Opinion
No. 2:06CV00090 JWC.
May 26, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Darryl Dwayne Briggins, an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus (docket entry #1) challenging the policy of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regarding when a federal prisoner is eligible for transfer to a community corrections center (CCC), which is now referred to as a residential reentry center (RRC). Respondent has filed a response (docket entry #7). For the reasons that follow, the petition must be DISMISSED as moot.
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge (docket entry #8).
Petitioner alleges he is serving a fifteen-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He says he is tentatively scheduled for transfer to a CCC/RRC on February 26, 2007, which will only permit him about thirty-seven days of CCC/RRC time. He says the BOP has denied his request for additional time, citing its February 2005 policy limiting CCC/RRC time to the final ten percent of an inmate's sentence, regardless of individual circumstances. He says the February 2005 policy is simply a repackaging of the BOP's December 2002 policy, which has been invalidated by the courts. He contends that he is entitled to serve the last six months of his sentence in a CCC/RRC, and he asks the Court to invalidate the February 2005 policy, bar retrospective application of the policy to him, and direct the BOP to transfer him to a CCC/RRC for at least the final six months of his sentence.
In Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 845-47 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a December 2002 BOP policy regarding CCC/RRC designation and held that the BOP has the discretion to transfer an inmate to a CCC/RRC at any time, but only the duty to consider a transfer to such a facility in the last six months of a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (BOP "may at any time . . . direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another"), § 3624(c) (BOP "shall, to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner . . . spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community").
In response to Elwood and other similar decisions, the BOP created new regulations, which became effective February 14, 2005. These regulations provide that, as a "categorical exercise of discretion," the BOP will designate inmates for CCC/RRC placement "only as part of pre-release custody and programming, during the last ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months." 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20, 570.21 (2005). Recently, in Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declared this policy invalid as conflicting with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which lays out certain factors that must be considered by the BOP in making inmate placement or transfer determinations. See id. ("The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility . . . that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering — (1) the resources of the facility contemplated; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; (4) any [relevant] statement by the court that imposed the sentence . . .; and (5) any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]"). Because § 3621(b) requires that discretion be exercised on an individual basis, the Eighth Circuit found that the February 2005 policy was invalid because it "removed the opportunity for the BOP to exercise discretion for all inmates not serving the last ten percent of their sentences." Fults, 442 F.3d at 1092; see also Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2005) (BOP regulation is invalid because the BOP "may not categorically remove its ability to consider the explicit factors set forth by Congress in § 3621(b) for making placement and transfer determinations").
Here, Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed as moot because, in response to Fults, the BOP is currently modifying its procedures for institutions within the Eighth Circuit. Respondent states that Petitioner will be evaluated for RRC placement, utilizing the BOP policy used prior to the December 2002 and February 2005 policies, and that any RRC recommendation will be based on the § 3621(b) factors and correctional and population management interests, including the length of sentence, seriousness of current offense, criminal history, programming needs, availability of facilities and necessary health care, and public safety.
Article III of the United States Constitution requires that a "case or controversy" exist for standing to bring an action in federal court. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a case or controversy to exist, a plaintiff must suffer an "injury in fact" which is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action of the defendant, and it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Because Respondent will not be applying either the December 2002 or February 2005 policies to Petitioner, Petitioner has not shown that he has suffered, or will suffer, an injury which is fairly traceable to either of the invalidated policies and which could be redressed by a grant of federal habeas relief. His challenges to these policies are, therefore, moot.
Furthermore, nothing in Elwood, Fults or the applicable statutes entitles any prisoner to six months of placement in a RRC. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 251 ("[T]hat the BOP may assign a prisoner to a [RRC] does not mean that it must."); Elwood, 386 F.3d at 847 ("We emphasize . . . that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) does not require placement in a [RRC]."). Under Elwood, the BOP is simply required to formulate a plan of pre-release conditions, which may include RRC placement, and to place an inmate in pre-release conditions, which may include a RRC, for "a reasonable part of the last ten percent of [his] term;" however, neither of these obligations extends beyond the last six months of the prisoner's sentence. Id. Fults further defines the BOP's duty during that six-month period, requiring the BOP to consider RRC placement in good faith utilizing the statutory factors, without categorically limiting the possibility of RRC placement to the last ten percent of an inmate's sentence. Nothing in the decisions mandates that the BOP designate any inmate for RRC placement at any time, much less for the full six-month period.
Accordingly, this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED in its entirety. The dismissal is without prejudice in the event Respondent does not abide by the representations made in this proceeding.
IT IS SO ORDERED.