Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC 05-444941.
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Van Ness Management, appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff and respondent, Big Ring Holdings, LLC, $271,682 in damages resulting from a leaking ceiling above an as-yet-to-be-opened Laundromat, as well as attorney fees in the amount of $611.544.75. It argues that (1) the jury’s verdict is inconsistent and the judgment must be reversed; (2) the award of fees is excessive; (3) the court erred by failing to reduce the verdict; and (4) also erred by improperly allowing evidence of damages after the sale of the building. Finding none of these argument meritorious, we affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2004, Big Ring Holdings leased the ground floor of a six-story building on Ellis Street in San Francisco from Van Ness Management. Big Ring Holdings planned to open a self-serve laundromat in the space, one that also included a “green” wash and fold service as well as dry cleaning.
The ground floor of the building Big Ring Holdings chose for its new business was commercial; the remaining five stories above it were apartments. When Jeffrey Cleary, Big Ring Holdings’ sole owner, looked the space over he noticed one small leak. He pointed the leak out to Gary Brown, who was the sole member of Van Ness Management. Brown promised Cleary it would be repaired. Cleary relied on this promise and signed the lease for the space.
Cleary hired Terry Smith to help him design the laundromat and to build out the space. Smith estimated that the entire process of getting the space into shape to open for business would take three months. It did not.
Shortly after work on Big Ring Holdings’ new premises began, the space above the laundromat began to leak. Cleary counted numerous such leaks in different locations. In addition to letting grey water into the space, the leaks also emitted urine and feces. The leaks damaged the equipment Cleary had brought in to run the business and also damaged the build-out.
For the next nine months, as the leaks continued, Cleary frequently complained to Brown about the leaks. Brown assured him that the leaks would be fixed. They weren’t.
As early as 2000, Brown knew that the building’s waste pipes had to be replaced. However, rather than replacing the pipes, Brown told various employees-none of whom was a plumber-to fix the leaks one at a time, on an “as needed basis.”
Sometime before January 2005, Smith, Cleary’s consultant, offered to help find and fix the leaks. (RT 875) Smith quickly learned that the plumbing had to be replaced entirely. Sometime in 2005, Cleary told Brown that he had to get a plumber in to do the repairs.
Three months later, Brown hired R&L Plumbing to fix the leaks. According to R&L the pipes were “old, ” “bad, ” and the building was in “poor condition.” While R&L was undertaking repairs of the plumbing system in the building, the leaks got worse and trash and other debris accumulated in the space below the leaks. R&L worked on the leaks for three months. Brown did not replace more than a portion of the old plumbing and the leaks continued.
In June 2005, Van Ness Management’s insurer paid Cleary $40,638.49 as partial compensation for damage to the materials Cleary stored in the space while the leaks were being repaired. Shortly thereafter, Van Ness Management sold the building and assigned Big Ring Holdings’ lease to Rachel Artap. Artap didn’t know about the leaks, or of the ongoing dispute between Big Ring Holdings and Van Ness Management about the leaks. The leaks, and associated damages, continued.
At the time the building was sold, Big Ring Holdings, which was unable to open the laundromat, had incurred expenses of between $360,000 and $380,000. Several months after the building was sold, Big Ring Holdings sued Van Ness Management. During the pendency of the suit, Big Ring Holdings continued to attempt to open up the business, a process that was repeatedly delayed because of the need to repair the build out and equipment damaged by the leaks. Ultimately unable to recover from the losses it incurred in its effort to open the Laundromat, Big Ring Holdings closed the business in October 2007.
The parties went to trial before a jury in May 2008. The trial took 21 days, during which time Big Ring Holdings argued that, while the building was owned by Van Ness Management, Big Ring Holdings incurred costs between $360,000-$380,000 in getting the space ready to open the business. Big Ring Holdings put on evidence of lost profits in the amount of $1.5 million and the loss of its business, which was valued at $322,331.
The parties’ equitable claims-Van Ness Management’s cross complaint against Cleary’s consultant Smith, and Big Ring Holdings’ alter ego claim against Brown-were bifurcated and reserved for a later bench trial.
The jury found that Van Ness Management breached its contract with Big Ring Holdings and made intentional false representations of important facts to Big Ring Holdings. The jury awarded Big Ring Holdings damages in the amount of $271,682.
Seven months later, the court heard Phase 2 of the matter, namely, Van Ness Management’s cross-complaint against Cleary’s consultant, Terry Smith and Big Ring Holdings’ alter ego claim against Brown. Big Ring Holdings dismissed without prejudice its alter ego claim against Brown as an individual. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found in Smith’s favor.
Big Ring Holdings then moved for attorney fees under the lease, which contained an attorney fees clause. The court awarded Cleary fees in the total amount of $611,544.75. Judgment in Cleary’s favor for both phases of the trial as well as his attorney fees request was entered on July 10, 2009.
Van Ness Management filed a notice of appeal of the court's July 10, 2009, order on September 3, 2009.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Special Verdict
Van Ness Management argues that the jury made inconsistent findings of fact in the special verdict form with regard to its misrepresentations to Big Ring Holdings. We reject this argument.
The special verdict form presented to the jury contained two sets of identical questions. The first set, questions (1 through 8) polled the jury on its findings with regard to Big Ring Holdings’ intentional misrepresentation claim. The second set of questions (9 through 13) concerned Big Ring Holdings’ negligent misrepresentation claim. Although the special verdict form did not distinguish between the two sets of questions, the jury was advised by the court during deliberations (in response to its inquiry about what appeared to be duplicate questions) that questions 1-8 concerned intentional misrepresentation and questions 9-13 concerned negligent misrepresentations. Counsel for Van Ness Management was present when the court made this clarification and made no objection to it.
The jury answered questions 1-8 in the affirmative, and responded “yes” to question 3, which asked it to determine whether Van Ness Holdings “[made] false representations of important facts to Big Ring Holdings.”
After the court read the jury verdict, it informed counsel that “there is some inconsistency in the verdict form in that the same question -- question 9 is the same as Question 3. Question 3 was answered ‘yes.’ Question 9 was answered ‘no.’ ” The court told counsel that “[w]e can infer from this and from the Court’s previous answer to the jury’s questions, that the jury determined that there were intentional misrepresentations to Big Ring Holdings but not negligent misrepresentations to Big Ring Holdings. However, I’m interested, while the jury is here and before they have been discharged, counsel’s view on this. [¶] Certainly, the parties could stipulate that their interpretation also is that there was no negligent misrepresentation, but the questions are the same.”
Both questions asked “[d]id Van Ness Management make false representations of important facts to Big Ring Holdings.”
Counsel for Van Ness Management took the position that no clarification was necessary, even after the court suggested, and counsel for Big Ring Holdings agreed, that “we should send a further inquiry into the jury and ask them if by answering 3 ‘yes’ and 9 ‘no, ’ it was their verdict that there was intentional misrepresentation and not negligent misrepresentation.” Van Ness Management insisted, however, that “we should[n’t] mess with the verdict.”
Even after Van Ness Management stated a desire to avoid “mess[ing] with the verdict, ” the court nevertheless “propose[d] to bring the jury back into the courtroom and advise them that I’m going to give them a further question which is, and advise them that their answers to Questions 3 and 9, which are exactly the same question, appear to be different; and did, by their answers to those questions, intend that there was a finding of negligent misrepresentation and there was-that there was intentional misrepresentation and not negligent misrepresentation.” The jury was summoned, the court asked them to clarify their verdict, and they returned to the jury room to answer that question.
While the jury was deliberating, the court noted that the “jury previously asked this same question, why 3 and 9 were the same; and we answered that 3 through 8 relate to intentional misrepresentation and 9 through 13 relate to negligent misrepresentation.” The court then went off the record to “fashion[] a further question for the jury to clarify the earlier special verdict....” On the record, the court sought counsel’s input on that question.
Counsel for Van Ness Management stated, “I don’t understand the need for clarification, Your Honor.” Counsel for Van Ness argued that the jury had already been told that “Questions 3 through 8 relate to plaintiff’s claim of intentional misrepresentation. Questions 9 through 13 relate to plaintiff’s claim of negligent misrepresentation.” Counsel went on to argue that the jury had already received clarification, and “answered the special verdict form accordingly.”
In response to the jury’s question about why questions 3 and 9 on the special verdict form were the same, the court responded, in writing, that “Questions 3 through 8 relate to plaintiff's claim of intentional misrepresentation. Questions 9 through 13 relate to plaintiff’s claim of negligent misrepresentation.”
The court asked counsel for Big Ring Holdings whether “perhaps we need not do something further?” and counsel responded that “we should ask them just to make sure....” The court asked whether “the parties agree that the jury did not find negligent misrepresentation?” Counsel for Van Ness Management stated “[i]t appears from the special verdict form that they found no.” Counsel for Big Ring Holdings then stated that “[w]e’ll stipulate. We’ll stipulate that there’s no ambiguity in the form.” The court went on to say, “And that the jury did not find negligent misrepresentation but did find intentional misrepresentation?” to which counsel for Big Ring Holdings responded “Yes.” The court asked counsel for Van Ness Management if he also stipulated and counsel responded “That’s our position.”
Given this history, most of which is ignored in Van Ness Management’s opening brief, it is remarkable that Van Ness Management now argues that the special verdict form is inconsistent, “against the law, ” and “ground for a new trial.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 619 provides that “[w]hen the verdict is announced, if it is informal or insufficient, in not covering the issue submitted, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury may be again sent out.” Here, the jury’s verdict was-on its face-“informal or insufficient, ” because the verdict answered “yes” and “no” to identical questions.
However, neither the trial court nor the attorneys found the jury’s verdict to be insufficient. While it was deliberating, the jury was instructed that questions 3 and 9 referred to different types of misrepresentations, and counsel certainly understood this to be the case, going so far as to stipulate to the lack of any confusion in the verdict form.
Had Van Ness Management truly believed the jury’s verdict was ambiguous or insufficient-which it obviously did not-it had ample opportunity to seek clarification in writing of the different types of misrepresentation referred to in questions 3 and 9. That it did not do so-even when invited by the trial court on several occasions-constitutes a clear forfeiture of this issue. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 262; see also K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 950 [procedural challenge forfeited where appellant failed to object].) Similarly, under the doctrine of invited error, Van Ness Management is estopped from asserting prejudicial error here because its “own conduct caused or induced the commission of the wrong. [Citations.]” (Telles Transport, Inc. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167.)
In its reply brief, Van Ness Management asserts that this error can never be waived. This is simply not the case. (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding and Equipment Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456-457, fn. 2.) In any event, our holding is not that the error was waived, but that Van Ness Management forfeited it by failing to raise it.
In light of the clear record in this case that Van Ness Management was fully aware that questions 3 and 9 of the special verdict form referred, respectively, to intentional and negligent misrepresentation, respectively, that it urged the trial court not to send the verdict back to the jury to explicitly state the difference between the two questions (which it had previously been instructed on under an instruction to which Van Ness had no objection), and that it stipulated to the verdict form being without ambiguity, we are at a loss to explain why Van Ness has chosen to make this argument on appeal.
B. Attorney Fees
Van Ness Management takes issue with the court’s award of attorney fees. It does not dispute that an award of fees was permissible under the parties’ lease, or that Big Ring Holdings was the prevailing party. Rather, it contends that the trial court’s award of contractual attorney’s fees, pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 was excessive. It contends that the trial court’s calculation of the “lodestar” amount was erroneous because it made an award for time spent on Big Ring Holdings’ alter ego claim, that fees attributable to “multiple motions for attorneys fees were excessive, ” and that the “attorneys fees for prejudgment interest on the attorneys fees were not necessary.” Finally, Van Ness Management argues that, in general, “[a] claim of almost $800,000 in attorneys fees for a breach of contract case is clearly excessive.” We reject these arguments.
Fees were awarded to Big Ring Holdings pursuant to section 19.13 of the lease between Van Ness Management and Big Ring Holdings. This section provides, with regard to attorney fees, that “If either party hereto brings an action to enforce the terms hereof, declare the rights hereunder in any way related to this Lease, the prevailing party in any such action... shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by the losing party, including fees and costs on appeal.” Pursuant to this contractual provision, the trial court found that Big Ring Holdings was the prevailing party and awarded it attorney fees.
Before we discuss the law in this area, we will recite the history of the court’s award of attorney fees in this case. Big Ring Holdings filed three fee requests. Its first motion, filed in October 2008, sought fees in the amount of $635,445.25 for the three-year period during which it litigated the matter against Van Ness Management. It also sought to recover costs of $99,488.45 for that same time period. In an order filed March 17, 2009, the court awarded Big Ring Holdings fees in the amount of $611,544.75. This fee award was memorialized in the judgment of the court dated July 10, 2009, and was appealed from in a notice of appeal filed on September 3, 2009.
In April 2009, Big Ring Holdings sought to file a supplemental motion for fees incurred after the time period covered in its earlier request. The court denied the motion without prejudice to reconsidering the issue after judgment was filed in the case. This motion was renewed on July 31, 2009. In an order filed October 20, 2009, the court reduced the additional $73,945.25 requested by a substantial amount and awarded Big Ring Holdings $46,900.25. The court found a further request for fees in the amount of $4,380.89 untimely and denied it. Van Ness Management did not appeal from this fee award.
The general legal principles in this area are quite clear. When making an award of contractual attorney fees, the trial court has “broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group).) This is because “ ‘[t]he “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’-meaning that it abused its discretion. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228 [an appellate court will interfere with a determination of reasonable attorney fees ‘only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion’].)” (PCLM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
Civil Code section 1717, which governs the fee award in this matter, provides in part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ.Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) The trial court’s determination of appropriate fees proceeds in two steps. First, the court “begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney... involved in the presentation of the case.’ [Citation.]... In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, we indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131-1132; see also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)
Second, after determining the lodestar amount, the court shall then “‘consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.’” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1096, quoting Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77.) The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (PLCM Group at p. 1096.) The “necessity for and the nature of the litigation” are also factors to consider. (Kanner v. Globe Bottling Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 559, 569 [appellate court affirmed award of fees reduced by trial court]; EnPalm, LCC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774-775.)
In the course of litigation over the issue of attorney fees, the trial court had before it over 300 pages of detailed monthly billing invoices and vendor receipts, and declarations of Jeff Cleary who, in addition to being the sole member of Big Ring Holdings, is a lawyer who was admitted to the California bar in 1997, and Fulton Smith, the lawyer Cleary chose to represent him in his action against Van Ness Management.
In his declaration, Cleary described the reduced rate he negotiated with Smith, and his review of the monthly billings in the matter. Based on experience as a lawyer and his review of the record, Cleary attested to the quality of the work done, the need for experienced commercial litigators in what Cleary referred to as a “bet the company” case and the quality of the work done. He also stated that “Defendants disputed every issue, contested every discovery request, contested the admission of virtually ever document and contested every witness at trial....” In addition, “Defendants never participated in any meaningful way in settlement discussions (they never even made a CCP 998 offer until 10 days before trial), and... Defendants repeatedly attempted to and delayed trial....”
Fulton Smith also provided the court with a declaration that attested to his 20 years of experience in litigating both simple and complex civil actions, the fact that he had agreed to represent Big Ring Holdings at a reduced rate (which was never raised), and his efforts to minimize fees and costs.
Over the course of four hearings, the court carefully and conscientiously scrutinized Big Ring Holdings’ billing, required that Big Ring Holdings resubmit its billings in order to permit the court to determine which fees were attributable to the main action, the later ego claim, and the defense of Cleary’s consultant, Smith. The court’s fee order of $611,544 is well within its discretion.
Van Ness Management argues, however, that the trial court failed to exercise “equity” because it did not reduce the lodestar amount of Big Ring Holdings’ award by the $40,988.75 attributable to work spent pursuing Big Ring Holdings’ claim that Brown, individually, was an alter ego of Van Ness Management and, therefore, liable for any judgment against it.
In its order, the trial court explicitly addressed the issue of the award of fees for Big Ring Holdings’ alter ego claim. It stated that “The Court also awards attorney fees time and effort spent on the issue of alter ego. As noted in the Court’s ruling on December 17, 2008, the lease provision governing attorney fees in this case contains broad language. The proceedings in this case included vigorous litigation of the issue of alter ego as it relates to liability and satisfaction of a judgment. Thus, these fees are properly included in the award.”
The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fees related to litigating the issue of Brown’s liability for the damages Big Ring Holdings incurred in the event Van Ness Management did not pay the damage award against it were reasonable. Given the extent of its damages, and the fact that Van Ness Management was solely owned by Brown, Big Ring Holdings reasonably pursued an alter ego theory in order to protect any recovery it might achieve. That Big Ring Holdings ultimately dismissed this claim, without prejudice to renewing it later, does not indicate that the claim was meritless but, rather, that as a tactical matter, was a claim that could be pursued, if necessary, at a later date.
Nor is it the case, as Van Ness Management suggests, that Big Ring Holdings’ dismissal of this claim means that Big Ring Holdings did not obtain a favorable result in this litigation. The trial court held that Big Ring Holdings was the prevailing party. Big Ring Holdings recovered for both Van Ness Management’s breach of contract as well as for its intentional misrepresentations. This result was entirely, rather than partially, favorable.
Further, Van Ness Management does not point to any specific authority for its claim that the court was prohibited from awarding fees for legal work spent on this claim. Instead, it cites cases that recite the general principles that operate in this area of the law. (Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp. v. Howard J. White, Inc. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 266, 272; National Computer Rental, Ltd. v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 58, 63; PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1094-1096; Kanner v. Globe Bottling Co., supra, 273 Cal.App.2d at p. 569.) These cases, however, do not establish that the trial court in this specific context erred in awarding fees for Big Ring Holdings alter ego claim.
In addition to its argument that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Big Ring Holdings attorney fees for the pursuit of its alter ego claim, Van Ness Management also objects to fees awarded by the court following two supplemental fee requests, which cover the period after its original fee request. Van Ness Management recognizes that, in its order following these requests, the court “did make some reductions.” Nevertheless, it claims that the amounts awarded pursuant to the supplemental fee requests “should have been struck or reduced significantly, ” and the effort to secure prejudgment interest “was not a reasonable expenditure of time and fees.”
There are a number of problems with this argument, the first of which is fatal. On September 3, 2009, Van Ness Management appealed from the July 10, 2009, judgment, which awards fees for work conducted on Big Ring Holdings behalf in the three years up to trial. It did not, however, appeal from the court’s October 20, 2009, order, which awarded fees related to Big Ring Holdings’ supplemental fee requests and its effort to secure prejudgment interest. Having failed to appeal from this order, Van Ness Management cannot now complain of it.
In addition, Van Ness Management has utterly failed to meet its burden of presenting us with specific objections to the hours claimed by Big Ring. (Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2008) §§ 12.14A, 12.34, pp. 336-337, 368.4.) It was required to support these objections by evidence-simply claiming that the fees were unreasonable or excessive is insufficient. (See Avikian v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119; Children's Hospital and Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) This it did not do.
In any event, the court did not err in awarding these fees. As we have already explained, its alter ego award was well within its discretion. And the trial court’s October 20, 2009, order makes very clear that it was aware of and made reductions for the duplicative work conducted in bringing the supplemental fee award. The court reasonably reduced this fee request by a total of $17,500. The court also found that the fees requested for Big Ring Holdings’ unsuccessful motion for prejudgment interest on the original attorney fee award were excessive and substantially reduced this award.
Finally, we also reject Van Ness Management’s very broad argument that the fee award was, in general, “excessive, ” apparently because it is larger than the damages award. Van Ness Management fails to meet its burden of supporting this claim. It also does not acknowledge that its own fee request exceeded Big Ring Holdings’, an implicit endorsement of the reasonableness of the award. In any event, the trial court is under no general compulsion to reduce a Civil Code section 1717 fee award to some percentage of the damages awarded by the jury. We will not disturb the trial court’s decision.
D. Motion for Offset
After the jury verdict, Van Ness Management filed a motion for, among other things, a “credit on the verdict, ” to reflect a payment previously made to Big Ring Holdings in the amount of $40,638.49, and to “relief from debt” in an unspecified amount. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion.
The jury was aware that Big Ring Holdings had received a payment from Van Ness Management (the parties stipulated that there should be no reference to the fact that the payment originated from Van Ness Management’s insurer.) The jury was also aware of the amount of the payment ($40,638.49). Further, Cleary testified that he had deducted this payment from the amount of damages he was seeking from the defendants. Big Ring Holding’s financial documents made this clear as well. In his opening statement and in his closing argument, Big Ring Holdings’ trial counsel acknowledged this payment and reminded the jury that Big Ring Holdings was not including the damages for which it had been compensated by this payment in its claim.
The trial court quite properly denied this motion which, in effect, sought to offset from the jury’s damages award amounts that were never sought from the jury by Big Ring Holdings. The case cited by Van Ness Management-apparently in support of its contrary argument-is inapposite. In Margott v. Gem Properties, Inc. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 849, the court offset one judgment by the amount of a judgment obtained in another proceeding for the same damages. Here, Big Ring Holdings was clear that it did not seek to recover for damages for which it had been previously compensated.
We reach a similar conclusion with regard to Van Ness Management’s “debt relief” argument. Cleary testified that at the end of his business he sold, among other things, his washers, driers, and the copper pipe. He also testified that he was not seeking any amounts for which he had already been compensated through the sale of these items.
If Van Ness Management wished to ensure that the jury’s damages award did not improperly compensate Big Ring Holdings for these amounts, it was incumbent upon it to request a verdict form in which the jury itemized its damages award. (See Greer v. Buzgheia (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1158 [“[t]o preserve for appeal a challenge to separate components of a plaintiff's damage award, a defendant must request a special verdict form that segregates the elements of damages.].”) Having failed to do so, it instead requests that we speculate that the jury’s award improperly compensated Big Ring Holdings for damages it had already received compensation for. We decline to do so.
E. Evidence of Damages After the Building was Sold
Van Ness Management argues that the trial court erred because it allowed the jury to consider evidence of damages after the sale of the building. We disagree.
By way of background on this issue, Van Ness Management moved in limine for the court to exclude evidence of damages to Big Ring Holdings after the building was sold on June 27, 2005. Accordingly, the court instructed the jury that “On June 27, 2005, Van Ness Management sold 372/376 Ellis Street. After that date, Van Ness Management no longer had control over the building or a duty to repair the building, including the space leased by Big Ring Holdings. To recover damages occurring after June 27, 2005, Big Ring Holdings must prove that Van Ness Management’s breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation, if any, occurring before June 27, 2005, were a cause of that damage.”
Van Ness Management now contends that “[t]he damages in this case should have been cut off on June 27, 2005, and the trial court's failure to do so constitutes reversible error.” Van Ness Management does not specify what damages it alleges were improperly allowed, nor does it specify how the instruction-to which it failed to object-is erroneous. In fact, the instruction appears to be an accurate summary of the lease provision regarding the transfer of liability in the event of a sale of the premises. Nor does Van Ness Management provide this court with any evidence of damages sought by Big Ring Holdings for post-sale damages. Thus, we cannot ascertain whether such evidence was admitted and, if so, whether Van Ness Management objected, because its argument on this score contains not a single citation to the record. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent, Big Ring Holdings.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.