Opinion
CV116018916S.
12-06-2012
Donna M. BEST v. TOWN OF STRATFORD et al.
Rosenblatt Leon M. Law Offices, West Hartford, for Donna M. Best. Dey Smith Steele LLC, Milford, Welch Teodosio Stanek & Blake LLC, Ryan & Tyma LLP, Shelton, for Town of Stratford et. al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Rosenblatt Leon M. Law Offices, West Hartford, for Donna M. Best.
Dey Smith Steele LLC, Milford, Welch Teodosio Stanek & Blake LLC, Ryan & Tyma LLP, Shelton, for Town of Stratford et. al.
OWENS, J.T.R.
Plaintiff Donna M. Best has been the Director and Administrator of the Stratford Emergency Medical Services (" EMS") for the defendant, Town of Stratford for twelve years. She has been the operative head of the EMS department and responsible for all command and budgetary duties. Her position is defined and created by § 5.2.2 of the Town Charter of Stratford, Connecticut (" Charter").
In 2011 it is claimed that the defendant, Phillip Onofrio illegally usurped Ms. Best's office jurisdiction, and franchise when he took over control of the Stratford EMS and became the director. He assumed all of her jurisdictional command and fiscal responsibilities.
The defendant claims the Charter gives the mayor the authority to appoint any number of directors for each public safety department, based on the single, article, " a" contained in § 5.2.2. The evidence from trial does not support such a claim.
Defendant's interpretation violates settled rules of statutory construction. Onofrio cannot show complete legal title to the position because §§ 5.2.2-5.4.2 of the Charter clearly articulate the " Administrator of Stratford EMS" is the director of the department. All references define " director" as a singular position. Under a writ of quo warranto it is the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, Onofrio possesses complete legal title to the public office he holds. The defendants have not shown complete legal title to the position.
The testimony supports that Ms. Best has been the operative head of the Stratford EMS since 2000. She currently holds the titles of " Administrator of the Stratford EMS" and " Director of Stratford, EMS." Section 5.2.2 of the Charter clearly defines the " Administrator" of Stratford EMS to be the director of the department. Section 5.2.2 also defines the police chief, fire chief, and head of the human resources department as directors of each of those respective departments. Each department has only one director.
The Stratford EMS is a municipal department within the Town of Stratford that provides emergency medical care to the residents and visitors of Stratford. There are approximately 125 people who work in the EMS department. As the Director and Administrator of EMS, Best was responsible for all operative command, managerial, and fiscal decisions and responsibilities for Stratford EMS from 2000 to 2011.
At trial, Best testified the EMS Operations Manual, specifically § 1-2.2, concerning the " administrative command structure, " stated clearly that a chief shall be the EMS Administrator and in charge of all operations. Moreover, Best's position is classified in her collective bargaining agreement as the " EMS Administrator." Best was at all times prior to the defendant, Onofrio's arrival the director, the chief, and the administrator of the EMS. The Operations Manual had been formally adopted by the mayor and was the operations manual at the time of trial.
While Ms. Best was the active director, chief, and administrator of EMS, the Town of Stratford began advertising for a new " director" in 2010. The advertised duties for the new director of Stratford EMS were exactly the same as Best's duties.
In March of 2011, the defendant, Phillip Onofrio, became a second " director" of Stratford EMS and effectively removed Ms. Best from her position as director. After Onofrio took over as " director" of the EMS, the plaintiff sought a writ of quo warranto from the court because Onofrio did not possess legal title to that public office.
Although the plaintiff maintained her employment, it is uncontroverted that her office, jurisdiction, and duty to run the department as the director and administrator had been completely usurped. At trial, Stratford's " director" of Human Resources, Ronald Ing, testified without contradiction that as soon as Onofrio assumed the office of director, Onofrio took complete operational control of the organization and reduced Best to a subordinate role. Ing also testified that Onofrio took over the position as director in March 2011 without any authorization from the Town Council to pay for his salary.
Best testified, without contradiction, that every single task that Onofrio was hired to perform had been her direct responsibilities for the past eleven years. There is no dispute that Onofrio now performs each and every one of the duties contained in Best's job description. Ing eventually acknowledged and testified that when he read § 5.2.2 of the Charter he agreed that in her capacity as the Administrator of Stratford EMS Best was also the director pursuant to the wording of the Charter.
When Onofrio took over the office of director, Best was instructed, by the Stratford Chief Administrative Officer, vacate and leave her office. When Best met Onofrio for the first time, after he assumed control over her office, he introduced himself as the " director" of Stratford EMS. Immediately after that, Onofrio took away all of Best's duties as the operational head of the EMS. Onofrio: (1) took over her budget responsibilities; (2) replaced her on the Public Safety Committee; (3) took over training the staff and volunteers; (4) took over Best's previous responsibility for providing strategic direction of the EMS; (5) began performing her tasks of establishing operational policies and procedures; (6) took over her hiring responsibilities, including her responsibilities for writing job descriptions, interviewing and narrowing down the candidates for presentation of only the most qualified to the mayor for final approval; and (7) took charge of the command structure Best had been in charge of.
It is well settled that " [i]ln a quo warranto proceeding, the burden is upon the defendant to show a complete title to the office in dispute." (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, 174 Conn. 36, 38, 381 A.2d 547, 548 (1977). A quo warranto action is a civil proceeding ... Thus the trial court must find that the defendant met this burden by a preponderance of the evidence in order to find for the defendant. Deguzis v. Jandreau, 27 Conn.App. 421, 424, 606 A.2d 52, 54 (1992). In a quo warranto action, defendant must prove that he is entitled to the office and can prevail only on the strength of his own title not the weakness of the claim of the other party. State ex rel. Martin v. Pepin, 14 Conn.Supp. 225, 230 (Super.Ct.1946) (Inglis, J.).
The plain language of the Charter states the Administrator of Stratford EMS is the " Director" of the EMS Municipal Department. The charter does not provide for a second director. Thus, the defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing complete legal title to that position.
The mayor's ability to appoint departmental directors is restricted by the Charter. Section 1.2.13 of the Charter allows the mayor to appoint " department heads, except as otherwise provided in th[e] Charter." Section 5.2.2 does not provide for a second director to be created or hired by the Mayor because that job is codified as a singular position. Section 5.2.2, titled " Directors, " and states: " [t]he Fire Chief, Chief of Police, Administrator of Emergency Medical Services, Human Resources director, and the heads of each administrative department shall be a director, or the CAO may serve as a director of any or all departments until such time as a director is deemed necessary, unless otherwise provided." Every reference to " a director" contained in § 5.2.2 is singular. The defendant's argument that the language somehow creates authority for two or more directors is confounding and would require an exercise in mental gymnastics not consistent with our tenets of statutory construction. It would require a tremendous leap of faith.
General Statutes § 52-491 provides: " When any person or corporation usurps the exercise of any office, franchise or jurisdiction, the superior court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person or corporation for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law."
A successful quo warranto action unseats an illegal office holder and declares the position vacant. New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 219 Conn. 432, 436, 593 A.2d 1383 (1991). To prevail in a quo warranto proceeding, the title challenged must be to a public office. Id. see also Bateson v. Weddle, 2010 WL 3038562 *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 6, 2010), aff'd, 306 Conn. 1, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (Arnold, J.). To determine whether a governmental position constitutes a public office within the meaning of quo warranto two criteria must be met: (1) It must have its source in a sovereign authority speaking through the constitution or legislature; and (2) its incumbent, by virtue of his incumbency, must be vested with some portion of the sovereign power which he is to exercise for the benefit of the public. New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra, 219 Conn. at 436, 593 A.2d 1383. The object in a quo warranto action is simply to test the legal or actual right for the defendant to hold the office. Marsala v. City of Bridgeport, 15 Conn.App. 323, 327, 544 A.2d 191, 193 (1988).
" A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which ... an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer." Kelly v. Bridgeport, 111 Conn. 667, 670, 151 A. 268 (1930).
Ms. Best testified without contradiction that Stratford EMS is a municipal agency that provides emergency medical services to the residents and visitors of Stratford. She also testified without contradiction that the position of Administrator and Director of Stratford EMS is codified in the Charter. See West Dumais v. Underwood, 47 Conn.App. 783, 790, 707 A.2d 333, 337 (1998) (for purposes of writ of quo warranto, municipal " charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised ..." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
" It is well established that a [town's] charter is the fountainhead of municipal powers" Hartford Taxpayers Assn., Inc. v. Streeter, 190 Conn. 736, 742, 462 A.2d 379 (1983). It is equally settled that " [a] city can do no act ... unless it is authorized to do so by its charter." (Citations omitted.) Hennessey v. Bridgeport, 213 Conn. 656, 661, 569 A.2d 1122 (1990); Bateson v. Weddle, supra, 2010 WL at 3038562, *12. " The city's powers are thus limited to those that the charter expressly grants and to those that, by implication, are necessary to the exercise of the powers expressly granted." Id. A city charter " must be construed, if possible, so as reasonably to promote its ultimate purpose." Arminio v. Butler, 183 Conn. 211, 218, 440 A.2d 757 (1981). Here §§ 5.2.2 and 5.4.2 state clearly that the Administrator of Stratford EMS is the director of that public office.
When interpreting a town charter, the tenets of statutory construction apply. Booker v. Jarjura, 120 Conn.App. 1, 8-9, 990 A.2d 894, 900 (2010) A court's fundamental objective is to:
[a]scertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In other words, [a court seeks] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Bateson v. Weddle, supra, 2010 WL at 3038562 *11 (quoting Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 294-95, 933 A.2d 256 [2007]). " In arriving at the intention of the framers of the charter the whole and every part of the instrument must be taken and compared together. In other words, effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph, sentence, clause and word in the instrument and related laws." Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Bd. of Representatives of City of Stamford, 214 Conn. 407, 423, 572 A.2d 951, 960 (1990).
The defendant's legal argument simply does not pass muster. The claim that the framer's use of the indefinite article " a" in § 5.2 .2 allows there to be as many directors of EMS as the mayor wants despite the language in § 5.2.2 articulating expressly that the " Administrator of Emergency Medical Services" (Best) is the " director" is without merit.
The defendant has failed to satisfy his burden to show complete legal title to the position. It was clearly the intent of the framers for the clause " a director" to refer to a singular position.
Each reference to " a director" in §§ 5.2.2 to 5.2.8 refers to a director in a single capacity concerning his individual authority to head up a department. It is clear that co-directors were not contemplated; otherwise the framers would not have continuously codified " director" in the singular. There is nothing in the Charter to suggest that each department can have more than one director. Clearly, if such and an odd intention had been contemplated, the framers would have articulated it plainly. Clearly they did not. See State v. Scott, 256 Conn. 517, 538, 779 A.2d 702 (2001) (" [c]onstruction should not exclude common sense so that absurdity results and the evident design of the legislature is frustrated" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Although the Charter does not specify a particular mode of appointing directors, it obviously quantifies how many there can be. There can only be one for each department. See e.g. Bateson v. Weddle, 2010 WL 3038562 (Conn.Sup.2010) (Arnold, J.) aff'd, 306 Conn. 1, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (granting writ of quo warranto to oust defendant because singular position of wetlands compliance officer authorized by Charter was already filled).
Judge Arnold's well reasoned analysis in Bateson v. Weddle is closely analogous and instructive to this case. Id. There, the municipality attempted to circumvent the charter and internal regulations to create a second wetlands compliance officer. The court held that the appointment of a second wetlands compliance officer was in contravention of regulations because " the term Wetlands Compliance Officer [was] singular, and there [was] no provision for multiple Wetlands Compliance Officers in the Regulations or the Town Charter." There is no provision in the Stratford Charter for multiple directors of EMS. The defendants have not introduced any clear evidence that allows for there to be multiple directors of that department. In fact the defendant's only witness contradicted himself with regard to how many directors of EMS there currently were. The plaintiff has shown through evidence that the position of director of Stratford EMS has always been codified as a singular position and there is only one director of each of the departments enumerated in § 5.2.2. When the plain language is coupled with the actual practice, it becomes evident that Ms. Best is the only director of EMS allowed. Cf. State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, supra, 174 Conn. at 39, 381 A.2d 547; Carleton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of Bridgeport, 10 Conn.App. 209, 522 A.2d 825 (1987) (upholding writ of quo warranto where superintendent of municipal treatment plants appointed in contravention to law); State ex rel. Southey v. Lasher, 71 Conn. 540, 546, 42 A. 636 (1899) (" [i]f the charter points out a particular way in which any act is to be done or in which an officer is to be elected, then, unless these forms are pursued in the doing of any act or in the electing of the officer, the act or the election is not lawful"). See also State ex rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612, 620, 136 A.2d 792 (1957).
The claim that Bateson is distinguishable because the Charter in that case articulated a specific manner of appointment also fails. Judge Arnold's decision points out that the charter and internal regulations defined the office of wetlands commissioner as a singular position. Bateson v. Weddle, supra, 2010 WL at 3038562 at *13.
The language of the Charter in this case is similarly clear. The Administrator of EMS is the director of EMS. The Charter defines the position as a singularity. It does not allow for a second director position to be created. Moreover, if the Mayor wanted to create a new or additional director of EMS, the Charter mandates that he seek the approval of the Town Council by ordinance which he never filed. The defendant's only witness testified conclusively that the Town Council did not vote to create the position, only to fund it. In sum, to conclude that the Charter can be expanded to fit the defendant's premise, based on a single indefinite article, is unreasonable and not consistent with the rules of statutory construction, not to mention common sense. Cf. Bateson v. Weddle, supra, 306 Conn. at 18; State v. Scott, supra, 256 Conn. at 538, 779 A.2d 702. The defendants cannot show complete legal title by a preponderance of the evidence. They have not shown that he is the de jure director of Stratford EMS.
During trial, the defendants attempted through their attorney to argue that because town counsel advised him, his takeover was in accordance with the Charter. This argument misapprehends the law with regard to a writ of quo warranto.
When the defendant attempted to justify the takeover based on the plaintiff's performance, this court disallowed that evidence on relevancy grounds, stating that a writ of quo warranto is " a pretty narrow issue." (Tr. 9/10/12: 63.) When the defendant attempted to elicit evidence that defendant had a good faith basis for taking over the office of director of EMS, plaintiff's counsel objected again on the ground that the evidence was not relevant. When defendant's counsel said: " Our claim is ... [the Town of Stratford] have a good faith basis for doing what they have done, " this court again struck the question.
The court recognized it is not relevant how or why the person obtained the office. Once a court ascertains that the person is not the de jure office holder he must be removed. See State ex rel. Gaski v. Basile, supra, 174 Conn. at 41, 381 A.2d 547; State ex rel. Maisano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256, 231 A.2d 539 (1967); State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 72 A. 575 (1909); State ex rel. Southey v. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540, 42 A. 636 (1899).
The defendant's argument that he had a " good faith" basis for seizing the public office is not relevant to this court's legal analysis.
CONCLUSION
The defendant Onofrio is not the de jure director of the Stratford EMS. The defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the defendant Onofrio has failed to present any evidence to show complete legal title to his office, while the plaintiff presented a solid foundation of evidence showing that she is the director/administrator of EMS and has been for the past eleven years. The defendant, Onofrio, has failed to sustain his burden that he possesses complete legal title and this Court orders.