Opinion
C. A. 5:24-1624-BHH-KDW
10-08-2024
Clarence Bogan, Petitioner, v. Warden, F.C.I. Edgefield, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Clarence Bogan (“Petitioner”) is a federal prisoner who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, for a Report and Recommendation. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on May 29, 2024. ECF No. 15.Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's Motion. ECF No. 16. After obtaining an extension, ECF No. 19, Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion on July 29, 2024. ECF No. 22. Respondent filed a Reply to Petitioner's response on August 2, 2024. ECF No. 25.
Because the court has considered matters outside of the pleadings, the undersigned considers the motion as one for summary judgment. The Roseboro order issued to Petitioner contained an explanation of the summary judgment procedures.
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, be granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution Edgefield in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner states he is serving a 130-month term of imprisonment. Id. at 7. Petitioner filed the instant action challenging the calculation of his federal sentence and requests he be credited with the time he spent in custody from the time the federal detainer was placed on him until he was sentenced. Id. at 7-13.
In support of his summary judgment motion, Respondent provided the court with the declaration of Stacy Fanello, a Correctional Programs Specialist at the Designation and Sentence Computation Center (“DSCC”) in Grand Prairie, Texas. ECF No. 15-1 at 1-3. Fanello attests Petitioner was arrested by Georgia State Authorities on June 28, 2017, for multiple charges that were subsequently nolle prossed. Id. at 1-2. Fanello states Plaintiff remained in Georgia state custody after it was discovered he was on parole stemming from 2002 and 2014 convictions. Id. at 2. Fanello attests that Plaintiff's parole was revoked on December 14, 2017, on Case Numbers 2002 C 28761 and 2013 C 4805, and he was turned over to the Georgia Department of Corrections. Id. Fanello states Petitioner was originally sentenced in Case Number 2002 C 28761 on June 6, 2002, to a 25-year term of imprisonment, later amended to a 40-year term of imprisonment and sentenced in Case Number 2013 C 48051 on August 14, 2014, to a 20-year term of imprisonment. Id.
Fanello states Petitioner was indicted on federal charges in United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia in Case Number 5:18-CR-00002-002 on January 11, 2018. Id. Fanello attests Petitioner was taken into temporary custody on February 6, 2018, by the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) pursuant to the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued on January 23, 2018. Id. Fanello states Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on October 3, 2019, to a 130-month term of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Id. Fanello attests the court further ordered 24-months of the sentence to run concurrently and 106-months to run consecutively to Case Numbers 2002 C 28761 and 2013 C 48051. Id. Fanello states the federal sentence commenced on October 3, 2019, the date it was imposed. Id. Fanello attests the BOP designated the state facility for service of his sentence until the concurrent state sentence was completed pursuant to the BOP's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Id. Fanello states Petitioner was returned to Georgia state authorities on February 13, 2020. Id. Fanello attests Petitioner satisfied his state parole revocation sentences in Case Numbers 2002 C 28761 and 2013 C 48051 on March 18, 2020, and he was released to the exclusive custody of the USMS. Id.
Petitioner challenges the manner in which he is serving his federal sentence and requests that the court give him credit for time served from the point the federal detainer was placed on him until the federal sentence was imposed. ECF No. 1 at 8-12.
II. Discussion
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Habeas Corpus
1. Section 2241 Generally and Exhaustion Requirement
Generally, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to an appropriate forum before filing his petition in this court. This requirement of exhaustion is largely unavoidable. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944). “Unlike petitions brought under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254, which challenge the validity of a state court conviction and sentence, petitions brought under § 2241 generally challenge the execution or implementation of a sentence, such as parole matters, sentence computation, calculation of good-time credits, prison disciplinary actions, and transfers.” Clemmons v. South Carolina, No. 0:08-607-RBH, 2008 WL 2845636, *1 (D.S.C. July 18, 2008).
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts consistently require prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exhaustion allows prison officials to develop a factual record and “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). Here, Respondent stipulates that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. ECF No. 15-1 at 1.
2. Analysis a. Federal Sentence Computation Generally
It is well established that after a district court imposes a sentence, the Attorney General, through the BOP, is responsible for administering the sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). The authority to determine when a federal sentence commences belongs uniquely to the BOP, subject to federal judicial review under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2008).
The computation of a federal sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585 and is comprised of a two-step determination: first, the date on which the federal sentence commences and, second, the extent to which credit may be awarded for time spent in custody prior to commencement of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
b. Commencement of Sentence
A federal sentence cannot commence before it is imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“Commencement of sentence: A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”). While the provisions of § 3585(a) are determinative in most instances, 18 U.S.C. § 3621 describes procedures for prisoners who are not in exclusive federal custody when a federal sentence is imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Program Statement 5880.28, promulgated as guidance for § 3621 provides:
A prisoner who is in non-federal custody at the time of sentencing may begin service of the federal sentence prior to arriving at the designated federal facility if the non-federal facility is designated in accordance with the Program Statement on Designation of State Institution for Service of Federal Sentence and 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (Imprisonment of a convicted person). This type of designation is ordinarily made only upon the recommendation of the sentencing court.
In no case can a federal sentence of imprisonment commence earlier than the date on which it is imposed.ECF No. 15-1 at 49.
Respondent contends Petitioner's federal sentence commenced on October 3, 2019, the date it was imposed by the United States District Court. ECF No. 15 at 6. Petitioner does not challenge this date. ECF No. 22 at 5. Based upon a review of the record, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's federal sentence has been computed correctly as commencing on October 3, 2019, consistent with federal statutes, regulations, and policy.
c. Prior Custody Credit
Credit for prior custody is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which states:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). The United States Supreme Court has held that under Section 3585(b), “Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive double credit for his detention time.” U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992); see also United States v. Mojabi, 161 F.Supp.2d 33, 36 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that “[s]ection 3885(b) prohibits ‘double credit,' i.e. awarding credit for presentence time served against one sentence if that time has already been credited against another sentence”).
Respondent notes the federal court ordered a portion of Petitioner's sentence to be served concurrent with his existing state sentences, and therefore Petitioner received credit for the time he spent in state custody from October 3, 2019, the day of his federal sentencing, to the day he was released by Georgia authorities to the exclusive custody of the USMS. ECF No. 15 at 9. Respondent states Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for credit for the time he spent in state custody after his arrest that was credited toward his state sentence prior to the imposition of his federal sentence. Id.
In response, Petitioner primarily argues he is entitled to prior custody credit under the holding in Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971). ECF No. 22 at 6. Under Willis, the BOP grants prior custody credit, even if it results in a double credit toward a state sentence, when two conditions are met: (1) a prisoner's state and federal sentence are run concurrently; and (2) the full term release date of the federal sentence is equal to or greater than the full term release date of the state sentence. See Willis, 438 F.2d at 925; Program Statement 5880.28. If both of the above conditions are met, credit is awarded towards the federal sentence for time spent in state pre-sentence custody that begins on or after the date of the federal offense, and runs to the imposition of the state sentence. Id. Petitioner argues under the holding in Willis Respondent's summary judgment motion should be denied as the case is not ripe for dismissal. ECF No. 22 at 7. Petitioner claims there still remains a question whether the exception to 3585(b) reaches a partially concurrent sentence, and whether the court intended the pre-trial time to be granted, and therefore Respondent cannot meet the standard for a summary judgment motion. Id.
In Reply, Respondent contends the Willis exception is not applicable to Petitioner's case. ECF No. 25 at 2. Respondent explains that the time Petitioner served from the date of his parole revocation, December 14, 2017, until his federal sentencing, October 3, 2019, was time spent in the service of his state sentence and was not presentence time. Id. Respondent therefore argues this time spent prior to Petitioner's federal sentencing cannot be considered under Willis for applying prior custody credit. Id.
The undersigned finds Petitioner is not entitled to any additional prior custody credit because he was serving a state sentence during the time period in question and therefore is not entitled to pre-sentence credit under the holding in Willis. See Lindsey v. Deboo, Civil Action No. 5:11-CV-155, 2012 WL 1987187, at *5 (N.D. W.Va. June 1, 2012) (explaining a petitioner cannot receive any additional credit pursuant to Willis because Willis does not provide for the application of prior custody credit once any other sentence commences); DeJesus v. Zenk, 374 Fed.Appx. 245, 247 (3rd Cir. 2010) (stating “that the reasoning in the Willis/Kayfez line of cases does not permit federal credit for time served after the state sentence was imposed but before the federal sentence was pronounced.”); Hargrove v. Wilson, No. 3:14CV75, 2015 WL 459224, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2015) (explaining that under Willis pre-custody credits are only available for “time spent in non-federal presentence custody, before either a state or federal sentence is imposed.”). The undersigned recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.