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Bramow v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Oct 26, 2005
707 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)

Opinion

No. 5-439 / 04-1118

Filed October 26, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, William L. Thomas, Judge.

Jennah Bramow and her mother appeal from a $20,000 damage award in their action against the school district for negligently hiring, overseeing and supervising a teacher who inappropriately touched Jennah, arguing the district court erred in excluding certain testimony. AFFIRMED.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin Associates, Des Moines, and C. Jean Pendleton of Jean Pendleton Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Matthew G. Novak and Thad J. Collins of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard by Hecht, P.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Nelson, S.J.

Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).


Cindi Bramow, as mother and next friend of her daughter, Jennah, sued the Cedar Rapids Community School District, alleging the District was negligent in hiring, overseeing, and supervising a teacher who inappropriately touched Jennah. A jury found in favor of Bramow and awarded $20,000 in past and future damages. Bramow appeals the damage award, contending it would have been higher had the district court admitted evidence concerning the long-term effects of the abuse. We affirm the court's evidentiary rulings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In 1995, Jennah was a third-grade student in Cedar Rapids. Gary Lindsey was Jennah's music teacher. According to Jennah, Lindsey inappropriately touched her on two occasions. There was also evidence that Lindsey had inappropriate physical contact with several other students.

Bramow sued the Cedar Rapids Community School District. The case proceeded to trial before a jury. Following trial, the jury rendered a verdict in the amount of $20,000 in favor of Bramow. In response to a post-trial motion challenging the award as inadequate, the district court stated:

Gary Lindsey was also named as a defendant in the action, but the claims against him were settled prior to trial.

Given the circumstances of the case I believe that the verdict of the jury is reasonable. There is obviously no mathematical formula for the calculation of pain and suffering, past or future, and the amount awarded here strikes me as reasonable given the plaintiff's present circumstances.

On appeal, Bramow contends: (1) the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain testimony regarding the long-terms effects of sexual abuse on children, (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony concerning the damages sustained by other students of Lindsey, (3) the district court erred in excluding hearsay testimony regarding another student's relationship with Lindsey, and (4) the district court erred in excluding hearsay testimony of a conversation with school employees regarding Lindsey.

Bramow correctly articulates our standards of review. See In re Detention of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Iowa 2005) (generally reviewing evidentiary issues for abuse of discretion); McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 2001) (reviewing hearsay rulings for error). We "will reverse the trial court's determination on the issue of admissibility of evidence only when we find a clear abuse of discretion." Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Iowa 1987). See also Gamerdinger v. Schaefer, 603 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 1999) (trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence).

II. Evidentiary Rulings A. Testimony of Forensic Investigator

A forensic investigator named Rose Matuszek, working in conjunction with the Cedar Rapids Police Department, interviewed Jennah about the two sexual incidents. Bramow called Matuszek as a witness. She testified about her qualifications and experience, provided general information regarding sex abuse victims, and recounted her conversation with Jennah.

At issue is the following question posed to her by Bramow's attorney: "When a child does actually go forward and report sexual abuse and is not believed, can there be after effects for the child and the system?" Defense counsel objected to the question on the ground it called for opinion testimony. The district court sustained the objection.

Bramow contends the district court abused its discretion in excluding Matuszek's answer to this question. State ex rel. Leas in Interest of O'Neal, 303 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Iowa 1981) (stating admissibility of lay or expert opinion testimony "rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifest abuse of that discretion causing prejudice to the complaining party"). We find no abuse or prejudice.

Bramow designated Matuszek as an expert witness who would testify about "her findings, observations, examination, evaluations, and diagnoses" of Jennah. Matuszek was not designated as an expert on the long-terms effects of childhood sexual abuse. This alone would constitute a basis for affirming the district court's evidentiary ruling excluding the testimony of an expert witness. Iowa Code § 668.11(2) (2003).

Bramow contends, however, that Matuszek's undesignated testimony was nonetheless admissible as that of a "treating physician/professional." Hansen v. Central Iowa Hosp. Corp., 686 N.W.2d 476, 484 (Iowa 2004); Morris-Rosdail v. Schechinger, 576 N.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998) (recognizing that testimony of a treating physician is generally not subject to discovery procedures requiring disclosure of expert witnesses). Bramow notes in particular that Matuszek recommended Jennah receive counseling. We are not persuaded, however, that Matuszek was within the category of expert witnesses who may be called to testify even if not designated in advance of trial pursuant to the applicable rules.

Matuszek did not "treat" or "diagnose" Jennah. She simply interviewed the child in connection with the police department's investigation of Lindsey. Matuszek's summary of her role is instructive:

Instead of the police or Department of Human Services conducting interviews of children when there is (sic) allegations of either physical abuse or sexual abuse to a child, child is brought to the protection center and myself or one of the other interviewers conducts the interview in place of the police or Department of Human Services.

Matuszek's testified she is a forensic interviewer with specialized training in interviewing children and with experience conducting thousands of such interviews. She did not testify she had training or experience as a psychologist, social worker or other counseling professional. Finally, there is no indication Jennah or her family sought out Matuszek. Instead, the police department contacted the Bramow family in connection with the investigation of Lindsey. In our view, therefore, Matuszek's recommendation that Jennah seek counseling did not transform the State's investigatory interview into a counseling session and did not render Matuszek a treating professional whose testimony was exempted from the expert designation requirement.

We turn next to Bramow's contention that prejudice resulted from the court's ruling. On this issue, we note that not all evidence of the effects of sexual abuse was excluded. The district court specifically allowed Matuszek to testify about "latent or later manifestations" of sexual abuse. She stated:

I know that some of the problems children can encounter down the road when they've been sexually abused, sometimes they have difficulty maintaining stable relationships, suicidal ideations, substance abuse, poor self-esteem, sexual — they become sexually promiscuous, depression, anxiety, sometimes they drop out of school, just a real variance of problems that children can have.

In light of this testimony, the exclusion of Matuszek's testimony concerning the "after effects" of reporting sexual abuse did not prejudice the Bramows.

The Bramows raise several other grounds for reversal of this evidentiary ruling. We find it unnecessary to consider those grounds.

B. Testimony Relating to Effects of Abuse on Other Students

The district court allowed Bramow to elicit testimony from some of Lindsey's former students regarding other incidents of abuse. The court rejected Bramow's efforts to also elicit testimony concerning the long-term effects of abuse on these other students. The court reasoned:

[A]ny collateral consequences involved to other people in the incidents, any damages would not be admitted. We're not trying those cases. The evidence about those incidents is to show what — perhaps why the district should have known had they investigated it was a negligent hire or supervision, retention. I have excluded — the defendant wished to offer concerning other sources of the plaintiff's damages, so I've excluded both of those.

Bramow contends this excluded testimony should have been presented to the jury to place Jennah's damages in proper perspective. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's rejection of this contention.

The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that

[t]he question as to whether damages awarded in a given case are inadequate must be determined on the peculiar facts of that case. The comparison of damages awarded in a given case with awards of damages in other cases is not a satisfactory procedure for determining adequacy.

Householder v. Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974) (citations omitted). Although this language pertains to damage comparisons among cases as opposed to a comparison of damages sustained by several non-party witnesses in a single case, we believe the Householder rationale is instructive.

Jennah's damages were unique. See 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 125, at 147 (2003) (stating damages are based on "facts and circumstances of each particular case"). They turned on her life experiences before and after Lindsey's acts. Given the "highly subjective" nature of awards for emotional damages, we are not persuaded that the effect of similar acts on other students would have assisted the jury in calculating her award. See 22 Am.Jur. 2d Damages § 221, at 210 (2003). See also Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 ("`[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Cf. Vander Linden v. Crews, 231 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1975) (holding trial court erred in allowing wife to testify concerning mental anguish she and daughter sustained following husband's arrest, as testimony "was irrelevant to any pleaded issue in this case"); Davis v. L W Constr. Co., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1970) (holding trial court had discretion to determine relevancy of information and did not abuse discretion in admitting evidence of damage to neighboring property).

We acknowledge Bramow's assertion that the testimony of other victims about the long-term adverse effect of Lindsey's wrongful conduct against them would have assisted the jury in understanding that sexual misconduct profoundly damages a child. While this notion has some logical appeal, the question before us is not whether we, had we been sitting as trial judges, would have received the other victims' testimony in evidence. The question, instead, is whether the district court's exclusion of such evidence constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. We cannot say that it was in this case. The district court, who enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters, could reasonably conclude on this record that the admission of the other victims' testimony would unreasonably complicate and extend the trial of this case by setting up a series of mini-trials with this case. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm on this issue.

Had the testimony of other victims been admitted on the issue of Bramow's damages, the defendant would have been motivated to attempt to challenge accuracy, credibility and relevance of such evidence, thus extending the trial of this case to an extent viewed unreasonable by the district court.

C. Testimony of Conversation with Former Student

Bramow sought to elicit testimony from a man named Jerry Dennis, Jr. He was called to testify about statements made to him by a former student who had sexual contact with Lindsey. The district court sustained a hearsay objection to this testimony.

Bramow concedes Dennis's testimony is hearsay but contends it falls within the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(3). Specifically, she contends the former student's state of mind is "relevant to the issue of Plaintiffs' damages and whether such damages would be customary or expected in this case."

Assuming, without deciding, this student's state of mind is relevant, Bramow's offer of proof reveals no testimony concerning the student's state of mind. During the offer, Dennis testified that he thought the contact between Lindsey and the student was "disgusting" and "disturbing" but, even when prompted with leading questions, he said nothing about what the former student felt. For this reason, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony.

D. Testimony of Conversation with School Employees

Bramow attempted to introduce the testimony of Bette Schutte, the mother of one of Lindsey's students, who was called to recount a conversation her husband had with the principal and counselor of the school Jennah attended. The district court sustained a hearsay objection to this proposed testimony.

The husband was unavailable because he was declared mentally incompetent as a result of a brain aneurysm.

Bramow maintains this testimony showed the school district had notice of Lindsey's inappropriate conduct and explained the Schutte family's subsequent conduct of removing their daughter from the school. These asserted relevancy grounds relate to liability rather than damages. As Bramow prevailed, she has no basis for appealing this question. Blume v. Auer, 576 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).

At oral argument, counsel for Bramow stated this issue was raised solely to preserve a right to have this testimony admitted in the event of a reversal and remand on liability as well as damages.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Bramow v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Oct 26, 2005
707 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)
Case details for

Bramow v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist

Case Details

Full title:CINDI BRAMOW, as Mother and Next Friend of JENNAH BRAMOW, A Minor…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Oct 26, 2005

Citations

707 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)