Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-0227.
April 27, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Amdura Corporation's motion to dismiss the intervention of Coflexip Stena Offshore Company. For the following reasons, the Court denies Amdura's motion.
I. Background
Coflexip Stena Offshore, Inc. contracted with Bisso Marine on March 14, 1998 to lift two reels of offshore piping from the M/V MARK K to the CSO MARIANOS on the Mississippi River. Bisso Marine dispatched the D/B LILI BISSO to perform the lift. During the initial lift, the crane allegedly failed, and the crane boom fell onto the reel. The D/B LILLI BISSO, the M/V MARK K, the CSO MARIANOS, the pipe reel, and the pipe on the reel sustained damage.
Bisso Marine and TIG Insurance Company filed suit on January 22, 1999 against Conmaco, Inc. and Amdura Corporation. They seek compensation for damages to the D/B LILI BISSO and compensation for related expenses.
Nineteen months later, on August 22, 2000, Coflexip moved to intervene, seeking compensation for damages to the M/V MARK K, the CSO MARIANOS, the pipe reel, and the pipe on the reel. On November 20, 2000, Coflexip retained Dr. Doug Bynum to investigate the accident (Coflexip's Mem. Opp'n, Ex. O at 1), and, on December 28, 2000, it exchanged Dr. Bynum's expert report, in which he opines that the crane roto-chamber was defective. Trial is scheduled for January 22, 2002.
Amdura now moves to dismiss Coflexip's intervention. It argues that Coflexip's intervention is untimely and barred by the maritime doctrine of laches.
II. Discussion
In admiralty law, laches is an equitable doctrine entrusted to the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party's delay in bringing a claim should bar the suit. See Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 72 S.Ct. 12, 13 (1951) (per curiam); Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1980). As an equitable doctrine, laches cannot be determined merely by reference to and a mechanical application of an analogous statute of limitations. See Gardner, 342 U.S. at 31, 72 S.Ct. at 13; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 66 S.Ct. 582, 584 (1946). Instead, the Court must assess whether it would be inequitable to enforce the claim under the circumstances because of the delay. See Czaplicki v. S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533, 76 S.Ct. 946, 952 (1956); The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660-61 (1871). Accordingly, the Court must inquire into the excuse for the delay and the resulting prejudice in establishing a claimed right or defense. See Gardner, 342 U.S. at 31, 72 S.Ct. at 13; Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" off Nassau, 433 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. 1970); Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1965) (citing cases). "A weak excuse may suffice if there has been no prejudice; an exceedingly good one might still do even where there has been some." Fidelity Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. C/B MR. KIM, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1965) (quoting Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1963)).
While the analogous statute of limitations is not conclusive, it determines who bears the burden of proving or disproving inexcusable delay and resulting prejudice. See Czaplicki, 351 U.S. at 533, 76 S.Ct. at 952; Mecom, 622 F.2d at 1215. For when a plaintiff files an admiralty claim after the analogous statutory period expires, the plaintiff must prove an excuse for delay or an absence of prejudice to rebut a claim of laches. Mecom, 622 F.2d at 1215. The analogous statute of limitation may arise in state or federal law. See, e.g., Czaplicki, 351 U.S. at 533, 76 S.Ct. at 951 (noting only New York and New Jersey statutes of limitation might be applicable); Pizani v. M/V COTTON BLOSSOM, 669 F.2d 1084, 1087 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1982) ("the analogous state statute of limitations had run" (emphasis added)); Mecom, 622 F.2d at 1215-16 (affirming rejection of laches; district court found Texas statute was analogous statute of limitations); Bush v. Oceans Int'l, 621 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying three-year Jones Act limitation).
A. Analogous Statute of Limitations
Coflexip argues that the analogous statute of limitations is 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a, which provides: "Unless otherwise specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for personal injury or death, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the date of the cause of action accrued." The Court rejects this argument because § 763a, by its terms, only applies to "damages for personal injury or death;" it does not apply to property damage claims such as those asserted by Coflexip. Instead, the Court finds that the analogous statute of limitations for Coflexip's property damage claims is Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, which prescribes delictual actions after one year. See Puerto Rican-American Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Shipping Co., 829 F.2d 281, 283 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Puerto Rican statute of limitations to property damage claim); Azalea Fleet, Inc. v. Dreyfus Supply Mach. Corp., 782 F.2d 1455, 1459 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Missouri statute of limitations to property damage claim); Mecom, 622 F.2d at 1215-1216 (affirming application of Texas statute of limitation to property damage claim). See also Marine Equip. Mgmt. Corp. v. Louisiana Salt Carriers, Inc., 1993 WL 310510, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 9, 1993) (applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 to property damage claim) (Heebe, J.); Odeco Drilling, Inc. v. M/V CLAIRE TIDE, 1992 WL 329514, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 3, 1992) (Livaudais, J.) (rejecting § 763a in favor of Texas statute of limitation); Mobil Exploration Producing U.S., Inc. v. AZ/Grant Int'l Co., 1992 WL 186975, at *7 (E.D. La. July 28, 1992) (Sear, J.) (applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 to property damage claim). As Coflexip filed its motion to intervene almost two and a half years after the accident, the Court finds that Coflexip bears the burden of disproving inexcusable delay and resulting prejudice.
B. No Prejudice
Coflexip offers several reasons for its delay in moving to intervene. It asserts that for the first year after the accident Coflexip was primarily concerned with repairing the damages it sustained, that it was not apprised of this lawsuit until January 2000, and that it had no corporate counsel from October 22, 1999 through June 1, 2000. While these justifications may explain the delay, they are not sufficient to excuse Coflexip's late intervention.
Notwithstanding this inexcusable delay, the Court finds that the delay has not prejudiced Amdura's ability to assert a claimed right or defense. Amdura argues that it is prejudiced by Dr. Bynum's late breaking and novel theory that the crane roto-chamber was defective because the roto-chamber has been destructively tested without Amdura's participation or knowledge. Dr. Bynum, however, did not participate in the testing or destruction of the roto-chamber by Bisso Marine's experts on May 1, 1998. He formed his theory of the defective roto-chamber in December 2000 after examining the available evidence. As the trial is not until January 22, 2002, Amdura has ample time to challenge Dr. Bynum's expert opinion. While this challenge may require additional discovery, the mere fact that the roto-chamber has been destroyed does not prejudice Amdura's ability to assert a claimed right or defense because, in developing his theory, Dr. Bynum had access to the same information presently available to Amdura. Therefore, in the absence of any cognizable prejudice, the Court denies Amdura's motion to dismiss Coflexip's intervention.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Amdura Corporation's motion to dismiss the intervention of Coflexip Stena Offshore Company.