Opinion
January 29, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.).
Ordered that the order entered December 14, 1988 is reversed insofar as appealed from, the cross motion is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing on whether personal jurisdiction was properly obtained over Donald Glachman; and it is further,
Ordered that the order entered January 9, 1989 is reversed, the motion of Rick S. Felberbaum is denied, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as it is asserted against Rick S. Felberbaum; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs.
This action arose out of the alleged negligence of the defendants in representing the plaintiffs' interests in the sale of certain real property located in Kings Point, New York. The Supreme Court improperly dismissed the complaint insofar as it is asserted against the defendant Donald Glachman. The reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint and the response to Donald Glachman's interrogatories rendered the complaint sufficiently "particular" to enable Donald Glachman to determine the plaintiffs' cause of action against him (see, CPLR 3013; Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 565; Moore v Johnson, 147 A.D.2d 621; Tuffley v. City of Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110, 113). That, in addition to giving the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, leads us to conclude that his cross motion should be denied (see, Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 634; Fox v 18-05 215th St. Owners, 143 A.D.2d 804, 805).
In light of the conflicting affidavits submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion seeking dismissal of the affirmative defense asserted by Donald Glachman of lack of personal jurisdiction, we further find that a hearing should be held to consider the issue whether personal jurisdiction was properly acquired over him (see, Gildston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 A.D.2d 261, 262; Anton v. Amato, 101 A.D.2d 819, 820-821).
With respect to the claim against the defendant Rick S. Felberbaum, the plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of a reasonable excuse for the delay in entering a default judgment and a meritorious cause of action. Thus, the complaint should not have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) (see, Rendelman v Southside Hosp., 141 A.D.2d 521, 522; Woodward v. City of New York, 119 A.D.2d 749, 750-751). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.