Opinion
CL-2022-0559
11-04-2022
B.P., ON BEHALF OF E.B.P., a minor child v. ONEONTA CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.
J. Edward Lowe, Oneonta, for appellant. J.R. Brooks of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
J. Edward Lowe, Oneonta, for appellant.
J.R. Brooks of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
MOORE, Judge.
B.P. ("the mother"), on behalf of her minor child, E.B.P. ("the child"), appeals from a judgment entered by the Blount Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") dismissing her complaint against the Oneonta City Board of Education ("the Board"); Ricky Hicks, Don Maples, Patrick Adams, Sharon Breaseale, and Matthew Taylor ("the Board members"), who are members of the Board; Daniel Smith ("the superintendent"), the superintendent of the Board; Julie Talton ("the principal"), the principal of the Oneonta Elementary School ("the school"); and Michael Vise ("the assistant principal"), the assistant principal of the school.
In the initial complaint, the mother named the Board as the sole defendant, but the mother later amended the complaint to name the Board members, the superintendent, the principal, and the assistant principal as additional defendants. Although the mother did not identify in what capacity she was suing the individual defendants, it appears, based on the claims asserted in the amended complaint, that she sued them in their official capacities.
Background
On September 28, 2021, the mother filed, on behalf of the child, a complaint in the Blount Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), contesting a one-day in-school suspension imposed upon the child for allegedly violating Board Rule 1.08 ("the Board rule") by entering the faculty lounge of the school while a student there. That same day, the circuit court entered an order directing the Board to stay the imposition of the disciplinary action against the child. On December 22, 2021, the circuit court entered an order determining, among other things, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the case. See Ex parte Limestone Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 265 So. 3d 276 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). The circuit court dissolved the stay and subsequently transferred the case to the juvenile court. See § 12-11-11, Ala. Code 1975.
The Board rule outlines, among other violations subject to discipline, "[a]ny other violation which the principal may deem reasonable to fall within this category after investigations and consideration of extenuating circumstances."
On January 7, 2022, the juvenile court entered a temporary restraining order, staying the imposition of the disciplinary action against the child. On January 19, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the juvenile court entered a judgment on March 28, 2022, dismissing the case and dissolving the temporary restraining order. The mother timely filed her notice of appeal to this court on April 11, 2022.
While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court supplemented the record on appeal to include, among other things, the affidavit of the principal regarding events that had occurred since the filing of the notice of appeal that may have rendered the appeal moot; this court likewise allowed the mother to supplement the record with her own affidavit. See South Alabama Gas Dist. v. Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2013) (observing that appellate courts may consider facts relevant to the issue of mootness entered into the record on appeal after the entry of the judgment appealed from because mootness is a jurisdictional issue). The principal and the mother agree that, after the stay was dissolved, the child served the one-day in-school suspension and that the child has since graduated from the school. In her affidavit, the principal attests that the child has not and cannot suffer any further adverse consequences based on the alleged violation of the Board rule or the suspension, which was not placed in the child’s permanent record. The mother sets forth in her affidavit that, because the child has become a student at the Oneonta Middle School, which she states is in the same building as the school, the child remains subject to the Board rule and the oversight of the Board.
Analysis
[1–3] The defendants argue on appeal that, based on the circumstances as they now exist, the appeal should be dismissed as moot.
"‘"‘The test for mootness is commonly stated as whether the court’s action on the merits would affect the rights of the parties.’ Crawford v. State, 153 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)). ‘A case becomes moot if at any stage there ceases to be an actual controversy between the parties.’ Id. (emphasis added) (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999))."
"‘Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 983 (Ala. 2007) (first emphasis added). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) ("[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.").’
"South Alabama Gas Dist. v. Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 974-75 (Ala. 2013).
"‘"[A]n appeal will be dismissed as moot ‘if an event happening after hearing and decree in circuit court, but before appeal is taken, or pending
appeal, makes determination of the appeal unnecessary or renders it clearly impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief.’" Masonry Arts, [Inc. v. Mobile Cty. Comm’n,] 628 So. 2d [334] at 335 [(Ala. 1993)], quoting Morrison v. Mullins, 275 Ala. 258, 259, 154 So. 2d 16, 18 (1963).’
"Estate of Mollett v. M & B Builders, L.L.C., 749 So. 2d 466, 469 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
"‘"The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."’
"King v. Campbell, 988 So. 2d 969, 976 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895))."
Davis v. Davis, 221 So. 3d 474, 480-81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). See also C.F.D. v. J.P., 359 So. 3d 1134 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Accordingly, this court must determine whether the case remains justiciable in light of the child’s having served the imposed disciplinary suspension. See Town of Elmore v. Town of Coosada, 957 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (Ala. 2006) ("Because mootness goes to justiciability, [an appellate court] will not consider the merits of a claim that is moot.").
[4] In the complaint, as last amended, the mother asserted claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the Board rule. It is clear that any claim for injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of the disciplinary action has become moot as a result of the child’s having served the in-school suspension. See Irwin v. Jefferson Cnty. Pers. Bd., 263 So. 3d 698, 704 (Ala. 2018) (indicating that appellate courts cannot enjoin an act which has already occurred).
[5] To the extent that the complaint sought declaratory relief, that claim essentially centers on whether the Board rule supported the disciplinary action and whether the Board rule could be constitutionally enforced. Because the child has already served the suspension imposed pursuant to the Board rule, the mother is seeking, in effect, an advisory opinion related to the constitutionality of the rule. See Underwood v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 128 (Ala. 2009) (concluding that, because the underlying relief being sought had been mooted by intervening circumstances, the related claim for declaratory relief was seeking an advisory opinion and was also moot). Our supreme court has stated that the Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 6-6-220 through -232, Ala. Code 1975, "does not ‘"empower courts to decide moot questions, abstract propositions, or to give advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have these questions decided for the government of future cases."’" Bruner v. Geneva Cnty. Forestry Dep’t, 865 So. 2d 1167, 1175 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Stamps v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662 (1963) (emphasis added in Stamps)). The juvenile court could not provide the declaratory relief requested. See Woodgett v. City of Midfield, 319 So. 3d 1231, 1239 (Ala. 2020) (concluding that, "[b]ecause a justiciable controversy no longer existed between the parties, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s subsequently filed declaratory-judgment action challenging" a local act and a city ordinance as unconstitutional). Thus, even if we were to reverse the judgment of dismissal as the mother requests, the reversal would not afford the mother any effective relief.
[6] Finally, we do not consider this to be a case involving an important issue that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," that we may address despite the mootness of the controversy. State ex rel. Kernells v. Ezell, 291 Ala. 440, 444, 282 So. 2d 266, 270 (1973). Although it is undisputed that the child remains within the Oneonta school system, and, thus, subject to the student handbook containing the Board rule, the mother did pot present any evidence in her affidavit from which this court could conclude that there is a likelihood of repetition of the facts giving rise to the underlying litigation, and the mother argues only that the child might be subjected to discipline for other, future hypothetical behavior that might be covered by the Board rule. See Underwood, 39 So. 3d at 132; Case v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2006) ("Matters that may or may not occur in the future are not matters in controversy.").
Because we conclude that no justiciable controversy continues to exist between the parties and that any action by this court would ultimately have no effect on the rights of the parties in light of the circumstances as they exist at the time of this appeal, the appeal is moot and, thus, is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Thompson, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.