Opinion
A89A0553.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 1989. REHEARING DENIED MARCH 13, 1989.
Appeal dismissal. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Cheatham.
Douglas K. Boyle, pro se. Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Barry I. Mortge, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Appellant, pro se, without complying with the provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35 which require an order of this court granting appellant's application to appeal, filed his appeal from the order of the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, denying his pro se motion to set aside the default judgment against him in a Libel for Condemnation of $1,111. Held:
OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) mandates that an appeal from a judgment in the amount of $2,500 or less must be brought as a discretionary appeal. Vaughn v. Cable East Point, 185 Ga. App. 203 ( 363 S.E.2d 639); Rich v. McDonald Car c. Leasing, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 613 (1) ( 349 S.E.2d 832); Perryman v. Ga. Power Co., 180 Ga. App. 259, 260 (2) ( 348 S.E.2d 762). Also, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) mandates that an appeal from a denial of a motion to set aside a judgment be brought as a discretionary appeal. See Byrd v. Byrd, 183 Ga. App. 302 ( 359 S.E.2d 2); Roach v. Roach, 182 Ga. App. 122, 123 ( 354 S.E.2d 877); Folks, Inc. v. Agan, 177 Ga. App. 480 ( 340 S.E.2d 26).
The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional and this court cannot accept an appeal not made in compliance therewith. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed. Carley, C. J., and Beasley, J., concur.