Opinion
20-17414
10-31-2022
STEPHEN BRUNI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DAVID SHINN, Director; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondents-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 18, 2022 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona D.C. No. 3:19-cv-08041-DLR Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Stephen Bruni appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Bruni confessed to sexually molesting a minor during a physical altercation with his brother, the minor's father. During a phone call with his brother five weeks later, Bruni again admitted to molesting the minor. The state trial court admitted this second confession at trial along with other evidence of Bruni's guilt-including the testimony of the victim. The district court denied Bruni's habeas petition and granted a certificate of appealability for us to consider whether the state court adequately accounted for Bruni's testimony when it determined the telephonic confession was voluntary. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and review the district court's decision denying the petition de novo. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
We may grant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) only if the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, and only if the error was not harmless. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). A reviewing court may hold that the state court's decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts if it concludes that the state court failed to consider or ignored highly probative evidence. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) ("To fatally undermine the state fact-finding process, and render the resulting finding unreasonable, the overlooked or ignored evidence must be . . . sufficient to support petitioner's claim when considered in the context of the full record bearing on the issue presented in the habeas petition."), overruled on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal habeas courts review a state court's ruling under a "highly deferential standard," which "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quotation omitted). Federal habeas courts do not sit to error correct, to re-adjudicate facts, or to encourage state courts to write clearer opinions-federal habeas courts serve to "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems." Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 276 (2015).
The state trial court's decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined in light of the evidence presented-which included testimonies from Bruni, the minor victim, Bruni's brother, and others-that Bruni's telephonic confession was voluntary. The trial court's order made clear that it based its voluntariness determination on at least eight facts from the evidence presented and found that it was only "speculation" that Bruni felt coerced to confess during the telephone call. While the trial court did not explicitly state that it had considered Bruni's testimony that he still felt fearful of his brother during the call, it stated that it had "review[ed] the evidence" from the hearing, which included such testimony. The state trial court thus did not "completely fail[] to acknowledge" Bruni's evidence, but rather made a reasonable determination of the facts and held that the eight other factors outweighed Bruni's testimony. Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 955 (9th Cir. 2020).
Even if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the state trial court's determination, on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede it. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). The state trial court was in the best position to conduct factfinding and evaluate the evidence. A fair reading of the state trial court's opinion-giving the state court the "benefit of the doubt," as we must-shows that it did so reasonably. See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, it was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Because we hold that the state trial court's decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, we need not reach the issue of whether it constituted harmless error.
AFFIRMED.
S. R. THOMAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The question in this case is whether the state court decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). I agree with the magistrate judge's assessment that the state court made an unreasonable determination of facts, and that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A state court makes unreasonable factual findings if it "never considered or even acknowledged" testimony that was "highly probative." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that it was a "major omission" for a court to not even mention a petitioner's testimony and that "state courts might have disbelieved [petitioner], or perhaps discounted his testimony, but they were not entitled to act as if it didn't exist").
A claim that a petitioner's confession was coerced involves mixed questions of law and fact. The ultimate conclusion of a state court that a confession was voluntary constitutes a legal issue that requires an independent federal determination. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). Confessions, particularly if they were not voluntarily given, can have one of, if not the, most profound impacts on a jury in a trial. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). A confession that is the product of coercion must be suppressed. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). A confession may be considered involuntary where the accused's will was overcome by third party entities. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
Here, the first confession was excluded because it was undeniably coerced by a beating by the defendant's brother that ended up with the defendant's hospitalization. However, the state court admitted the second confession, extracted by the person who beat the defendant, because it was conducted over a telephone and some time had passed since the beating. Petitioner testified that he was still afraid of his brother and did not want to risk a second beating. As the magistrate judge aptly concluded, the state court did not engage in any fact-finding regarding the evidence presented and made no credibility determinations. Rather, the state court only relied on surmise and speculation. It "never considered or even acknowledged" testimony that was "highly probative." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1006. Because the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.