them.
To the extent Mother argues that there was a delay by DPSS in referring her to conjoint therapy and assisting her in finding adequate housing, we find this issue waived for her failure to object below. “Many dependency cases have held that a parent’s failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. [Citations.] As some of these courts have noted, any other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citation.]” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339.) This policy applies full force to the instant case, as neither the juvenile court nor DPSS was put on notice that reunification services were inadequate or that DPSS had failed to timely provide a referral to a therapist or assist in housing, even though Mother had ample opportunity to object to it.
Ultimately, it was Mother’s failure to benefit from the services provided that resulted in the court finding it was detrimental to return the children to Mother’s care and not a deficiency in the types of services provided. Mother was unable to demonstrate she had benefited from the services that had been provided to her, that she was capable of understanding how to appropriately parent children who have been hurt by her, or that she was able to control her inappropriate behavior and comments to the children. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DPSS, we find that the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
B. Substantial Evidence of Detriment
Mother also claims the court erred in finding that a substantial risk of detriment existed and that the children should not be returned to her.
“In determining whether it would be detrimental to return the child at the 18-month review, the court must consider whether the parent participated regularly in any treatment program set forth by the plan, the ‘efforts or progress’ of the parent, and the ‘extent’ to which the parent ‘cooperated and availed himself or herself of services provided.’ (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)” (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.)
In reviewing the juvenile court’s resolution of factual issues, all reasonable inferences are to be given to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court, and the record is viewed in the light most favorable to those orders. The juvenile court’s findings and orders are not to be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court, not the appellate court. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) In cases of conflicting evidence, full effect is given to respondent’s evidence, however slight, and appellant’s evidence is disregarded, however strong. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881.)
Mother contends that because she successfully completed the substance abuse program and therefore addressed the underlying problem that brought the family to the attention of the court, the children (at least the two younger ones) should have been returned to her care. However, as the record reveals, Mother’s progress in therapy was poor, as were her parenting skills. In addition, she still had failed to obtain adequate housing and maintain consistent visitation. As noted by M., Mother “jumping from house to house” was evidence of Mother’s continuing instability. Moreover, neither M., A., nor S. desired to be returned to Mother’s care. In fact, M. believed Mother would revert back to her old ways after they were returned to her care and that she was merely taking the necessary steps to get them back. M. also noted that he did not trust Mother and did not feel further therapy sessions would build a better bond.
While evidence of parental failure “to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs” is “prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental” (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), evidence that a parent had fully complied with or completed the treatment plan does not create a presumption that it is safe to return a child to parental custody. Reviewing courts have recognized that therapy and parent education may not be sufficiently effective in reducing risk where a parent is unwilling to acknowledge his or her conduct or the causes that resulted in a child’s removal from parental custody. (See In re Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 553 [“[r]eunification and successful treatment cannot occur until [the mother] accepts responsibility for her actions”]; In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 516 [“[t]raditional treatment is of limited value until the abuse is admitted”].) Here, Mother was unable or unwilling to accept responsibility for her actions as evidenced by her denial and lack of remorse during conjoint therapy sessions and her actions during visitation. Despite Mother’s good efforts in complying with her case plan, she did not show sufficient improvement in acquiring the parenting skills most crucial under the circumstances of this case. Sufficient evidence supported the finding that returning the children to Mother would be to their detriment.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is DENIED.
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P.J., GAUT, J.