Opinion
Case No. EDCV 21-1672 JGB (SPx)
02-25-2022
Byron BLACK v. CITY OF BLYTHE, et al.
Cory R. Weck, Brynna D. Popka ; McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Ontario, CA, for Plaintiff Byron Black. S. Frank Harrell, Jesse K. Cox, Lukas R. Kramer; Lynberg and Watkins, P.C., Orange, CA, for Defendant County of Orange. Allen Christiansen ; Law Offices of Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, APC; Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant City of Blythe.
Cory R. Weck, Brynna D. Popka ; McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Ontario, CA, for Plaintiff Byron Black.
S. Frank Harrell, Jesse K. Cox, Lukas R. Kramer; Lynberg and Watkins, P.C., Orange, CA, for Defendant County of Orange.
Allen Christiansen ; Law Offices of Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, APC; Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant City of Blythe.
Proceedings: Order (1) GRANTING Plaintiff's Application to File Exhibit Under Seal (Dkt. No. 26); (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Defendant City of Blythe's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 19); (3) GRANTING Defendant County of Orange's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 20); and (4) VACATING the February 28, 2022 Hearing (IN CHAMBERS)
JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant City of Blythe ("Blythe MTD," Dkt. No. 19), motion to dismiss filed by Defendant County of Orange ("Orange MTD," Dkt. No. 20) (collectively, "Motions"), and Plaintiff Byron Black's application to file an exhibit under seal ("Application," Dkt. No. 26). The Motions are filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court determines these matters are appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15. After considering all papers filed in support of the Application, and in support of and in opposition to the Motions, the Court GRANTS the Application, GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Blythe MTD, and GRANTS the Orange MTD. The Court VACATES the February 28, 2022 hearing. I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2021, Plaintiff Byron Black ("Black") filed a complaint against the City of Blythe, City of Santa Ana, County of Orange ("County"), J. Cardona, and Does 1 through 100 in the Superior Court of California for Riverside County. ("Complaint," Dkt. No. 1-1.) On October 1, 2021, the City of Blythe removed the action. ("Notice of Removal," Dkt. No. 1.) On October 7, 2021, Mr. Black voluntarily dismissed City of Santa Ana from the case. (Dkt. No. 9.)
On October 29, 2021, Mr. Black filed a first amended complaint against the City of Blythe ("City"), the County, J. Cardona, and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, "Defendants"). ("FAC," Dkt. No. 16.) The FAC alleges five causes of action: (1) false imprisonment/false arrest against all Defendants; (2) violation of Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; (4) negligence against all Defendants; and (5) municipal liability for failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and Does 1 through 10. (See FAC.)
On November 29, 2021, the City filed its motion to dismiss. (See Blythe MTD.) Mr. Black opposed on December 6, 2021. ("Blythe MTD Opposition," Dkt. No. 22.) The same day, Mr. Black also filed the Application. (See Appl.) On December 13, 2021, Mr. Black replied. ("Blythe MTD Reply," Dkt. No. 28.)
On November 29, 2021, the County also filed its motion to dismiss. (See Orange MTD.) Mr. Black opposed on December 6, 2021. ("Orange MTD Opposition," Dkt. No. 23.) Mr. Black replied on December 13, 2021. ("Orange MTD Reply," Dkt. No. 29.)
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The following allegations are accepted as true for the purposes of the Motion:
On July 17, 2020, Plaintiff Byron Black was relaxing at home with his wife, son, and brother in Orange County, California, when a man dressed like a Fed-Ex delivery driver rang his doorbell. (FAC ¶ 15.) Mr. Black opened the door, and the man asked him to step outside to sign for a package. (Id. ¶ 16.) As Mr. Black stepped outside, three men dressed in plain clothes, along with the man dressed like a delivery driver, surrounded Mr. Black, handcuffed him, and told him he was under arrest. (Id. ¶ 17.)
The men informed Mr. Black that they were arresting him pursuant to a warrant issued by the County of Riverside, California on a felony vandalism charge. (Id. ¶ 19.) Mr. Black was afraid, confused, and humiliated. (Id. ¶ 18.) His son came downstairs because of the commotion, but Mr. Black pleaded with him to go back upstairs. (Id. ) Mr. Black's wife witnessed her husband handcuffed and in fear for his safety. (Id. ) Because these incidents took place in front of his house, Mr. Black was also in full view of neighbors and passersby. (Id. ) Before the men took him away, Mr. Black gave his wedding ring to his wife. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Mr. Black was transported to the Orange County Jail and held on a $5,000 bond. (Id. ) The handcuffs placed on Mr. Black caused great pain to his wrists, arms, and shoulders. (Id. ¶ 21.) At the jail, Mr. Black was searched and processed. (Id. ) He was subjected to x-rays, DNA collection, and probing medical questions. (Id. ) While he waited in jail, Mr. Black feared for his health and safety, particularly in light of the Coronavirus-2019 ("COVID-19") pandemic.
At around 3:00 a.m. the next day, July 18, 2020, Mr. Black was released. (Id. ¶ 24.) Mr. Black retained counsel for the forthcoming criminal trial for the felony charges. (Id. ¶ 25.) On or about August 11, 2020, the judge presiding over Mr. Black's felony case signed a certificate of identity theft and made a judicial finding of factual innocence. (Id. ¶ 27.) The judge determined that Mr. Black's "identity has been mistakenly associated with a record of the criminal conviction in this case" and that Mr. Black "is not the person for whom the warrant in this case was issued." (Id. ) He found that "there is no reasonable cause to believe that the petitioner committed the offense in this case, and that the petitioner is factually innocent of that offense." (Id. )
On or about September 3, 2020, the Blythe Police Department ("Blythe PD") issued a supplemental incident report ("Supplemental Incident Report") regarding Mr. Black's arrest, detention, and imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 28.) The Supplemental Incident Report found that the warrant to arrest, detain, or imprison Mr. Black for the felony vandalism charge was erroneously issued. (Id. ) The Report identified the suspect who should have been named in the original warrant as William Black, a man who is nearly ten years older than Mr. Black and has blond hair and blue eyes. (Id. ) Mr. Black has brown hair and hazel eyes. (Id. )
Mr. Black alleges that Blythe PD officers, including Defendant J. Cardona, issued, or caused to be issued, the warrant for his arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 29, 31, 39.) He further alleges that the men who arrested him on July 17, 2020 were members of the Orange County Sheriff's Department Tactical Apprehension Unit. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 31–32, 40.) He asserts that all Defendants unlawfully imprisoned him, or caused his unlawful imprisonment at the Orange County Jail. (Id. ¶ 31.) Their actions caused Mr. Black injury, severe emotional distress, and pain and suffering. (Id. ¶¶ 39–42.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Application to Seal
There is a strong presumption against filing documents under seal. See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, two standards govern requests to seal documents: the "compelling reasons" standard and the "good cause" standard. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2010). The "good cause" standard is an "exception" to the "presumptive ‘compelling reasons’ standard" and only applies to "sealed materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the merits of a case." Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). For all other cases, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of presenting "compelling reasons." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. "[T]he party must ‘articulate[ ] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the ‘public interest in understanding the judicial process.’ " Id.
B. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)") tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Factual allegations must be enough to "raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (" Rule 8(a)"), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief," in order to give the defendant "fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id.; see Horosny v. Burlington Coat Factory, Inc., 2015 WL 12532178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept all material allegations in the complaint—as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them—as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) ; ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) ; Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). Rather, the allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (" Rule 15") provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that " ‘[t]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.’ " Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) ). Generally, a "district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Application to Seal
Mr. Black seeks to file the Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside's certificate of identity theft and judicial finding of factual innocence in his case ("Certificate of Identity Theft"). (See Appl.) Here, Mr. Black asserts that he seeks to file the judicial finding under seal pursuant to Rule 4.601 of the California Rules of Court, which states that "[a]ny Certificate of Identity Theft: Judicial Finding of Factual Innocence ... is confidential." Cal. R. Ct. 4.601(a). "[T]he court, the identity theft victim, the prosecution, and law enforcement agencies may have access to the [Certificate]," and "[t]he court may allow access to any other person on a showing of good cause." Cal. R. Ct. 4.601(b). The Court notes that the document contains personally identifiable information. The Court finds that the maintaining the confidentiality of this information is a compelling reason that outweigh the public interest in discovery of this information. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Application.
B. Requests for Judicial Notice
Mr. Black and the City both request that the Court take judicial notice of Blythe PD's September 3, 2020 Supplemental Incident Report. ("Blythe RJN," Dkt. No. 19-2; "Black RJNs," Dkt. No. 24, 25.) Mr. Black also requests judicial notice of the Certificate of Identity Theft discussed above. (See Black RJNs.) "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally looks only to the face of the complaint and documents attached thereto." Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entmt. Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 2015). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court "may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Here, the FAC references both the Supplemental Incident Report and the Certificate of Identity Theft. (FAC ¶ 28.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Blythe RJN and GRANTS the Black RJNs.
C. City of Blythe's Motion to Dismiss
The City moves to dismiss all five of Mr. Black's causes of actions against it. (See Blythe MTD.) First, the City argues that the three state law claims—false imprisonment (Count One), intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") (Count Three), and negligence (Count Four)—fail on statutory immunity grounds under California law. Second, the City contends that Count Two, which alleges deprivations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is not a municipal liability claim. Finally, the City asserts that Count Five, Mr. Black's failure to train claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fails to state a claim.
1. Statutory Immunity for State Law Claims under Cal. Gov't Code § 815(a)
The City argues that the protections against government tort liability in Section 815(a) of the California Government Code grant the City immunity from Mr. Black's state law claims of false imprisonment, IIED, and negligence. (Blythe MTD at 4–9; Blythe MTD Reply at 6.)
The City correctly identifies that California public entities are not subject to tort liability unless a statute permits such liability. Cal. Gov't Code § 815(a) ; see also Eastburn v. Reg'l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552, 80 P.3d 656 (2003). However, as Mr. Black notes, public entities may be vicariously liable for their employees' actions under Section 815.2 of the California Government Code. This provision states that "[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against the employee or his personal representative." Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2(a). Even so, vicarious liability does not attach if "the employee is immune from liability." Id. § 815.2(b). As such, to determine the City's liability, the Court must consider whether California law protects the City's employees from false imprisonment, IIED, and negligence claims.
California law does not "exonerate[ ] a public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment." Cal. Gov't Code § 820.4 ; see also Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273 (1997) ("Under California law, a police officer may be held liable for false arrest and false imprisonment...."); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying police officers and the employer county immunity from false arrest claims under Cal. Gov't Code § 820.4 ). Accordingly, the City may be held vicariously liable if Mr. Black properly pleads a false arrest claim. Moreover, Mr. Black's IIED and negligence claims against the City arise from the false arrest claim. (FAC ¶¶ 58–67, 71–74.) Therefore, a Blythe employee would not be immune from Mr. Black's IIED and negligence claims, and the City can be held vicariously liable. See Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1378–79 (holding that discretionary act immunity did not protect police officers' alleged acts of "negligently [ ] conducting the investigation to verify that [the plaintiff] was the correct suspect" and of "intentionally caus[ing] his arrest and imprisonment"); Hall v. City of Fremont, 520 F. App'x 609, 612 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court erred in concluding the city defendant was immune from an IIED claim where city's police officer detained the plaintiff); Tacci v. City of Morgan Hill, 2012 WL 195054, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (finding that "neither the defendant officers nor the municipal defendants are immune" where the IIED claim "is derivative of his claim for false arrest").
The Court concludes that immunity does not insulate the City from liability for Mr. Black's state law claims. If Mr. Black "adequately pleads the elements" of false imprisonment, IIED, and negligence, then he "adequately pleads the vicarious liability of the [City] for those causes of action." Lawson v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1389, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 834 (2010).
a. Count One: False Imprisonment / False Arrest
" ‘False arrest’ and ‘false imprisonment’ are not separate torts. False arrest is but one way of committing a false imprisonment." Asgari, 15 Cal. 4th at 752 n.3, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273 (quoting Collins v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673, 123 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1975) ). False arrest "relat[es] to conduct that is without valid legal authority." Id. at 757, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273. False imprisonment "consists of the ‘nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.’ " Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559 (1994) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1123, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46 (1988) ). "The only mental state required ... is the intent to confine, or to create a similar intrusion"; the intent element need "not entail an intent or motive to cause harm." Id. at 716, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559.
"Under California law, a person who sets in motion a false arrest/imprisonment can be held liable for the tort even if he does not directly participate in the actionable conduct." Martin v. County of San Diego, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Bell v. State of California, 63 Cal. App. 4th 919, 928, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 (1998) (finding that defendant who supervised the officers who executed the arrest could be held liable for false arrest)); Pierce v. County of Marin, 291 F. Supp. 3d 982, 998–99 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (same); Harden v. S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 215 Cal. App. 3d 7, 15, 263 Cal.Rptr. 549 (1989) ("All who take part in or assist in the commission of a false imprisonment are joint tort feasors....") (internal citation omitted); c.f. Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 376, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (2004) (holding that civilians who provide information leading to an arrest cannot be held liable for false arrest).
Here, Mr. Black does not allege that any Blythe PD officer arrested him. (FAC ¶¶ 29–32.) Instead, he alleges that the City's officers proximately caused his false arrest by "issu[ing] or caus[ing] to be issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff without probable cause." (Id. ¶ 29.) Mr. Black alleges that "a reasonable investigation" by the City's officers would have revealed that he "was not the wanted suspect," but they failed to conduct one. (Id. ¶ 39.) The Supplemental Incident Report suggests that Blythe PD possessed photos of the vandalism suspect when Mr. Black's warrant issued. (Suppl. Incident Report at 2.) Mr. Black alleges that he and the original suspect differ in age and physical characteristics. (FAC ¶ 28.) Mr. Black further alleges that Blythe PD officers intended to have him "arrested, detained, and imprisoned without probable cause." (Id. ¶ 29.) By causing the warrant to issue, Blythe PD officers were the "moving force" behind his unlawful arrest. (Id. ¶ 31.) Moreover, Mr. Black alleges that Blythe PD officers "unlawfully imprisoned Plaintiff, or caused [his] unlawful imprisonment." (Id. ¶ 41.) Because the officers acted "in their capacity as police officers and/or supervisors with the Blythe Police Department," Mr. Black asserts the City is vicariously liable for their conduct. (Id. ¶ 29.) Though barely, the Court concludes that Mr. Black plausibly pleads a false arrest claim against the City. See Pierce, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (finding that plaintiff alleged a false arrest claim arising from mistaken identity when an officer "knew or reasonably should have known that plaintiff was not Huggard and that plaintiff had been mistakenly booked ... on the warrant for Huggard, and nevertheless sent plaintiff's picture when asked for a photograph of the subject of the warrant for Huggard").
The City correctly notes that the Supplemental Incident Report is a post-incident report, which should not be treated wholesale as "pre-incident knowledge." (Blythe MTD Reply at 7–8.) However, the Court finds that certain findings in the report show what Blythe PD officers knew at the time they issued Mr. Black's arrest warrant.
Contrary to the City's contention, Mr. Black need not allege that the City intended to cause his wrongful arrest. (Blythe MTD at 2, 6.) As noted above, the required mental state is not "an intent or motive to cause harm," but simply "an intent to confine." Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 716, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559. Mr. Black has alleged that the City's officers issued a warrant for his arrest because they intended to have him arrested. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29.) This is enough. For the same reason, a mistake does not absolve the City of liability. (Blythe MTD at 6; Blythe MTD Reply at 6–7.) Because Mr. Black alleges a false arrest claim, the Court DENIES the Blythe MTD as to Count One.
b. Count Three: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state an IIED claim, Mr. Black must allege: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." C.B. v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 544 F. Supp. 3d 973, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting Miller v. Fortune Comm. Corp., 15 Cal. App. 5th 214, 228–29, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 (2017) ). Outrageous conduct "must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Id.
The conduct at issue is the City's officers' issuance of Mr. Black's arrest warrant allegedly without probable cause. Mr. Black alleges that this act "caused Plaintiff to be subjected[ ] to unlawful and unconstitutional arrest, detention, and imprisonment without probable cause." (FAC ¶ 58.) While courts have held that an "unlawful arrest" without probable cause may constitute "outrageous conduct," McDonald v. County of Sonoma, 506 F. Supp. 3d 969, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2020), it is unclear whether the issuance of an arrest warrant without probable cause is also extreme. Mr. Black's cited authority involve excessive force and are inapposite. (Blythe MTD Opp'n at 8.) Even if the issuance of the warrant itself could constitute outrageous conduct, Mr. Black fails to allege that the City's officers intended to cause emotional distress. His conclusory statements that their conduct was "intentionally harmful" and undertaken "with the intent of, or reckless" are inadequate. (FAC ¶¶ 58–59.) Because Mr. Black fails to establish the first element, his IIED claim falls short and vicarious liability against the City does not attach. The Court GRANTS the Blythe MTD and DISMISSES Count Three as to the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
c. Count Four: Negligence
"The elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach of the duty of care." Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 534, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 801 (2009).
Mr. Black alleges the City's officers and employees owed him the following duties:
• "To conduct a reasonable investigation before proximately causing a person to be seized";
• "To verify information known to be wrongful to prevent causing innocent persons to be misidentified as criminal suspects";
• "To conduct a reasonable investigation before taking actions seeking the arrest or warrant for a person, in order to avoid causing the arrest of an innocent person";
• "To either follow one's training and experience—or seek and obtain the proper training or experience—in how to conduct a reasonable investigation or correct false information";
• "To refrain from foreseeably causing unlawful and/or wrongful seizures"; and
• "To refrain in general from violating citizens' rights, which are guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions and which are otherwise protected by law."
(FAC ¶ 72.) He further alleges that the City's officers breached these duties "by (1) failing to investigate a crime and/or the nature of Plaintiff's believed involvement in a crime that led to issuing a baseless and unlawful arrest warrant ..., (2) negligently hiring, retaining, training, directing, ordering, and supervising agents and employees who unlawfully arrested and detained Plaintiff and (3) adopting regulations, policies, and procedures that caused Plaintiff to be unlawfully arrested and detained." (Id. ¶ 74.)
The Court finds that Mr. Black fails to sufficiently allege that the City's officers owed him a legal duty. First, he offers no authority for a legal duty to conduct reasonable investigations before a warrant issues. Courts have found that a negligence claim based on "negligent investigation which leads to an arrest" sounds in malicious prosecution, rather than in false arrest. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1998) ; see also Ramsden v. Western Union, 71 Cal. App. 3d 873, 881, 138 Cal.Rptr. 426 (1977) (finding no recovery for negligence under theory that "defendants owed a duty ... to determine the truthfulness of the information supplied them showing the innocence of Plaintiffs prior to accusing Plaintiffs of the commission of a crime"). As a result, officers cannot be held liable for such decisions under Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6, which immunizes the initiation of formal proceedings. Trujillo v. City of Ontario, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1124 n.23 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Other courts have found that whether an officer investigates or not is a "discretionary act[ ] that fall[s] within [Cal. Gov't Code] § 820.2's statutory immunity." Pallas v. Accornero, 2019 WL 3975137, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019). While an "officer is not immunized from any negligence in conducting the investigation," id., Mr. Black's allegation is that the City's officers and employees failed to investigate altogether. Accordingly, any alleged failure to investigate cannot serve as the basis for the negligence claim here.
False arrest is distinct from malicious prosecution, "which constitutes procuring the arrest or prosecution of another under lawful process, but from a malicious motive and without probable cause." Asgari, 15 Cal. 4th at 754, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273. Officers receive immunity for malicious prosecution claims. Cal. Gov't Code § 820.4 ; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 262.1 ; Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6.
Second, "California law does not recognize a general duty of care on the part of supervisors with respect to negligent hiring, retention, or training." Estate of Osuna v. County of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2019). While California courts "recognize[ ] the existence of a ‘special relationship’ between arresting officers and arrestees," the issue here is "whether the supervisors responsible for hiring, training, disciplining, and so forth had such a special relationship." Id. at 1183. Mr. Black fails to allege any special relationship between himself and the City's employees who hire and train.
The City is correct that Mr. Black cannot allege a negligent hiring claim directly against the City. See Johnson v. Shasta County, 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2015) ("With respect to hiring and supervising practices, however, there is no statutory basis under California law for declaring an entity directly liable for negligence."). However, as discussed above, Mr. Black's negligence claim against the City alleges vicarious liability, not direct liability. (FAC ¶ 73.)
Similarly, Mr. Black fails to adequately allege that the City's officers held alleged duties to refrain from taking certain actions. An officer in "the State of California can be held liable for [ ] negligent omissions only if a special relationship [is] then obtained between him and plaintiff." Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779, 139 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1977) ; see also Pierce, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (finding defendant officers created a "special relationship" when they "created or increased a peril by affirmative acts" and thus could be held liable for "fail[ure] to take corrective action" to prevent plaintiff's misidentification). Again, Mr. Black has not alleged a special relationship. Nor has he alleged that the City's employees created or increased the risk of his misidentification.
Accordingly, in the absence of a sufficiently alleged legal duty, Mr. Black fails to state a claim for negligence under a vicarious liability theory against the City. The Court GRANTS the Blythe MTD and DISMISSES Count Four as to the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
2. Count Two: Deprivation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In Count Two, Mr. Black asserts deprivations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Mr. Black alleges that Defendants subjected him to unreasonable searches and seizures, used unreasonable force, and deprived him of liberty without due process. (FAC ¶¶ 49–56.) The City argues that the claim fails because Mr. Black only alleges individual liability, and not municipal liability. (Blythe MTD at 3–4.) The Court agrees with the City. First, to the extent that Mr. Black seeks to hold the City vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its officers' actions, such a claim is impermissible. Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), municipalities cannot be sued under a theory of respondeat superior for injuries inflicted by its employees or agents. Instead, municipalities are subject to Section 1983 liability when the plaintiff was injured pursuant to (1) an express municipal policy, such as an ordinance, regulation, or policy statement, (2) a "widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage’ with the force of law," or (3) the decision of a person with "final policymaking authority." City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–83, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Here, Mr. Black fails to plead a policy, practice, or decision of a final policymaker that caused his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment injuries. Mr. Black only alleges that the City "acted under the color of state law," Defendants "fail[ed] to intervene," and Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference." (FAC ¶¶ 51, 54.) Without more, Count Two amounts to a theory of respondeat superior.
Second, even if Count Two is a claim for municipal liability, it is insufficiently pled. Mr. Black notes that he identified several policies under Count Five. (Blythe MTD Opp'n at 8–10; FAC ¶ 83.) However, these alleged policies pertain to his failure to train claim. Nowhere in the FAC does Mr. Black allege that such policies now give rise to a separate Monell claim against the City. Mr. Black carries the burden of setting forth sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory, and he has failed to meet it. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Blythe MTD and DISMISSES Count Two as to the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
3. Count Five: Monell Liability for Failure to Train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Finally, the City argues that the Court must dismiss Mr. Black's municipal liability claim for failure to train because he fails to allege deliberate indifference. (Blythe MTD at 11–14.)
Though the City raises and rebuts additional theories of municipal liability, the Court does not consider them because Count Five is a failure to train claim.
To state a failure to train claim under Monell, Mr. Black must plead that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the City had a training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the persons with whom its officers are more likely to come into contact, and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly trained those officers. C.B., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 991 (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) ). A municipality's "continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). "[T]he existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved ..., is the ‘moving force’ behind the plaintiff's injury." Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ). "Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell." City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).
Here, Mr. Black asserts the same violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising from his allegedly unlawful arrest, detention, and imprisonment without probable cause. (FAC ¶¶ 81–82.) Mr. Black alleges seven "policies" to which the City adhered instead of instituting proper training. (Id. ¶ 83.a-i.) However, Mr. Black fails to explain how these alleged failures amount to deliberate indifference. He claims that the City "has a known history of issuing warrants for arrest without performing reasonable due diligence and investigation." (Id. ¶ 88.) This conclusory statement is insufficient to show more than a single incident of unconstitutional activity, given Mr. Black's seven different failure-to-train policies.
Rather than addressing this deficiency, Mr. Black contends that his Monell claim against the City survives under a ratification theory. (Blythe MTD Opp'n at 10.) Ratification is a separate claim from a failure to train claim. Count Five is titled "Failure to Train" and alleges that Defendants "are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the failure to train their employees and agents." (FAC ¶ 82.) Mr. Black cannot now fashion a different cause of action because he fails to state his pleaded claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Blythe MTD and DISMISSES Count Five as to the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
In sum, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Blythe MTD and DISMISSES Counts Two through Five against the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court DENIES the Blythe MTD as to Count One.
D. Orange County's Motion to Dismiss
Mr. Black asserts Counts One through Four against the County. (See FAC.) The County moves to dismiss all claims on mostly the same grounds as the City. (See Orange MTD.)
1. Statutory Immunity for State Law Claims
Like the City, the County argues that statutory immunity protects it from direct liability against any of Mr. Black's claims. (Orange MTD at 10–11.) As with the City, however, Mr. Black pleads vicarious liability against the County for his state law claims of false arrest, IIED, and negligence. (FAC ¶¶ 43, 67, 73.) Statutory immunity does not insulate the County from liability for false arrest or for IIED and negligence, which are derivative of the false arrest cause of action. Accordingly, the County is not immune. The Court considers whether Mr. Black adequately plead his claims to impose vicarious liability on the County.
a. Count One: False Arrest / False Imprisonment
Mr. Black's false arrest claim against the County largely mirrors his claim against the City, except he alleges that the County's officers arrested him. Mr. Black alleges that members of the Orange County Sheriff's Department Tactical Apprehension Unit "unlawfully arrested and detained, or caused the unlawful arrest and detainment." (FAC ¶¶ 31, 40.) This arrest occurred pursuant to a warrant. (Id. ¶ 19.) He further alleges that the County's officers then "transported [him] to and unlawfully imprisoned [him] at Orange County Jail." (Id. ¶ 32.) As the County notes, California law imposes another immunity hurdle when a plaintiff brings claims against an arresting officer. (Orange MTD at 12.) Under Section 43.55(a) of the California Civil Code, "[t]here shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest regular upon its face if the peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant." Cal. Civ. Code § 43.55(a). "A failure of any condition prevents immunity from attaching to a peace officer making the arrest." McKay v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d 251, 254, 168 Cal.Rptr. 442 (1980).
A warrant that is "regular upon its face" means "[a] paper arrest warrant that has been issued pursuant to a judicial order," or "[a] judicial order that is entered into an automated warrant system by law enforcement or court personnel." Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43.55(b)(1)-(2). Here, Mr. Black does not allege that the executed warrant was "irregular on its face." Pankewicz v. Jess, 27 Cal. App. 340, 342, 149 P. 997 (1915). Nothing suggests that the warrant was not issued pursuant to a judicial order, and Mr. Black does not attach the warrant to the FAC or his opposition. Though Mr. Black alleges that the Riverside County Superior Court found that he was "not the person for whom the warrant in this case was issued," he never alleges that he was not named in the warrant. (FAC ¶ 27.) Accordingly, Mr. Black also fails to allege that the County officers acted without the reasonable belief that he was not the person referred to in the warrant. C.f. Garcia v. County of Riverside, 817 F.3d 635, 645 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that Section 43.55 did not bar a false arrest claim where the plaintiff "challenge[d] Defendants' decision to detain him based on a warrant for another person"); Neylon v. County of Inyo, 2016 WL 6834097, at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (finding that defendants did not act reasonably when officers arrested a plaintiff whose name did not match the one on the felony warrant). Mr. Black must, therefore, allege that the County's officers acted with malice.
Malice "is defined as that attitude or state of mind which acuates the doing of an act for some improper or wrongful motive or purpose." Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 872 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Laible v. Sup. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 157 Cal. App. 3d 44, 53, 203 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1984) ). California courts equate malice with "deliberate falsehood" and "reckless disregard of the truth." Martin, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (citing Harden, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 15, 263 Cal.Rptr. 549 ). The Court finds that Mr. Black fails to show malice. Mr. Black alleges that the County and its employees "acted with malice or a reckless disregard for the truth," because "they knew, or should have known, that the arrest, search, detention, and/or imprisonment of Plaintiff was unlawful and yet they acted with a willful and reckless disregard for the truth or probity of the arrest warrant." (FAC ¶ 40.) This conclusory statement merely restates the legal elements without pleading sufficient facts. While Mr. Black alleges that the state court later found him factually innocent, the Court agrees with the County that this allegation—without more—depicts a mistake, rather than deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth. (Orange MTD at 12–13.) Mr. Black makes no other allegations that raise the inference that the County's officers acted with malice. Accordingly, because Mr. Black fails to overcome Section 43.55 immunity for any County officer, his false arrest claim against the County fails. The Court GRANTS the Orange MTD and DISMISSES Count One as to the County WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
b. Counts Three and Four: IIED and Negligence
Because Mr. Black's remaining state law claims for IIED and negligence arise from his arrest and subsequent detention, they are similarly precluded under Section 43.55 of the California Civil Code. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Orange MTD and DISMISSES Counts Three and Four as to the County WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Because the Court finds that immunity applies under Section 43.55, the Court does not consider the County's immunity argument with respect to Section 844.6 of the California Government Code.
2. Count Two: Deprivation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The County next argues that Mr. Black fails to sufficiently allege municipal liability against the County under Count Two. (Orange MTD at 4–10.) For the reasons discussed above with respect to the Blythe MTD, the Court agrees. Count Two's allegations as to the County fare no better than its allegations against the City. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Orange MTD and DISMISSES Count Two as to the County WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
In sum, the Court GRANTS the Orange MTD and DISMISSES Counts One through Four against the County WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Blythe MTD. The Court DISMISSES Counts Two through Five against the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court GRANTS the Orange MTD in its entirety and DISMISSES Counts One through Four against the County WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The hearing set for February 28, 2022 is VACATED.