Opinion
Civil Action 1:21-CV-249
01-05-2022
LARITA BROWN, Plaintiff v. KEYSTONE HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants
RAMBO, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Larita Brown (“Plaintiff”) initiated this pro se civil rights case against various police departments, as well as several organizations where she receives services (Dauphin County CMU, Keystone Human Services, and the Dauphin County Housing Authority).
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and her original complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, I issued an order explaining that the complaint, as written, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for several reasons, including that: (1) she has sued entities (like the Police Station) that are not “people” and therefore are not liable under § 1983; (2) she did not give enough information about what Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority did wrong to state a claim under Monell; and (3) she has sued two non-profit organizations (Defendants Dauphin County CMU, Keystone Human Services) who are not state actors, and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983). (Doc. 7). I also afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an amended complaint. To date, no amended complaint has been received. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Based on the allegations in the Complaint and attached exhibits, it appears that Plaintiff either in the past, or currently, receives services from the Dauphin County CMU, Keystone Human Services, and the Dauphin County Housing Authority. Plaintiff also participates in the Shelter Plus Care Housing Voucher Program.
In attached handwritten notes, Plaintiff outlines several grievances she has with Defendants Keystone Human Services and Dauphin County CM U.She complains that she has been improperly “trapped” in the Shelter Plus Care voucher program-where she is required to be in mental health treatment to participate- when she should receive housing on a regular section 8 voucher. (Doc. 1-3, p. 5). Plaintiff also recounts a period of time when she was living in a U-Haul because she was not allowed to choose her own apartment in the Shelter Plus Care program. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Keystone Human Services placed all of her furniture in storage in 2019 and has not returned it and that Beth Stevenson, an employee of Defendant Keystone, kept Plaintiff's television and plants in her own home for three months after Plaintiff was moved into an apartment. (Doc. 1-3, p. 4). Plaintiff reports that her television and some of her plants were eventually returned. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she has participated in the Shelter Plus Care program for over ten years. (Doc. 1-3, p. 5).
On May 14, 2020, Dauphin County Housing Authority Section 8 Special Programs Coordinator Nicole Zenon sent Plaintiff a written notification that she would be terminated from the Shelter Plus Care Housing Voucher Program effective June 30, 2020. (Doc. 1-2, p. 1). In that letter, Programs Coordinator Zenon listed the following reasons as a basis for terminating Plaintiff's participation in the voucher program:
• The Housing Authority has received information that you have been absent from your unit since the end of January 2020. According to the Administrative Plan for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, “In cases where the entire family is absent from the unit for more than 90 days, the unit will be considered to be vacated and the assistance will be terminated.” [“Absence” means that no family member is residing in the unit.] Additionally, “if it is determined that the family is absent from the unit, the Authority will not continue assistance payments.”
• There has been reports of an unauthorized person living in your home, any unauthorized person(s) living in your home prior to approval from the Housing Authority is a violation of the contract to family obligation.
• The annual recertification was not returned and was return [sic] to the Housing Authority which further led us to believe that you were no longer living in the home.
• As a participant of the Shelter Plus Care program, participants conference you are required to maintain [sic]Id. The letter states that if Plaintiff does not agree with the Dauphin County Housing Authority's determination, she must request a hearing in writing within 10 days. Id.
I infer that Plaintiff did request a hearing. On July 23, 2020, Dauphin County Housing Authority Informal Hearing Officer Jennifer Coy sent a letter, notifying Plaintiff that an informal hearing was scheduled to take place on August 6, 2020. (Doc. 1-2, p. 2).
On August 7, 2020, Hearing Officer Coy received a request from Plaintiff that the hearing be conducted by telephone or video. (Doc. 1-2, p. 3). Plaintiff also requested copies of the evidence and “voiced concerns” about Hearing Officer Coy's eligibility to act as a hearing officer. Id. On August 13, 2020, Hearing Officer Coy responded to Plaintiff's requests by: (1) rescheduling Plaintiff's hearing to take place by telephone on August 27, 2020; (2) informing Plaintiff that Programs Coordinator Zenon had already provided the documents to Plaintiff; and (3) providing Plaintiff with a copy of the Housing Authority's procedures with regard to the informal hearing process. Id.
In her “notes” Plaintiff alleges that her letter requesting a virtual hearing included complaints that “she knew she was being set up,” because a Housing Authority website said that “the housing building was closed, that everyone was working from home and that we are to interact with them virtually.” (Doc. 1-3, p. 4).
Plaintiff failed to call in for the August 27, 2020 telephone hearing. (Doc. 12, p. 4). On September 2, 2020, a notice was mailed to Plaintiff upholding the decision to terminate Plaintiff's housing assistance due to Plaintiff's failure to appear. Id. That September 2, 2020 Notice was not attached to Plaintiff's Complaint. In her handwritten appendix to the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was ill at the time the telephone hearing took place. (Doc. 1-3, p. 4).
On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to Hearing Officer Coy requesting a hearing regarding the termination of Plaintiff's assistance in the Shelter Plus Housing Program. (Doc. 1-2, p. 4). Plaintiff alleges that, in this letter, she asked that she:
not continue to be held to the ‘Informal' level because [she] would only be dealing with the same people who already found [her] guilty and it would have been with only the same evidence, “Notes” against [her]. [She] was then sent another letter, dated October 20, 2020, of re-termination.(Doc. 1-3, p. 4).
In a letter dated October 20, 2020, Hearing Officer Coy denied Plaintiff's request. (Doc. 1-2, p. 4). In support of her denial of Plaintiff's hearing request, Hearing Officer Coy wrote:
You have been afforded multiple opportunities to receive a fair hearing regarding this matter. You failed to show for your informal hearing scheduled for August 6, 2020. In response to a letter received from you after the first scheduled hearing, we rescheduled another informal hearing via telephone conference for August 27, 2020. You then failed to call in for the teleconference. A notice was mailed to you on September 2, 2020 upholding the Housing Authority's decision to terminate your housing assistance due to your failure to appear. We did not receive any correspondence from you regarding that notice until October 5, 2020-over a month later. Additionally, you have failed to show good cause for missing your scheduled hearing.
The Housing Authority's Informal Hearing Procedures state: “If a family does not appear at a scheduled hearing and has not rescheduled the hearing in advance, the family must contact the Authority within [24] hours, excluding weekends and holidays. The Authority will reschedule the hearing only if the family can show good cause for the failure to appear.” Good cause is defined as “unavoidable conflict which seriously affects the health, safety or welfare of the family.”
As a result of you failure to appear at these hearings, your participation in the Shelter Plus Housing Program was terminated effective September 30, 2020-three months later than was originally scheduled. No further consideration will be afforded.Id.
On November 18, 2020, Ken Bolinger Rentals filed a Landlord/Tenant Complaint against Plaintiff. Ken Bolinger Rentals v. Larita Brown, No. MJ-12201-LT-0000224-2020 (Dauphin Cty. Magis Ct.). On December 3, 2020, judgment was entered in favor of the landlord. Id. In her handwritten notes, Plaintiff suggests that her rent was not paid because of the termination of her shelter plus voucher. (Doc. 1-3, p. 5).
On February 10, 2021, Plaintiff initiated this case. As Defendants, Plaintiff names:
(1) Keystone Human Services;
(2) Case Management Unit;
(3) Police Department; and
(4) Dauphin County Housing Authority.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff checked a box indicating she was pursuing a § 1983 claim. When asked to identify the federal constitutional or statutory rights that were violated, Plaintiff wrote:
Right to life, liberty and happiness. All, and more parties have/are making concerted efforts to deprive me of my freedom, food, housing, healthcare, safety, income and more. Sick and under extreme pressure need help. Police beat me, lied on me and framed me. Also are illegally entering the apartment.(Doc. 1, p. 3).
When asked the date and location of the events giving rise to her claims occurred, Plaintiff wrote:
(11) year period. Currently being sued/forced off of my housing due to the endeavors / fabrication of defendants.
All parties have framed me as a suicidal miscreant who needs to be institutionalized.Id.
When asked about the facts underlying her claims, Plaintiff wrote:
All the agencies have tortured me, terrorized me, slandered me, beat me physically, encouraged others to beat me physically, defamed me by sending others false/embellished reports of me, framed me by fabricating offenses and then turning them into [illegible word] without telling me just to control my life. The police are liars!!! They are framing me !!! And I am NOT SUICIDAL!!Id. In this section of her Complaint, Plaintiff also referenced “notes” and “relevant documents.” I infer that the reference to “notes” refers to Doc. 1-2, p. 5, and Doc. 1-3, pp. 1-7. The first page entitled “notes” appears to be a half-page typed bulleted list. (Doc. 1-2, p. 5). Nothing in the document suggests who wrote it or where it came from. Id. Based on its content, it appears to be notes and updates that may have formed the basis of the termination of Plaintiff's participation in the voucher program. Id. The seven pages of handwritten notes that follow appear to be, at least in part, a response to the typed “notes.” (Doc. 1-3, pp. 1-7). In part of that response Plaintiff questions how the housing authority could have known that Plaintiff left the state, and speculates that she was illegally tracked. (Doc. 1-3, p. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that she sustained the following injuries related to her claims:
I weigh less than 96 lbs due to the stress of this [illegible word] placed on me. I am forced to have sex with maintenance man and then strangers to not be homeless. I am forced to see psychiatrist just not to be homeless. I'm being beaten by the police and random strangers who the police enlist to attack me. The police took my car and everything in it claiming it was reported “abandoned” through it was insured and registered. The control all aspects of my life, including but not at all limited to my health, my bank account, my housing, food, they came into my apartment whenever they want, with warrant or no, they have keys to my place and on December 9th entered, slammed me on the floor, arrested me knowing I was seeing the judge on December 10th, put me on suicide watch with no food, water, blanket, meds for asking that I represent myself for this fake warrant. I don't want a public defender, she keeps saying “yeah you honor, this is her 2nd offense as if she's a prosecutor.(Doc. 1, p. 5).
Ruling on Motions to dismiss, the court generally relies only on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). Because the standards for dismissal for failing to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are the same as under a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider matters of which it may take judicial notice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A and under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).” Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994)). Therefore, I take judicial notice of the State court criminal dockets referenced in Plaintiff's civil case. It appears that a criminal complaint was filed against Plaintiff on December 9, 2019 arising out of events that occurred on March 14, 2019. Commonwealth v. Larita Brown, No. MJ-12105-CR-0000559-2019 (Magis. Ct. Dauphin Cty). Plaintiff was scheduled for summary trial on charges in a different case on December 10, 2019. Commonwealth v. Larita Brown, No. MJ-12104-NT-0000182-2019 (Magist Ct. Dauphin Cty.). The charges in both cases are drug and alcohol-related offenses.
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
Clear my record. Return my car/property. Quit influencing/interfering with my doctors, bank accounts, landlords, benefits, schooling, take the suicide stuff off my record-please don't kill me and then claim I killed myself. Quit hating me and teaching states to hate me. Forgive me for whatever I have done in the past. It was a long time ago. I've served my time. Quit. They even got people who smoke crack out in those streets calling me “crazy.” I am not making “wild allegations,” these agencies are doing these things and more. They are gleefully terrorizing me. Quit surveilling me-my phone, my apartment, my whereabouts. Quit influencing every landlord, tenant, neighbor to hate me and attack me. Let me get medical treatment for my intestinal problems, teeth, etc. Quit stealing every coat I own and then forcing me out in the cold so as to push me to confine myself to a hospital. Quit criminalizing my alcohol consumption-it is legal for me to drink and its not a problem but they are making it be one which prosecute/frame me. Don't kill me!!!(Doc. 1, p. 5).
In the page of the Complaint appended to her request for relief, Plaintiff apologizes for crimes committed 40 years ago. Review of publicly available state court dockets shows that Plaintiff was charged with and found guilty of crimes in the early 1980s in Philadelphia. See Commonwealth v. Larita A. Brown, CP 51-CR-0422031-1981 (C.C.P. Philadelphia Cty.). Plaintiff was sentenced to five to 10 years in prison. Id. Plaintiff contends that the Judge who presided over that case- Lynn Abraham-sent a dossier about Plaintiff to Harrisburg. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
On May 13, 2021, I issued an order advising Plaintiff that, as pleaded, her Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because: (1) she has sued entities (like the Police Station) that are not “people” and therefore are not liable under § 1983; (2) she did not give enough information about what Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority did wrong to state a claim under Monell; and (3) she has sued two non-profit organizations (Defendants Dauphin County CMU, Keystone Human Services) who are not state actors, and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983). (Doc. 7). I afforded Plaintiff until June 11, 2021 to file an amended complaint. Id.
On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file her amended complaint. (Doc. 9). On June 22, 2021, I extended the deadline for filing the amended complaint to August 2, 2021. (Doc. 10).
On July 28, 2021, Plaintiff requested a second extension of time to file her amended complaint. (Doc. 11). On July 29, 2021, I extended the deadline for filing the amended complaint to September 27, 2021. (Doc. 12).
On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff requested a third extension of time to file her amended complaint. (Doc. 15). On October 1, 2021, I extended the deadline for filing the amended complaint to November 30, 2021. (Doc. 16).
To date, Plaintiff has not requested additional time, and no amended complaint has been received.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Id. at 211. It also “has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and ‘“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions.
Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
A. THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT POLICE DEPARTMENT CANNOT PROCEED AS PLEADED
With respect to her claims against Police Departments in Harrisburg, Plaintiff alleges that police: illegally entered her apartment; are liars; beat her; enlisted others to beat her; arrested her with a fake warrant; put her on suicide watch with no food, water, or a blanket; have criminalized Plaintiff's alcohol consumption; spread rumors that Plaintiff is dangerous, manipulative, and crazy; told people Plaintiff is suicidal as part of a plot to kill her; confiscated Plaintiff's car under false pretenses; confiscated the U-Haul Plaintiff was living in at one time; and confiscated the property inside Plaintiff's U-Haul and ransomed some of it back to her (Plaintiff contends that her coat, detergent, and other items were missing from the returned property). Plaintiff does not name or otherwise identify the individual officers. Plaintiff does not name or otherwise identify any specific Police Department in Harrisburg.
As discussed above, to plead a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319 (emphasis added). Even if Plaintiff had named a specific police department in her Complaint, her §1983 claim would fail as a matter of law. As this Court has previously explained:
It is well-settled that police departments operated by municipalities are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep't, 146 Fed.Appx. 558, 562 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2005); James v. Lumberton Police Dep't, No. Civ. A. 06-2188, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2006); Texter v. Merlina, No. 1:04-CV-0173, 2005 WL 1513117, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 27, 2005); Benckini v. Upper Saucon Twp., No. Civ. A. 04-4304, 2005 WL 670688, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2005). An attorney's failure to name a department's municipality in a complaint has no effect on the department's status as a non-person for purposes of a civil rights action. To the contrary, governmental subunits lack the capacity to be sued regardless of whether their accompanying municipalities participate in the lawsuit. See James, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that “[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a ‘person' subject to suit under § 1983”); see also Richardson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. Civ. A. 3:07-0304, 2007 WL 1464582, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 15, 2007) (observing that a county sheriff's department could not be sued under § 1983 notwithstanding the county's non-participation in the lawsuit); Shimer v. Shingobee Island Water & SewerComm'n, No. Civ. A. 02-953, 2003 WL 1610788, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2003) (“[A]bsent specific statutory authority, . . . subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.”).Terrell v. City of Harrisburg Police Dept., 549 F.Supp.2d 671, 686 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Conner, J.).
In this case, Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against “various” unspecified Police Departments in Harrisburg, but has not sued any of the individual officers who committed the acts alleged, and has not sued the city or county. Because any Police Department lacks existence independent of the municipality that operates it, and is not a “person” under § 1983, Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant Police Department or Departments is not plausible as pleaded.
If Plaintiff is attempting to seek civil damages against the police for acts committed by individual officers, she will need name the individual officers as defendants and explain what act or acts violated her rights.
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DAUPHIN COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY
With respect to Defendant Dauphin County housing Authority, Plaintiff alleges:
A.) The housing authority have an official/formal process within its own authority to investigate any accusations of violations of funding/programing by the Federal Government. If I'm accused of and decided against funding for having a “Partner” illegally living here then I'm being accused of defrauding the Federal government. The housing authority is violating my civil right to due process by using “reports” to claim that I've broken Section 8 Rules and violating the law. Against. There is an official person that the housing authority uses to officially investigate allegations such as this.
B.) It is scary and creepy to know that the landlord reported that anyone, “Partner” is here often. To my knowledge, the landlord does not live on cite [sic], so how? Why?
C.) It is a conflict of interest, to say this least, to ask a landlord to wear two hats. As already cited, the housing authority has its own recourse but because we're in a pandemic, we are to be virtual and delayed. We are even to do our own inspections so it wouldn't be in the best interest of anyone's health to send out a formal housing authority agent whose job is to investigate allegations of housing fraud. The landlord was enlisted and empowered to use a key to force a search of “reported” “Partner.” Nothing was “Improved” in any common area but they “must” come in here. See Exhibit from Landlord.
Ms. Zenon terminated my voucher [illegible words] . . . hearing as per letter dated July 23, 2020. I complained because I knew that I was being set up. The website said that the housing building was closed,
that everyone was working from home and that we are to interact with them virtually. Per letter dated August 13, 2020, I was then scheduled for a virtual hearing but by then I was physically sicken. I wrote again afterwards to ask that I not continued to be held to the “informal” level because I would only be deeling [sic] with the same people who already found me guilty and it would have been with only the same evidence, “Notes” against me. I was sent another letter, dated October 20, 2020, of re-termination.
Please, someone other than the cited agencies, please, please, please, give me a Formal hearing? At that time, please explain to me why the punishment of being forced into homelessness, the pandemic, the elements, the civil unrest, into debt and more is justified because I failed to make some meetings?(Doc. 1-3, pp. 3-4).
A public housing authority, like Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees on a respondeat superior theory. Rather, pursuant to Monell, it can be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983. See Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F.Supp.2d 481, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[A] public housing authority . . . is considered a municipal corporation for the purposes of § 1983.”) (citation omitted); see also Swift v. McKeesport Hous. Auth., 726 F.Supp.2d 559, 571 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2010) (“[McKeesport Housing Authority], as a public housing authority and municipal corporation, is a person for purposes of § 1983.”); Wright v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 94-1601, 1994 WL 597716, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1994) (“While not a county or town government, [Philadelphia Housing Authority], as its name indicates, exercises power over only a particular place or district within Pennsylvania and therefore falls within this definition for municipal corporations.”).
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court established that municipalities and other local governmental units, like Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority are included among those “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. But “[u]nder Monell, a municipality cannot be subjected to liability solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, “under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.'” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original). To state a claim against Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority, Plaintiff must allege that the violation of her rights was caused either by a policy or by a custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
Municipal policies include the decisions of a government's lawmakers and the acts of its policymaking officials as well as municipal customs, which are acts or practices that, even though not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker, are so persistent and widespread as to have the force of law. Id.; Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, a municipality “‘can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.'” Mulholland v Gov't County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).
A policy or custom can be shown in any of four ways:
(1) the existence of a formal policy, officially promulgated or adopted by a municipality; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or (2) that an official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question took action or made a deliberate, specific decision that caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)(citation omitted); or (3) the existence of an unlawful practice by subordinate officials so permanent and well settled as to constitute “custom or usage” and proof that this practice was so manifest or widespread as to imply the constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-30 (1989); or (4) if liability is based on a claim of failure to train or supervise, that “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom...[municipal employees] came into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).Nye v. Cumberland Cty., No. 1:14-CV-713, 2016 WL 695109, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016).
“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, there must be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Plaintiff has not pleaded enough facts to state a plausible claim against Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority. Plaintiff has not alleged that her rights were violated due to a policy promulgated by Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority, and does not identify any policy. Although Plaintiff does criticize Hearing Officer Coy, nothing in the Complaint suggests that Hearing Officer Coy is responsible for establishing final policy related to the informal hearing procedures. Although Plaintiff criticized the informal hearing process (specifically she criticized calling the hearing “informal”), Plaintiff does not identify any practice that she believes is unlawful. Plaintiff does not allege that the Dauphin County Housing Authority failed to train or supervise any of its employees.
For Plaintiff's benefit, I also note that she has not alleged enough facts to support her claim that her due process rights were violated because the Defendant Housing Authority provided only an “informal” hearing. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. A due process claim requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is within the scope of protection of life, liberty, or property found in the Due Process Clause. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Second, if the interest is one that is protected by the Due Process Clause, “the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she is a participant in the Shelter Plus Care voucher program. This voucher is a property interest for the purposes of due process. See Swift, 726 F.Supp.2d at 574 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)). Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to satisfy the first element of the due process analysis. She has not, however, pleaded enough facts to satisfy the second element.
“In order to determine whether an individual has been deprived of [her] property without due process ‘it is necessary to ask what process the state provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.'” Swift, 726 F.Supp.2d at 574 (quoting Revell v. Ort Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2010)). “[A] pre-deprivation hearing is generally required before a state seizes a person's property ....” Swift, 726 F.Supp.2d at 574 (quoting Revell, 598 F.3d at 138). As the basis for her due process claim, Plaintiff appears to allege her voucher was terminated without an adequate hearing. The documents attached to Plaintiff's Complaint suggest that Plaintiff was offered a pre-deprivation hearing, but failed to attend it. The only facts alleged to support Plaintiff's allegation that the hearing she did not attend was “inadequate,” is that the hearing was called an “informal hearing.” To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the hearing provided was inadequate merely because it is called an informal hearing, this is not enough to support a plausible due process claim.
C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS CASE MANAGEMENT UNIT AND KEYSTONE HEALTH SERVICES
In her Complaint, Plaintiff suggests that the “CM” reported to the Defendant Housing Authority that the CM had not seen Plaintiff in months. (Doc. 1-3, p. 2). it is not clear who the “CM” is or whether the CM worked for Defendant CMU. I infer that the “CM” was Plaintiff's case manager. Plaintiff writes:
I told [Ms. Zenon] that the last time I saw a CM (who I only met once), she came to the parking lot of my building and told me that no one wanted to work with me and that they were trying to kick me off the program but that the higher ups refused to do it and we even told them that you don't want to be on the program. At that time, I asked the CM if she will work with me since it was our first meeting. She didn't respond. I went to the CMU officer twice afterwards when my calls weren't returned. I was met with back up both times.Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant CMU conspired to “slander, defame and frame” her. (Doc. 1-3, p. 6).
Plaintiff alleges that, like Defendant CMU, Defendant Keystone Health Services made incorrect reports that resulted in the termination of Plaintiff's Shelter Pus Care voucher. (Doc. 1-3, p. 1). Plaintiff also alleges that:
I've been living in this apartment for 2 years and am still sleeping on the floor because Keystone refuses to return my furniture (which is in their storage unit) (Beth Stevenson kept my T.V. and plants in her home for over (3) months even after I was moved into this apartment with some clothes out of my property. I had to go to Patty Kim's office to get help for her to give me my T.V. back. Most plants she
kept though I had approximately (43) of them. They've had the rest of my property in their storage since April 2019 while I sleep on the floor. Explain why I was forced into homeless in 2019 in the first place. I've had Shelter Plus Care for over (10) years but was not permitted to pick my own apartment, was told none could be found for me and it's how I ended up living in back of a U-Haul.(Doc. 1-3, p. 4).
As an initial matter, it is not clear whether Defendants CMU and Keystone Health Services are state actors. Plaintiff does appear to suggest, however, that these Defendants and Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority shared the common goal of terminating Plaintiff's Shelter Plus Care voucher with Defendant Dauphin County Housing Authority. Thus, I construe these allegations as an attempt to hold these two entities liable under § 1983 due to the existence of a conspiracy between Defendants CMU, Keystone Health Services, and Dauphin County Housing Authority.
“[C]onspiracy under § 1983 is not an independent cause of action, but a means to impute liability on third persons.” Ober v. Miller, No. 1:04-CV-1669, 2007 WL 4443256, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2007), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 849 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that a § 1983 “[c]onspiracy is merely a mechanism by which to obtain the necessary state action, or to impose liability on one defendant for the acts of the others performed in pursuance of the conspiracy” (citations omitted)).
To establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must allege facts that plausibly show: (1) the existence of a conspiracy and (2) deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” Jackson-Gilmore v. Dixon, No. 04-03759, 2005 WL 3110991 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2005). “To support this showing, the plaintiff must allege plausible facts and not conclusory assertions. This should include (1) the period of the conspiracy; (2) the object of the conspiracy; and (3) certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose.” Hankin Family P'ship v. Upper Merion Twp., No. 01-1622, 2012 WL 43599 at *17 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2012). Vague and conclusory allegations in a civil rights complaint will not survive a motion to dismiss. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible claim related to the deprivation of her civil rights. Therefore, her conspiracy claim against Defendants CMU and Keystone Health Services also failed.
D. LEAVE TO AMEND
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has been given leave to amend, and has received generous extensions of time to allow her to do so. Because Plaintiff has chosen not to amend her complaint, after being afforded nearly six months to do so, I find granting any further opportunity to amend would be futile.
V. RECOMMENDATION
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the
Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.