Summary
finding a school board did not comply with R.C. 3319.12 by reducing the salaries of all guidance counselors in a district because a reduction cannot apply only to teachers in a particular field; it must be applied to all teachers within the district
Summary of this case from Varasso v. Williamsburg Local School Dist.Opinion
No. 82-134
Decided January 5, 1983.
Schools — Transfer or reassignment of teacher — Reduction in number of teachers in particular area due to decrease in enrollment — Not violative of seniority provision of R.C. 3319.17, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County.
Appellee, Bernard Bohmann, is a school teacher and has been employed by appellant, Board of Education of the West Clermont Local School District, since September 1954.
The stipulations and the testimony presented revealed the following facts. Appellee's assigned teaching position for the 1976-1977 school year was in the Occupational Work Experience (O.W.E.) Program at Glen Este High School. Of the three teachers assigned to this program, appellee had the most seniority.
During the course of the 1976-1977 school year, student enrollment in the O.W.E. program declined. Based on this decline and the projected enrollment for the 1977-1978 school year, it was determined that the O.W.E. program would not necessitate the rehiring of all of the current O.W.E. instructors for the following school year.
Accordingly, the limited contract of O.W.E. instructor Robert Wiesenhahn was not renewed prior to April 30, 1977. Appellee's limited contract, however, was renewed.
It is undisputed that the non-renewal of Wiesenhahn's contract prior to April 30, 1977, was in accordance with R.C. 3319.11.
On or about June 27, 1977, Robert Wiesenhahn was reemployed by appellant as an O.W.E. instructor for the 1977-1978 school year. Thereafter, in a letter signed by the superintendent and the acting county superintendent, dated June 30, 1977, appellee was notified that his teaching assignment for the 1977-1978 school year would be as an in-school suspension and/or study hall teacher. This position was a new position at Glen Este High School, but a similar position existed at the other high school in the district.
Appellee began the 1977-1978 school year as a study hall teacher. Then, in December 1977, appellee filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Clermont County which alleged, in relevant part, that his transfer from an O.W.E. to a study hall teacher violated the seniority provision of R.C. 3319.17, and which sought reinstatement to his former position as an O.W.E. instructor.
Appellee also alleged that the transfer violated the collective bargaining agreement, board policy, and R.C. 3319.08, 3319.12 and 3319.17.
In pertinent part, the trial court found that appellee's transfer violated R.C. 3319.17 and ordered that appellee be reinstated to his position as O.W.E. instructor.
The trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals, in upholding appellee's reinstatement, stressed facts it considered to be peculiar to this case. It noted that although "there was no [evidence of a] decrease in the size of the student body, there was in fact a reduction in the teaching force as the number of teachers in the O.W.E. program was reduced from three (3) at Glen Este High School for the year of 1976-1977 to two (2) for the year of 1977-1978. However, this reduction in force was obscured by the fact that a previously non-existent position was created for the year of 1977-1978, i.e., that of in-school suspension, and/or study hall teacher, yet there is no evidence which establishes that the overall enrollment increased, or that there was any other change in circumstances which required the creation of the position at that particular time."
The court then stated that "* * * the question is whether or not the transfer is in any way subject to the provisions of R.C. 3319.17. Under these circumstances, there would have been a reduction in force had the new position not been created at that particular time. Thus, in the absence of any evidence to indicate the need for the new position, we conclude that there was in fact a reduction in force; and the creation of the new position under these circumstances did nothing to relieve the appellant of the duty to comply with R.C. 3319.17."
This cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Biegel, Kirkland Berger Co., L.P.A., Ms. Elaine M. Stoermer and Mr. James R. Kirkland, for appellee.
Ennis Roberts Co., L.P.A., Mr. George E. Roberts, III, and Mr. J. Michael Fischer, for appellant.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the seniority provisions of R.C. 3319.17 apply to the transfer or reassignment of a teacher from one teaching area to another in order to reduce the number of teachers assigned to a particular teaching field due to decreased student enrollment in that area. For the reasons that follow, this court holds that the seniority provisions of R.C. 3319.17 need not be followed under these circumstances.
The resolution of the dispute herein necessitates construction of R.C. 3319.17, which provides, in its entirely, that:
"When by reason of decreased enrollment of pupils, return to duty of regular teachers after leaves of absence, or by reason of suspension of schools or territorial changes affecting the district, a board of education decides that it will be necessary to reduce the number of teachers, it may make a reasonable reduction. In making such reduction, the board shall proceed to suspend contracts in accordance with the recommendation of the superintendent of schools who shall, within each teaching field affected, give preference to teachers on continuing contracts and to teachers who have greater seniority. Teachers, whose continuing contracts are suspended, shall have the right of restoration to continuing service status in the order of seniority of service in the district if and when teaching positions become vacant or are created for which any of such teachers are or become qualified."
R.C. 3319.17 applies to those situations where there is a reduction in the number of teachers employed. Thus, as a threshold consideration, this court must determine whether, under the facts of this case, there was a reduction in the number of teachers as contemplated by R.C. 3319.17.
Appellee argues that there was a "reduction" in staff as contemplated by R.C. 3319.17 since the number of teachers in the O.W.E. program was reduced from three to two at Glen Este High School due to decreased student enrollment in the O.W.E. program.
Being mindful of the well-established principle that "it is the duty of this court to give effect to the words used [in a statute and] not to delete words or to insert words," this court is not persuaded by appellee's statutory construction. R.C. 3319.17 clearly provides that certain procedures must be followed when there is a reduction in the number of teachers due to decreased enrollment of pupils. Contrary to the construction urged by appellee, however, this section does not read "when by reason of decreased enrollment of pupils in a particular course of study, * * * a board of education decides that it will be necessary to reduce the number of teachers in a particular teaching field, the board may make reasonable reductions."
Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127 [49 O.O.2d 445]. (Emphasis added.)
Nowhere in the relevant statutory language did the General Assembly broaden the scope of the term "reduction" as appellee so argues. If the General Assembly had intended R.C. 3319.17 to apply where there is a reduction of the number of teachers in a particular teaching field due to decreased student enrollment in that particular area, it could have easily so provided. But the General Assembly did not choose to expressly confer such seniority rights upon teachers under such circumstances, and this court will not, nor cannot, do so now under the guise of statutory construction. For, it is well-established that this court is limited in its analysis to construction and interpretation of statutes as written. See First National Bank of Wilmington v. Kosydar (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 101, 106 [74 O.O.2d 206], and cases cited therein. Indeed, it is well-settled that this court may not legislate to add a requirement to a statute enacted by the General Assembly. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 24, 27-28 [53 O.O.2d 13].
Moreover, a more faithful interpretation of R.C. 3319.17, and one which gives effect to its clear and unambiguous terms, is that R.C. 3319.17 applies to those situations where there is a reduction in the actual number of teachers in the board's employ at a particular time. In cases of teacher reassignment, the teaching complement remains the same. Thus, while teacher reassignment or transfer results in a shift in the number of teachers in a certain field of study, it does not result in a diminution of the actual number of teachers employed. Hence, the provisions of R.C. 3319.17 are not applicable to the transfer or reassignment of a teacher.
This court recently noted in Dorian v. Bd. of Edn. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 182, 184 [16 O.O.3d 208], that the General Assembly, in enacting R.C. 3319.17 recognized the need to give a board of education flexibility in decreasing the number of teachers in its employ due to circumstances beyond the board's and teachers' control. The decision of this court today reflects this spirit, for it properly preserves the flexibility a board of education needs in dealing with changing staffing requirements.
Furthermore, this construction is buttressed by and is in accordance with corresponding statutory provisions. Most notably, R.C. 3319.01 expressly affords the superintendent the power to "* * * direct and assign teachers and other employees of the schools under his supervision * * *." The decision herein acknowledges this legislative grant and properly preserves the right afforded superintendents to make staff assignments as they deem fit.
In the instant case, the superintendent, in reassigning appellee from his position as an O.W.E. instructor to that of a study hall teacher, was simply exercising his prerogative under R.C. 3319.01 to assign teachers to their teaching responsibilities. There was, as a result of this reassignment, a change in the number of teachers assigned to the O.W.E. program. There was not, however, a diminution in the actual number of teachers employed by the board. Accordingly, there was no reduction in staff as contemplated by R.C. 3319.17 and hence the section and its seniority provisions are not applicable.
The court of appeals based its decision on what it considered to be the peculiar facts of this case. While this court is cognizant that the facts of this case are peculiar, the focus of our inquiry must instead be on the duties imposed by and rights granted under R.C. 3319.17.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, PARRINO and HOLMES, JJ., concur.
LOCHER, C. BROWN and KRUPANSKY, JJ., dissent.
PARRINO, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for SWEENEY, J.
I concur in the majority's conclusion that R.C. 3319.17 does not apply to this fact situation. However, I write separately to set forth some practical implications which could result from a contrary holding as urged by appellee.
The majority's construction of R.C. 3319.17 is in the best interest of teachers. Construing it to apply to reductions in the actual number of teachers employed in the overall school system at a particular time provides a broader base for staffing decisions by school boards. For example, if a board decides that a particular program should be eliminated or reduced in size due to a decreased student enrollment, a teacher whose position is eliminated could be considered for transfer to another department.
While appellee's situation may be a matter of concern, it should be noted that he had the option of requesting a review of the transfer pursuant to the master contract and that he did not appeal on that issue.
Conversely, if the seniority provisions of R.C. 3319.17 are applied when the number of teachers in a particular program is decreased, the board may be forced to suspend a teacher losing a position because it could not consider staffing for the system as a whole. This could result in a teacher, with less seniority in the program which is reduced or eliminated, being suspended even though he has considerably more seniority than teachers in other departments in which he is also qualified to teach. Thus, applying R.C. 3319.17 to reductions in a department or particular program might ultimately prove an injustice to teachers.
Accordingly, I agree that the seniority provisions of R.C. 3319.17 only apply when there is a reduction in the overall number of teachers in the school system and that the judgment of the court of appeals be reversed.
The majority's holding unduly restricts the impact of R.C. 3319.17 in situations such as found in the case sub judice and, in so doing, validates practices which this section was intended to thwart. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes appellant's conduct was not covered by the provisions of R.C. 3319.17. This finding appears to be based on the fact that all the teachers employed by appellant in the O.W.E. program for the 1976-77 school year were employed by appellant for the 1977-78 school year. For several reasons, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that R.C. 3319.17 is inapplicable to the situation presented herein.
Analyzing R.C. 3319.17 and applying it to the relevant facts of this case reveals: (1) there was a decrease in the enrollment of pupils in the O.W.E. program at Glen Este High School during the 1976-77 school year; (2) due to this decrease in enrollment, the Board of Education of the West Clermont Local School District decided to reduce the number of teachers in the O.W.E. program at the Glen Este High School for the 1977-78 school year from three to two; (3) in making reductions in the number of teachers, R.C. 3319.17 mandates that "within each teaching field affected" (here the O.W.E. program) preference must be given to "teachers who have greater seniority"; and (4) despite the requirements of R.C. 3319.17, appellant employed Wiesenhahn as a teacher in the O.W.E. program instead of appellee who had greater seniority.
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear dictates of R.C. 3319.17, the majority determines the instant situation is not encompassed by this section since the overall number of teachers employed by appellant remained constant. The majority also states:
"Contrary to the construction urged by appellee, however, this section does not read `when by reason of decreased enrollment of pupils in a particular course of study, * * * a board of education decides that it will be necessary to reduce the number of teachers in a particular teaching field, the board may make reasonable reductions.'" (Emphasis sic.)
I differ with the majority's implication that it is necessary to add words and phrases to R.C. 3319.17 in order to adopt appellee's position. Rather, I feel one need only interpret the words of R.C. 3319.17 in a reasonable, logical manner to conclude this section applies in a situation where the number of teachers in a given field is reduced due to a decrease in student enrollment.
Even if one rejects the contention that R.C. 3319.17 applies to reductions in a particular teaching field, still the entire transaction herein, i.e., the nonrenewal of Wiesenhahn's contract, the subsequent rehiring of Wiesenhahn and the reassignment of appellee, should be held answerable to the dictates of R.C. 3319.17. Plainly, appellant would have been in violation of R.C. 3319.17 had it failed to renew appellee's contract instead of Wiesenhahn's contract. Just as plainly, there would have been a reduction in the number of teachers employed by appellant had Wiesenhahn not been rehired and had an apparently unneeded and undesirable position not been created for appellee. In effect, therefore, appellant, through its calculated firings, rehirings and reassignments, was able to achieve an end clearly prohibited by R.C. 3319.17. Stated another way, appellant's maneuverings do not mask the true import of its actions and, accordingly, I feel its conduct should be constrained by the mandates of R.C. 3319.17.
Finally, I, like the majority, agree with the principles recognized by this court in Dorian v. Bd. of Edn. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 182 [16 O.O.3d 208], relating to the need of granting boards of education flexibility in managing their staff. In Dorian the trial court found the Euclid Board of Education acted in good faith in suspending the teacher therein. However, in the case sub judice the trial court found against the Board of Education of the West Clermont Local School District and in favor of the teacher. The flexibility approved in Dorian is not co-extensive with permitting the school boards of this state to conduct staff business totally unfettered. I believe R.C. 3319.17 provides such a restraint and should be applied.
In sum, I feel R.C. 3319.17 should be interpreted to encompass a situation where a teacher, after twenty-three years of employment, is relegated to a newly created and seemingly unneeded position as a study hall teacher while an individual with less seniority retains a position in appellee's former area. Any other construction of this section encourages the school boards of this state to conduct the reassignment of teachers in an arbitrary and inequitable manner.
LOCHER and C. BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.