Summary
operating privilege suspension as a habitual offender constitutes a collateral civil consequence of acceptance of ARD on the underlying offense
Summary of this case from Com., Dept. of Transp. v. McCaffertyOpinion
Argued December 11, 1985
January 23, 1986.
Motor vehicles — Revocation of motor vehicle operator's license — Habitual offender — Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program — Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1542 — Due process — Notice of consequences of ARD election.
1. Under provisions of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1542, participation in an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program for any of the specifically enumerated offenses is considered a conviction for the purpose of determining habitual offender status. [312]
2. Due process principles do not require that a motor vehicle licensee be informed of the civil implications and consequences of acceptance of an ARD program following an arrest for a traffic offense which is essentially a criminal matter. [312]
Argued December 11, 1985, before President Judge CRUMLISH, JR., Judges ROGERS, CRAIG, MacPHAIL, DOYLE, COLINS and PALLADINO.
Appeal, No. 1219 C.D. 1984, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in case of William C. Brophy v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, No. 4827 January Term, 1984.
Motor vehicle operator's license revoked by Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appeal denied. DiBONA, JR., J. Exceptions filed and denied. Licensee appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Martin Knoblaugh, with him, Lloyd Norris, Lloyd Norris and Associates, for appellant.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Counsel, with him, Spencer A. Manthorpe, Chief Counsel, and Jay C. Waldman, General Counsel, for appellee.
William C. Brophy (appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which affirmed an order of the Department of Transportation (DOT), revoking his driver's license for five years pursuant to the habitual offender provisions of Section 1542 of the Motor Vehicle Code (Code).
Section 1542 of the Code provides:
(a) General rule — the department shall revoke the operating privilege of any person found to be a habitual offender pursuant to the provisions of this section. A 'habitual offender' shall be any person whose driving record . . . shows that such person has accumulated the requisite number of convictions for the separate and distinct offenses described and enumerated in subsection (b) . . .
(b) Offenses enumerated — Three convictions . . . shall result in [a designation] as a habitual offender . . .
(c) Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition as an offense — Acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for any offense enumerated . . . shall be considered an offense for the purposes of this section.
Id.
In this case, the appellant committed three offenses, one of which was appellant's participation in an ARD program, which is considered an offense for purposes of § 1542(c) of the Code, quoted above.
Appellant posits two issues before this Court. He first contends that his participation in an ARD should not be considered an offense for determining his status as a habitual offender under the Code. As noted above, the Code specifically provides that such participation shall be considered an offense; therefore, it is clear that participation in an ARD is an offense for determining habitual offender status. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. McDevitt, 57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 280 (1981), aff'd per curiam 500 Pa. 532, 459 A.2d 939 (1983).
Appellant additionally contends before this Court that because he was never informed, upon his acceptance of the ARD program, that such acceptance and participation would later be used in determining whether he was a habitual offender under the Code, his license should now be reinstated. This is essentially a due process argument, with the appellant asserting that he was not afforded due process rights under the Constitution.
The identical issue was posed to this Court in the companion case of Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 1010 (1986). In Brewster we held that appellant's due process rights were adequately protected by the de novo hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, and that due process does not require that appellant be informed of the civil implications and consequences of acceptance of an ARD program, essentially a criminal matter. Brewster is controlling here. Therefore, we hold that appellant was afforded all of his due process rights. The trial court is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, January 23, 1986, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, No. 4827 January Term, 1984, dated March 27, 1984, is affirmed.