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Braggs v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Jun 11, 2008
No. 3D06-2372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jun. 11, 2008)

Opinion

No. 3D06-2372.

Opinion filed June 11, 2008.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 06-4130.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Natalia Costea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SHEPHERD and SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.


Anthony Braggs appeals his convictions and sentence for sexual battery and petit theft. We reverse his convictions and sentence on grounds that his counsel's peremptory challenge of a prospective juror was improperly denied.

Braggs was charged with the sexual battery, armed robbery, carjacking and kidnapping of victim. Prior to the alleged sexual battery, Braggs and victim had been drinking together in a bar. Braggs convinced the victim to give him a ride home. He then proceeded to rape her in her car, left her behind, and took her cash, jewelry, cell phone and credit cards. The victim drove to the nearest turnpike toll booth, called the police and, hysterically, reported what had happened to her when the officer arrived. The officer's testimony as to what the victim told him was admitted at trial.

We address the only issue on appeal raised by Braggs in which we find merit. Braggs claims the trial court erred in denying his peremptory strike of juror Gray. We agree. During the voir dire of the jury, defense counsel struck juror Gray peremptorily. The prosecutor requested a race-neutral reason for the strike. Defense counsel first responded that juror Gray's brothers were alcoholics. Defense counsel then stated that another race-neutral reason was that juror Gray had friends who were police officers. In a lengthy colloquy that followed, the trial judge further inquired of defense counsel as to how the fact that juror Gray's brothers were alcoholics would be related to the case. The trial judge denied the strike as not being race-neutral. More specifically, Braggs asserts on appeal that the reasons given for the peremptory strike of juror Gray, that her two brothers were alcoholics and that she had friends who were police officers, were facially race-neutral. We agree. Therefore, as the reasons given for the peremptory strike of juror Gray were facially race-neutral, the trial court was required, but failed, to conduct the third step under Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), which requires that, where the proffered reason for the peremptory strike is facially race-neutral, the trial court must then determine whether the strike is pretextual before it can be disallowed.

The trial judge focused on the fact that the victim had admitted taking Xanax the night of the incident and stated that substance abuse was not a legal defense.


MR. TREVILLA [Defense Counsel]: Strike Barbara Gray, juror number 18.

MS. HILL [State]: Barbara Gray is a member of a protected class, and I would ask for a race neutral reason.

MR. TREVILLA: Sure. Both brothers are alcoholics and —

THE COURT: There is an issue of drugs in this case.

. . . .

MR. TREVILLA: I'm saying that the alcoholic issue may, and it's kind of twisted into my defense.

THE COURT: Mr. Trevilla, it may be twisted into your defense that she was inebriated that she did not consent. I'm not sure if that's a legal defense to the argument. I'm waiting to hear what it is.

. . . .

MR. TREVILLA: She's got friends who were police officers. That would affect her as a race neutral reason.

THE COURT: Anything said as a race neutral reason request, whether I believe you use it potentially or your original motivation. That is not a race neutral reason, and that is not my inquiry. If you gave me cause or concern based on where we are headed. You questioned the jury about alcohol and drugs.

. . . .

THE COURT: Mr. Trevilla, how do the facts of the case, with regard to the jury, what they're going to hear relevant to the defense, the fact that she was inebriated? I don't understand.

. . . .

THE COURT: Too close for comfort is not a legal defense. [I]t is not a race neutral reason, and the Court will disallow it. Enough of this nonsense.

The Supreme Court held in Melbourne, that "[a] party objecting to the other side's use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike." Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 (footnotes omitted). When these initial requirements are met, the court then must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike. It is the proponent's burden to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. If the explanation for the reason for the strike is facially race-neutral, and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the strike will be sustained. Step three focuses on the genuineness of the explanation. The trial judge here never engaged in the required step-three analysis to determine the genuineness of the explanation. As Braggs argues, because the reasons for the strike were determined incorrectly by the trial judge not to be race-neutral, the trial judge never addressed the issue of pretext, and improperly disallowed the peremptory challenge, seating the juror. See Greene v. State, 718 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We point out that, as to other State and defense exercised peremptory strikes, the record clearly demonstrates that the trial judge repeatedly made findings both on race-neutrality and on genuineness for each of the individual strikes. Thus, the trial court was aware that a three-step analysis was required under Melbourne. As in Greene, the trial judge discontinued the Melbourne analysis after the second step because he did not find the proffered reason to be ethnic-neutral. This was error. See Russell v. State, 879 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Because there was neither an analysis nor a determination of pretext, as required by Melbourne, we reverse Braggs's convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.

We find that the other issues raised on appeal, whether the trial court erred in allowing Officer Green to testify as to the details of the statement given to him by Casey and erred in not declaring a mistrial for comments made by the State in closing, are without merit and need not be addressed.

Reversed and remanded.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.


Summaries of

Braggs v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Jun 11, 2008
No. 3D06-2372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jun. 11, 2008)
Case details for

Braggs v. State

Case Details

Full title:Anthony Braggs, Appellant, v. The of Florida, Appellee

Court:District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District

Date published: Jun 11, 2008

Citations

No. 3D06-2372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jun. 11, 2008)