Summary
In Brown, where it was alleged that the defendant Board of Education had actual notice of the vicious propensities of the student who stabbed the plaintiff, the Second Department held that there had been no notice of the need for supervision at the time of the stabbing.
Summary of this case from Mirand v. City of New YorkOpinion
May 26, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Williams, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for injuries sustained when she was allegedly stabbed by a fellow high school student while on school premises. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a party must demonstrate, inter alia, the breach of a duty owed to her by the alleged tort-feasor (see, Solomon v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026). We find that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden and, therefore, the trial court properly granted the defendants' trial motion to dismiss. The negligence alleged by the plaintiff was that the defendant Board of Education of the City of New York had actual notice of the vicious propensities of the student who stabbed her and failed to take proper measures to curb those propensities and to protect her fellow classmates therefrom. The record indicates, however, that the Board of Education could not have envisioned the need for closer supervision at the time of the stabbing and that the plaintiff failed to prove any breach of a duty by the defendants (see, Glick v. City of New York, 53 A.D.2d 528, affd 42 N.Y.2d 831). Bracken, J.P., Weinstein, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.