Opinion
7:14-CV-01017 (DNH/TWD)
02-27-2015
LAWRENCE M. BRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF WATERTOWN, WATERTOWN POLICE DEPT., CHAD FREDRICK, SHANE RYAN, All in their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants.
APPEARANCES: LAWRENCE M. BRADFORD 13-B-2878 Plaintiff, pro se Ogdensburg Correctional Facility One Correction Way Ogdensburg, New York 13669-2288
APPEARANCES: LAWRENCE M. BRADFORD
13-B-2878
Plaintiff, pro se
Ogdensburg Correctional Facility
One Correction Way
Ogdensburg, New York 13669-2288
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review the Complaint in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action brought by Plaintiff Lawrence M. Bradford against Defendants City of Watertown, Watertown Police Dept., and Watertown Police Officers Chad Frederick, and Shane Ryan. (Dkt. No. 1.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff's second application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application"). (Dkt. No. 9.) Plaintiff has also moved for appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 3.)
Plaintiff's first IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) was initially denied as incomplete in an Order Directing Administrative Closure with Opportunity to Comply With Filing Fee Requirement due to his failure to submit the required inmate authorization form. (Dkt. No. 4.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 5.4(1)(A), (B). The case was reopened by Text Order of August 21, 2014, after Plaintiff filed the required authorization form. (Dkt. No. 6.) Thereafter, Plaintiff's initial application was denied without prejudice on the ground the information provided was incomplete. (Dkt. No. 8).
II. IFP APPLICATION
As to Plaintiff's second IFP Application, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated economic need and has filed the inmate authorization form required in the Northern District to proceed with this matter in forma pauperis. (Dkt. Nos. 6 and 9.) As a result, Plaintiff's second IFP Application (Dkt. No. 9) is granted.
III. INITIAL SCREENING
Having found that Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this case in forma pauperis, and because Plaintiff seeks relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Section 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any "complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity" and must "identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a person who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990), and should exercise "extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the Plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not "show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted). Allegations that "are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them" are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
Where a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (citation omitted).
IV. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the Ogdensburg Correctional Facility, having pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(2), in Jefferson County Court in or about August of 2013. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 5.) Plaintiff claims that on January 5, 2013, at 1:05 a.m., Defendant Watertown Police Department ("Police Department") officers Defendants Chad Fredrick ("Fredrick") and Shane Ryan ("Ryan") commenced a warrantless and unauthorized search of his apartment in the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 2-3. According to Plaintiff, Fredrick and Ryan appeared at his address to arrest him on an alleged robbery. Id. at 2. Plaintiff's roommate answered the door and said "no" when the two officers asked if Plaintiff was at home. Id. The roommate also said "no" when Fredrick and Ryan asked if they could come into the apartment and conduct a search. Id. The Defendant Officers then allegedly asked the roommate why they could not search if she had nothing to hide. Id. Plaintiff claims that due to pressure and coercion by Fredrick and Ryan, the roommate let them in, pointed to Plaintiff's bedroom, and walked away. Id. at 3.
It appears from the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint that he was at home at the time and was arrested and taken into custody by Fredrick and Ryan. Id. Plaintiff contends the search was accomplished through coercion and in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. At Plaintiff's Huntley hearing, Fredrick testified that the initial search had been conducted with the consent of Plaintiff's roommate. Id. According to Plaintiff, Fredrick deceived the court on many occasions during his testimony at the Huntley hearing, which led to the suppression of statements Plaintiff had given to Fredrick and Fredrick and Ryan's police report on Plaintiff's arrest. Id. Plaintiff claims that if Fredrick and Ryan had not entered his home without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and illegally arrested him, he might not be serving an unjust prison sentence of two-and-a-half years. Id. at 3-6.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of Five-Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars for mental anguish, loss of income, loss of family, and loss of business as a result of the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 7.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Watertown Police Department
Plaintiff has named the Watertown Police Department as a Defendant. "A police department is an administrative arm of [a] municipal corporation," and "cannot sue or be sued because it does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity." Baker v. Willett, 42 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Loria v. Town of Irondequoit, 775 F. Supp. 599, 606 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Dexter v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:14-CV-0363 (TJM/DEP), 2014 WL 2611384, at * 4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80008, at * 11 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014) (same). Accordingly, because the Watertown Police Department is not a proper defendant in this case, the Court recommends that it be dismissed from the action with prejudice.
Copies of all unpublished decisions cited herein will be provided to Plaintiff pursuant to Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The Second Circuit has directed district courts to grant leave to pro se litigants to amend their complaints to name the municipality in which a police department sits as the real party in interest when a case is dismissed against a police department on the grounds that it is not an entity capable of being sued. See Morris v. New York City Police Dept., 59 F. App'x 421, 422-23 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (directing the district court to permit amendment of the complaint to name the City of New York as a defendant when the suit was dismissed against the New York City Police Department on the grounds it was not a suable entity). Inasmuch as the City of Watertown is already named as a Defendant herein, the Court will construe Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against the Police Department as one against the City.
B. City of Watertown
In addition to Fredrick and Ryan, Plaintiff seeks to hold the City of Watertown liable for the alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, his Complaint fails to allege facts meeting the standard for establishing municipality liability as laid out in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In order to set forth a cognizable claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that a deprivation of his constitutional rights "was caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality." Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658); see also Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The plaintiff must first prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused his injuries beyond merely employing the misbehaving officer. Second, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection an 'affirmative link' between the policy and the deprivation of his constitutional rights.") (citing Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.8 (1985)) (plurality opinion).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing the existence of a municipal policy or custom regarding searches, and that Fredrick and Ryan's alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was causally connected to that municipal policy or custom. Furthermore, Plaintiff's Complaint contains no factual allegations regarding the Watertown Police Department that assist him in stating a claim for municipal liability against the City of Watertown under Monell. Therefore, the Court recommends that the action be dismissed as against City of Watertown with leave to amend.
C. Fredrick and Ryan
Plaintiff claims that Fredrick and Ryan violated his Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in a warrantless search of his apartment based upon the coerced consent of his roommate. Mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally construed, see e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008), the Court will require a response to Plaintiff's Complaint by Defendants Fredrick and Ryan. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether Plaintiff's claims can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
What Plaintiff claims occurred as a result of the allegedly unlawful search, including whether evidence was seized from Plaintiff's apartment during the search and, if so, the part, if any, it played in his arrest and conviction by guilty plea, is unclear. Thus, the Court cannot ascertain from the face of the Complaint whether a determination that Fredrick and Ryan violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unauthorized, warrantless search that resulted in his arrest, would necessarily imply that his conviction was improper. Therefore, the Court cannot determine at this point whether Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim will be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which precludes state prisoners from bringing a § 1983 claim that will "necessarily imply" the invalidity of his conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated. Id. at 487. See McCord v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 2008 (AJN), 2014 WL 2567108, at * 3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77539, at * 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2014) (noting that in Heck, "the Supreme Court recognized that the introduction at trial of unlawfully seized evidence would 'not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful") (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.)
VI. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has moved for appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 3.) However, a more fully developed record will be necessary before the Court can assess whether counsel should be appointed. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997) (court must look to the likelihood of merit of the underlying dispute in determining whether to appoint counsel). Therefore, the motion is denied, without prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide the superintendent of the facility, designated by Plaintiff as his current location, with a copy of Plaintiff's inmate authorization form (Dkt. No. 6) and notify the official that this action has been filed and that Plaintiff is required to pay to the Northern District of New York the entire statutory filing fee of $350.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further
The total cost for filing a civil action in this court is $400.00 (consisting of the filing fee of $350.00, see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and an administrative fee of $50.00). A party granted in forma pauperis status is not required to pay the $50.00 administrative fee; however, a prisoner granted in forma pauperis status is required to pay, over time, the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee, regardless of the outcome of the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3). Although his in forma pauperis application has been granted, Plaintiff will be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of Plaintiff's inmate authorization form (Dkt. No. 6) to the Financial Deputy of the Clerk's Office; and it is
RECOMMENDED, that the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against Defendant Watertown Police Department on the ground that it is not an entity capable of being sued; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND against Defendant The City of Watertown for failure to state a claim; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk shall issue summonses and forward them, along with copies of the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), to the United States Marshal for service upon Defendants Fredrick and Ryan; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants Fredrick and Ryan, or their counsel, shall file a response to the claims against them in the Complaint as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 3) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that all pleadings, motions and other documents relating to this action must bear the case number assigned to this action and be filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, 7th Floor, Federal Building, 100 S. Clinton St., Syracuse, New York 13261-7367. Any paper sent by a party to the Court or the Clerk must be accompanied by a certificate showing that a true and correct copy of same was served on all opposing parties or their counsel. Any document received by the Clerk or the Court which does not include a proper certificate of service will be stricken from the docket. Plaintiff must comply with all requests by the Clerk's Office for any documents that are necessary to maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions. Plaintiff is also required to promptly notify the Clerk's Office and all parties or their counsel , in writing, of any change in his address; his failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action ; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of all unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Dated: February 27, 2015
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge