Opinion
No. 56569-9-I.
March 12, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 05-2-07977-9, James H. Allendoerfer, J., entered August 1, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Bruce C. Galloway, Attorney at Law, 12101 N Lakeshore Dr, Lake Stevens, WA, 98258-9506.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Brian Charles Dale, Attorney at Law, 3411 Colby Ave, Everett, WA, 98201-4709.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
An interested party has a statutory right to seek revision within 10 days of any order or judgment entered by a superior court commissioner. Appellant C-Wolf filed a motion for revision within 10 days of the court commissioner's denial of a motion for reconsideration. The superior court therefore erred in denying the motion for revision as untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's ruling and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Respondents Blaise Sims and Kenneth Wilmoth (collectively Sims) are truck drivers formerly employed by C-Wolf, Inc., a Washington trucking company owned and operated by David and Anne Perrigoue (referred to collectively as C-Wolf). Sims filed this action for unpaid wages on March 10, 2005, alleging that C-Wolf had failed to pay statutory prevailing wages for certain public works construction projects. When C-Wolf failed to respond, Sims obtained a default judgment for $52,349.41.
C-Wolf moved to vacate the default judgment on May 10, 2005, citing excusable neglect under CR 60(b)(1) and CR 60(b)(11). A pro tem court commissioner denied the motion to vacate on May 25, 2005. C-Wolf moved for reconsideration of the denial on June 3, 2005. The commissioner denied the motion for reconsideration on June 15, 2005, and C-Wolf moved for revision on June 23, 2005.
The denial of the motion to vacate was originally without prejudice. On Sims' motion, a superior court judge revised the denial to be with prejudice, but noted that revision was subject to the pending motion for reconsideration.
On July 23, 2005, the superior court judge denied C-Wolf's motion for revision as untimely.
DECISION
C-Wolf contends that it had a statutory right to seek revision of the commissioner's order denying reconsideration and that the superior court erred in concluding that the revision motion was untimely. The superior court apparently concluded that under In re Marriage of Robertson, C-Wolf's motion for reconsideration did not extend the statutory deadline for seeking revision, and that a party dissatisfied with a commissioner's decision can seek revision or reconsideration, but not both. Because a party has a statutory right to seek revision of "any" court commissioner's order, we disagree.
113 Wn. App. 711, 714-15, 54 P.3d 708 (2002).
The superior court judge has supplemented the record on appeal with a statement that the denial of revision was based solely on a determination that the motion was untimely.
The superior court's authority to review a commissioner's ruling is grounded in Article IV, section 23 of the Washington Constitution, which provides for superior court commissioners "who shall have authority to perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers, subject to revision by such judge." RCW 2.24.050 specifies the general procedures governing revision:
All of the acts and proceedings of court commissioners hereunder shall be subject to revision by the superior court. Any party in interest may have such revision upon demand made by written motion, filed with the clerk of the superior court, within ten days after the entry of any order or judgment of the court commissioner. Such revision shall be upon the records of the case, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the court commissioner, and unless a demand for revision is made within ten days from the entry of the order or judgment of the court commissioner, the orders and judgments shall be and become the orders and judgments of the superior court, and appellate review thereof may be sought in the same fashion as review of like orders and judgments entered by the judge.
When reviewing a commissioner's ruling on revision, the superior court examines all of the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner and applies a de novo review standard to the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The statutory right of revision is independent of any right to appeal.
State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 132 (2004).
State v. Kells, 134 Wn.2d 309, 315, 949 P.2d 818 (1998).
In State v. Smith, our supreme court concluded that RCW 2.24.050 clearly and unambiguously authorizes "any party" to seek revision of "any order" and judgment of a superior court commissioner. The court noted that the word "any" means "every" and "all" and that RCW 2.24.050 further provides "all acts of court commissioners shall be subject to revision." Finally, in rejecting the suggestion that the State was restricted to seeking revision of a commissioner's ruling that is otherwise appealable, the Smith court emphasized that RCW 2.24.050 permits any party to seek revision of all rulings made by a court commissioner, "final or not."
117 Wn.2d 263, 814 P.2d 652 (1991).
Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 271.
Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 271.
Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 270.
Relying on In re Marriage of Robertson,10 Sims argues that C-Wolf's motion for reconsideration under CR 59 did not extend the statutory deadline for filing a revision motion. In Robertson, a party moved for revision 12 days after a commissioner modified a child support order. The superior court reasoned that because the commissioner's ruling became a final superior court order after 10 days, the affected party had additional days in which to file a timely motion for reconsideration under CR 59(b). The superior court then treated the motion as timely and revised the commissioner's ruling. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the superior court had improperly extended the time for reviewing a commissioner's order beyond the 10 days authorized by RCW 2.24.050. But Robertson addressed only the 10-day time limit of RCW 2.24.050. It provides no support for Sims' arguments here because it did not involve a timely motion for revision of a commissioner's ruling denying reconsideration. Sims' arguments fail to address the unambiguous language of RCW 2.24.050 authorizing revision of "any" commissioner's order.
113 Wn. App. 711, 54 P.3d 708 (2002).
Robertson, 113 Wn. App. at 714-15.
In summary, RCW 2.24.050 authorizes a party to seek revision of all orders entered by a court commissioner. Because C-Wolf moved for revision of the order denying reconsideration within ten days as required by RCW 2.24.050, the superior court erred in denying the motion as untimely. We therefore reverse the superior court's order and remand for consideration of C-Wolf's motion to revise.
Because C-Wolf was entitled to seek revision, we do not address the parties' arguments on the merits of C-Wolf's motion to vacate.
Reversed and remanded.
COLEMAN and APPELWICK, JJ., concur.