Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-11-142 (JTV).
Submitted: June 5, 2008.
Decided: August 29, 2008.
Upon Consideration of Plaintiff's Motion For a New Trial DENIED.
Michael I. Silverman, Esq., Silverman, McDonald Friedman, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Danielle K. Yearick, Esq., Tybout, Redfearn Pell, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the defendant's opposition, and the record of the case, it appears that:
1. This personal injury case arises from a January 2, 2003 rear-end motor vehicle collision which occurred in New Castle County, Delaware. Following a jury trial, the jury apportioned liability between the defendant and the plaintiff at 90% and 10%, respectively. However, the jury awarded no damages.
2. A jury verdict will be upheld unless it is against the great weight of the evidence such that a reasonable jury could not have reached the same conclusion. Therefore, great deference must be given to the jury verdict in deciding a motion for a new trial.
Burkett-Wood v. Haines, 906 A.2d 756, 764 (Del. 2006); Phillips v. Loper, 2005 WL 268042, at *1 (Del.Super.).
Burkett-Wood, 906 A.2d at 764; see also Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1997) ("[T]he Court's power to grant a new trial has been exercised cautiously and with extreme deference to the findings of the jury.").
3. The plaintiff moves for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's decision not to award any damages is against the great weight of the evidence. The plaintiff contends that all three doctors who testified at trial agreed that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the motor vehicle accident.
4. In response, the defendant contends that the evidence supports a jury finding that the defendant's negligence did not proximately cause injury to the plaintiff. The defendant contends that all three medical experts relied upon subjective complaints of the plaintiff and none found any objective evidence of injury. The defendant contends that the plaintiff's credibility was impeached and that the jury was within its discretion to reject his subjective complaints and any medical opinions based upon them.
5. Three doctors testified at trial, either live or by deposition. The plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Ross Ufberg, first met with the plaintiff on January 23, 2003, about two weeks after the accident. Dr. Ufberg opined that the plaintiff sustained injuries to his spine as a result of the motor vehicle collision. He based his opinion on the plaintiff's history, a physical examination, and the plaintiff's subjective complaints. He found no objective evidence of injury. In fact, an MRI of the plaintiff's cervical spine yielded unrevealing results.
6. The defense presented testimony of Dr. Willie Thompson and Dr. Donald Archer. The gist of their testimony was that information provided by the plaintiff was totally subjective and that there was no objective evidence of any injury to the plaintiff.
7. In the Maier and Amalfitano line of cases, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a jury verdict of zero damages is against the great weight of the evidence where there is uncontradicted and unrebutted evidence that an injury has occurred, however minimal, which was proximately caused by the alleged incident. Expert medical testimony may constitute conclusive evidence that requires a jury verdict of at least minimal damages if such testimony is based upon the subjective complaints of the plaintiff confirmed by independent objective testing.
Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2d 575, 575 (Del. 2001); Maier, 697 A.2d at 748. In Maier and Amalfitano, causation was conceded and the only issue before the jury was the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Ibid.
Amalfitano, 794 A.2d at 577; Phillips, 2005 WL 268042, at *2.
8. The Court does not believe that the jury award of zero damages is against the great weight of the evidence. Unlike in Amalfitano, there were no objective findings of injury. Rather, the three medical experts based their opinions largely on the plaintiff's subjective complaints, and the evidence presented at trial called into question the plaintiff's credibility, including his failure to reveal prior injuries. Thus, the jury was entitled to reject the plaintiff's subjective complaints as not credible and free to reject the opinions of the experts, which were based on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Burkett-Wood, 906 A.2d at 765 (upholding the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for new trial and holding that even though the jury found the defendant negligent, the only evidence that the plaintiff sustained some injury as a result of the accident was his subjective complaints of pain).
Approximately two weeks prior to the motor vehicle accident, on December 15, 2002, the plaintiff was involved in an altercation in which he was hospitalized with neck and head injuries. The plaintiff failed to disclose this to the hospital during his emergency room visit on the day of the automobile accident. Although the plaintiff told Dr. Ufberg about the December incident, he failed to disclose such to Dr. Thompson. Moreover, the plaintiff admitted at trial that following the January 2, 2003 incident, he completed a form for his employer in which he denied any head, neck, or back pain or restrictions and denied any prior serious injury.
Phillips, 2005 WL 268042, at *2 ("[A] jury may reject an expert's medical testimony when such testimony is based substantially upon the subjective complaints of the patient.").
9. Having observed the evidence, I find that a jury conclusion that both the plaintiff and Dr. Ufberg were not credible was well within the evidence. A finding from the testimony of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Archer that there was no real evidence of any injury to the plaintiff from the accident was also well within the evidence.
10. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial is denied .
IT IS SO ORDERED.