Opinion
7:20-CV-31 (WLS)
11-17-2021
JORDON CHRISTOPHER BLACKSHEAR, Plaintiff, v. LEEANNA SMITH, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought the above-styled action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 12, 2020. (Doc. 1). In the Court's initial review of the Complaint, the undersigned permitted Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendant Smith to proceed. (Doc. 10, p. 1). On May 24, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 35). After the Clerk of Court notified Plaintiff of his rights and obligations in responding to said Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response, and Defendant thereafter filed a Reply. (Docs. 37, 38).
Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in his Complaint concerning his incarceration at Valdosta State Prison (“VSP”). (Doc. 1). At some unstated date prior to February 12, 2019, Plaintiff was placed into a two-man cell “on the tier” with fellow inmate Jacorie Hinton, Sr. (“Hinton”). Id. at 4-5. On February 12, 2019, during a “shakedown” by the tactical team, Plaintiff was being handcuffed when Hinton “violently attacked” Plaintiff with a large metal object. Id. Hinton stabbed Plaintiff with the object ten or more times in the head, neck, back and chest. Id. at 5. Plaintiff suffered multiple lacerations and wounds which included a skull fracture. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant knowingly placed Plaintiff in the cell after being “warned by” Hinton that Hinton would hurt Plaintiff by “stab[ing] him up.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges Hinton was on the tier for a previous stabbing weeks earlier. Id. at 4.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 2005).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, ” and identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Brown v. Houser, 129 F.Supp.3d 1357, 1371 (N.D.Ga. 2015) (citing Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). Once the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations omitted).
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (alteration adopted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Evidence
In support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant, Unit Manager of Tier II at VSP (Doc. 35-4, p. 2), submits a transcript of Plaintiff's deposition, and her declaration, with attachments (Docs. 35-3, 35-4, respectively). Plaintiff filed a Response containing argument but did not submit any supporting affidavits or other sworn statements. (Doc. 37).
According to Plaintiff's deposition testimony, prior to the incident on February 12, 2019, Plaintiff was housed in dormitory K-1 at VSP after being moved from dormitory J when he was caught with a cell phone and a knife. (Doc. 35-3, pp. 15:14-20; 19:9-24). Plaintiff was in Tier II which is part of a nine-month program, with three months per phase. Id. at 17:12-18:7. Prior to being moved into the two-man cell where he was attacked, Plaintiff had an altercation with a previous cellmate which resulted in Plaintiff being stabbed by the cellmate. Id. at 18:17-23; 20:10- 21:2). Plaintiff did not alert any authorities to the altercation with his previous cellmate. Id. at 21:2-4.
Plaintiff testified that when a lieutenant noticed Plaintiff had been stabbed, and after approval by Defendant, Plaintiff was moved into the two-man cell with Hinton. Id. at 18:23-19:4; 21:4-15. After Plaintiff was moved into the cell with Hinton, Plaintiff had “no discrepancy” with Hinton, gave food to Hinton, got “high” with Hinton, and gave his personal belongings to Hinton. Id. at 23:8-11. Eight days after the move, Plaintiff was stabbed by Hinton during a technical shakedown, which was initiated after another inmate was killed in “population.” Id. at 19:5-7; 22:14-23; 23:11-14. Ten officers were in front of the two-man cell with Plaintiff and Hinton when the stabbing occurred. Id. at 25:16-19. After Hinton began stabbing Plaintiff, the officers used their tasers on Hinton to subdue him. Id. at 26:15-17. Plaintiff was then transported by ambulance to a hospital for treatment. Id. at 28:15-25.
Also according to Plaintiff's testimony, Defendant knew that Hinton had nearly killed another inmate. Id. at 22:24-23:7. Plaintiff asserts that he witnessed Hinton tell Defendant directly “I'm gonna kill that man and you raid his room.” Id. at 29:20-21; 30:7-10. Plaintiff asserts Defendant responded “he ain't gonna fuck with her . . . he ain't gonna do shit.” Id. at 30:12-13.
Plaintiff testified that he initially believed Hinton made the statement so that he would not have to share his cell with another inmate. Id. at 29:23-30:1. Plaintiff, himself, had planned to attack Hinton first. Id. at 32:3-7. Plaintiff acknowledged that nothing occurred between Hinton and himself that would have alerted the authorities that Hinton was a danger to Plaintiff. Id. at 32:8-13. Plaintiff did not file any complaints or complain to anyone about being placed in the cell with Hinton. Id. at 33:16-21. Though he was aware Hinton had a weapon, Plaintiff, himself, did not anticipate the attack by Hinton. Id. at 34:2-10. Plaintiff did not speak to Defendant about his cellmate. Id. at 35:1-5. Despite having access to protective custody on Tier II, Plaintiff did not seek protective custody because he was not afraid of Hinton. Id. at 35:25-36:18.
According to Defendant, inmates are assigned to Tier II if they are a threat to the safety and security of the facility, or if they have been involved in some other specified conduct, including but not limited to escape, leadership or participation in a major disturbance or riot, possession of a firearm, assault, or the introduction or trafficking of cellular devices, drugs, tobacco, or illegal contraband. (Doc. 35-4, p. 3). Defendant swears that Hinton was moved into the cell in which he attacked Plaintiff on December 3, 2018, and that Hinton had no disciplinary reports for attacking another inmate while he was housed in that cell. Id. at 4 (referencing id. at 16-23). Defendant asserts that she did not hear Hinton threaten Plaintiff in any way. Id. at 3. According to Defendant, Plaintiff did not file any complaints or complain to anyone about being placed in the cell with Hinton. Id. at 4. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not seek protective custody. Id.
Discussion
Defendant argues that she is entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff is barred from seeking money damages against her in her official capacity because of the Eleventh Amendment, (2) Plaintiff cannot prove an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, (3) she is entitled to qualified immunity, and (4) Plaintiff is barred from obtaining injunctive relief by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Doc. 35-1).
In his Response, Plaintiff clarifies that he is only suing Defendant in her individual capacity and that he is voluntarily dismissing his claim for injunctive relief. (Doc. 37, pp. 2-3). Therefore, the undersigned only considers whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect and whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Failure to Protect
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if [she] is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). “[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners . . . It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into [a] constitutional liability.” Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994)). To establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, a plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Id. (citation omitted).
When considering the first element, a court uses an objective standard to determine whether the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To satisfy this component, a plaintiff “must allege a prison condition that is so extreme that it poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's health or safety.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “There must be a ‘strong likelihood' of injury, ‘rather than a mere possibility,' before an official's failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
A plaintiff can establish a serious risk under two different theories: the particularized risk claim or the dangerous conditions claim. Estate of Owens v. GEO Group, Inc., 660 Fed.Appx. 763, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Under the first theory, a plaintiff must show that he was the target of a specific threat or danger. Id. Under the second theory, a plaintiff must show that the conditions he was subjected to were so dangerous that they resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. Id. As the premise of Plaintiff's claim concerns the threat made by Hinton, the Court will analyze his claims under the first theory.
In order to succeed on a particularized threat theory, Plaintiff must “adduce evidence that the individually named employee - [Defendant Smith] - had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm to” Plaintiff. Id. A prison “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [she] must also draw the inference.” Rodriguez v. Sec. for Dep't of Corrs., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). However, a prison official can avoid Eighth Amendment liability by showing, among other ways, “that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned makes the following findings. Plaintiff was moved to a two-man cell with Hinton because of an altercation with his prior cellmate that had resulted in Plaintiff being stabbed. Defendant approved the movement of Plaintiff into the cell with Hinton. Hinton told Defendant that he would kill Plaintiff if Defendant moved Plaintiff into Hinton's cell. Defendant responded that Hinton “ain't gonna fuck with her . . . he ain't gonna do shit.” Plaintiff resided with Hinton in the two-man cell without reported incident for eight days. Plaintiff, himself, did not feel that he was in danger, so he did not request protective custody, even though he knew how to do so. Plaintiff never reported any concerns to anyone about being in a cell with Hinton and Plaintiff never spoke to Defendant about being in a cell with Hinton. During a shakedown eight days after Plaintiff was moved into Hinton's cell, Hinton stabbed Plaintiff. Based upon these findings of fact, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims fail for the following reasons.
First, Plaintiff, himself, was not even aware of a substantial risk of serious harm when he was moved into the cell with Hinton. Plaintiff stated under oath in his deposition that he was “not afraid of nothing [sic].” (Doc. 35-3, p. 36:6). When asked to describe the process for requesting protective custody, Plaintiff confirmed that he knew how to ask for protective custody and that he had no reason to ask for protective custody. Id. at 36:10-18. Plaintiff also did not file any complaints after being moved into the cell with Hinton. Id. at 33:16-21 (“I didn't have no need to complain, because I was in the room trying to heal, bro.”); 33:23-24 (“Most of the time was just in the room sleeping, trying to rest.”). Further, Plaintiff resided with Hinton in the two-man cell for eight days without incident. Id. at 23:11-14. Taking Plaintiff's testimony to be true, Plaintiff was not in fear for his own safety and, in fact, resided with Hinton for eight days without incident.
Plaintiff's lack of complaints and failure to request protective custody are contrasted by the prisoner-plaintiff's actions in Rodriguez v. Secretary for Department of Corrections. In Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the prison official-defendants because, among other reasons, the prisoner-plaintiff verbally informed the prison official-defendants of threats made against his life and he filed a written request for protection. Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 618-19. Here, Plaintiff swore under oath that he was not afraid of Hinton, that he did not speak with Defendant about being moved into the cell with Hinton, that he resided with Hinton for eight days without incident, and that he did not see any reason to request protective custody.
Second, even if Defendant was aware of facts, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant “drew the inference” regarding subjective knowledge of the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Taking Plaintiff's deposition testimony to be true, when Hinton allegedly told Defendant that he would kill Plaintiff if she put Plaintiff in his room, Defendant allegedly responded, “he ain't gonna fuck with her . . . he ain't gonna do shit.” Id. at 30:12-13. Plaintiff's testimony demonstrates that Defendant did not have subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, or if she did have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, that she did not draw the inference. Put another way, Defendant may have “kn[own] the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844; see also Bishop v. Bolar, No. 15-0252-WS-C, 2016 WL 2962896 at *9 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2016) (adopted by Bishop v. Bolar, No. 15-0252-WS-C, 2016 WL 2962214) (S.D. Ala. May 20, 2016) (citing Brooks, 800 F.3 at 1299).
Because neither Plaintiff nor Defendant believed that Hinton posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to Plaintiff's health or safety, Plaintiff cannot make out an Eighth Amendment claim because he cannot establish that Defendant was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff because Defendant did not draw the inference. As Plaintiff “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof[, ]” the undersigned finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to protect claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Qualified Immunity
Defendant has also raised the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 35-1, pp. 10-11). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
As the Court finds no constitutional violation based on the facts provided, Defendant is also entitled to qualified immunity. Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 Fed.Appx. 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) be GRANTED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the district judge for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.