Opinion
2021 CA 0864
04-04-2022
Katherine Reznik BENOIT v. Benjamin Paul BENOIT
Katherine R. Benoit, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Pro Se Appellant Plaintiff—Katherine Reznik Benoit Prisca A. Zeigler, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellant Plaintiff—Katherine Reznik Benoit Deborah P. Gibbs, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee Defendant—Benjamin Paul Benoit
Katherine R. Benoit, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Pro Se Appellant Plaintiff—Katherine Reznik Benoit
Prisca A. Zeigler, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellant Plaintiff—Katherine Reznik Benoit
Deborah P. Gibbs, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee Defendant—Benjamin Paul Benoit
Before: McClendon, Welch, and Theriot, JJ.
WELCH, J. Katherine Reznik Benoit appeals a judgment partitioning the community of acquets and gains previously existing between her and Benjamin Paul Benoit. For reasons that follow, we vacate the amended judgment, reinstate the original judgment, amend the original judgment, and as amended, affirm the original judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Benoit and Ms. Benoit entered into a covenant marriage on October 5, 2003, and one child was born of their marriage. On November 27, 2018, Ms. Benoit filed a petition for separation based on La. R.S. 9:307(B)(6), which provides for separation from bed and board in a covenant marriage "[o]n account of habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable." Ms. Benoit also sought a termination of the community property regime. Mr. Benoit responded with an answer and reconventional demand, which sought, among other things, a separation of bed and board, the termination of the community, and after all delays and due proceedings, a divorce and a partition of the community of acquets and gains previously existing between him and Ms. Benoit.
On February 12, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment, which was signed by the trial court on April 30, 3019. Therein, the parties stipulated that, in accordance with the facts alleged in Ms. Benoit's petition, Mr. Benoit had exhibited cruel treatment and outrages toward Ms. Benoit that rendered the parties living together insupportable and that they had undergone the requisite counseling. The stipulated judgment further provided for a separation from bed and board in accordance with the covenant marriage statutes and, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2374(C), terminated the parties’ community property regime retroactive to the date Ms. Benoit filed her petition, i.e., November 27, 2018.
On October 30, 2020, Mr. Benoit filed a petition for divorce, and a judgment of divorce was rendered and signed on December 15, 2020. However, prior to the divorce proceedings, based upon the pending request to partition community property, the parties were ordered to file sworn detailed descriptive lists of assets and liabilities of the community. After the parties filed their respective sworn detailed descriptive lists and amendments thereto, a trial to partition the community was held on March 13, 2020.
The partition trial involved numerous claims between the parties. However, of particular importance to this appeal are the following issues: (1) the classification of the settlement proceeds from a personal injury lawsuit, which were received during the community as a result of Mr. Benoit's involvement in a motor vehicle accident; (2) Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for the use of his separate property (the settlement proceeds) to pay community obligations and to pay the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage; (3) Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for his uncompensated labor—the installation of new flooring—that increased the value of Ms. Benoit's separate property; (4) Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for the use of his separate property (the settlement proceeds) to purchase new appliances for Ms. Benoit's separate property; (5) both parties’ reimbursement claims for their attorney fees incurred during the separation and divorce proceedings; and (6) the value and allocation of the community enterprise, Eagle Lawn Service, L.L.C. ("Eagle")
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court rendered judgment, giving oral reasons and making specific factual findings. Relevant to the issues in this appeal, the trial court found that the settlement proceeds from the personal injury lawsuit in the amount of $330,644.29 were Mr. Benoit's separate property; therefore, the trial court granted Mr. Benoit's request for reimbursement for use of his separate funds to pay community obligations, i.e. the repayment of loans from Mr. Benoit's father and Ms. Benoit's mother, and to pay the parties’ living expenses. The trial court found that Mr. Benoit's installation of new flooring in Ms. Benoit's separate home increased its value, valued Mr. Benoit's labor for installing new floors at $10,000.00, and granted Mr. Benoit's request for reimbursement for the value of his uncompensated labor. However, the trial court denied Mr. Benoit's request for reimbursement for the appliances purchased for Ms. Benoit's separate home. The trial court also awarded each party reimbursement for one-half of the attorney fees that they had incurred during the proceedings. The trial court further found that Eagle had no value because it consisted solely of Mr. Benoit's efforts and ability to obtain contracts, and it allocated that asset to Mr. Benoit.
The trial court signed a judgment on April 16, 2020, which provided in pertinent part as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that the following assets ... are hereby allocated to [Mr.] Benoit:
1. The ... IRA valued in the approximate amount of $11,553.91, ...;
2. 100% ownership interest in Eagle ..., valued at $0.00;
* * *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED[,] AND DECREED that [Ms.] Benoit owes reimbursements to [Mr.] Benoit in the amount of $39,117.41 as follows:
a. The sum of $543.00 representing one-half of the $1,086.00 federal and state income tax refund from 2018 received by [Ms.] Benoit;
b. The sum of $2,637.50 representing one-half of the sum of $5,275.00 of [Mr.] Benoit's separate property used to purchase appliances for [Ms.] Benoit's separate property[; ]
c. The sum of $4,459.91 representing one-half of the separate funds of [Mr.] Benoit used to repay the loan from [Ms. Benoit's mother];
d. The sum of $10,000.00 representing one-half of [Mr.] Benoit's separate property used to repay the loan from [Mr. Benoit's father];
We note that the trial court, in its oral reasons for judgment, denied Mr. Benoit's reimbursement in this regard. Where there is a conflict between the judgment and the reasons for judgment, the judgment controls. Delahoussaye v. Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges, 2004-0515 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 646, 654 ; see also Spiers v. Roye, 2004-2189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06, 927 So.2d 1158, 1163 n.5, opinion set aside in part on rehearing on other grounds. (5/19/06) (noting that the holding in Delahoussaye applies to oral reasons for judgment). Therefore, as to this issue, the April 16, 2020 judgment controls.
e. The sum of $11,477.00 representing one-half of the attorney fees incurred by [Mr.] Benoit in this proceeding to date;
f. The sum of $10,000.00 representing [Mr.] Benoit's unreimbursed labor for the improvement of [Ms.] Benoit's separate property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that [Mr.] Benoit owes reimbursement to [Ms.] Benoit in the amount of $2,500.00 , representing one-half of her attorney fees incurred in this litigation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that the net reimbursement owed to [Mr.] Benoit in accordance with the above is $36,617.41 ($39,117.41-$2,500.00 = $36,617.41). This reimbursement is limited by the value of net community property received by [Ms.] Benoit, which includes only her movables, furnishings, and vehicle, without value proven at trial, and therefore this reimbursement claim is limited to $0.00 pursuant to the authority of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that [Ms.] Benoit owes reimbursement to [Mr.] Benoit in the amount of $119,190.16 for one-half of [Mr.] Benoit's separate property used for the ordinary and customary living expenses of the parties during the marriage, calculated as follows:
$330,644.29 (the total personal injury settlement proceeds received for the injuries of [Mr.] Benoit)
LESS THE FOLLOWING DISBURSEMENTS:
| $2,450.00 | payment on [Mr.] Benoit' s [student] loan |
| $2,166.00 | payment on [Mr.] Benoit' s [student] loan |
| $34,485.92 | for purchase of lawn equipment |
| $8,036.15 | purchase of trailer for lawn business |
| $20,000.00 | repayment of loan from [Mr. Benoit' s father] |
| $8,319.00 | repayment of loan from [Ms. Benoit' s mother] |
| $11,531.91 | purchase of ... IRA |
| $5,275.00 | purchase of appliances for [Ms.] Benoit' s separate property |
| TOTAL SEPARATE PROPERTY USED FOR CUSTOMARY LIVING EXPENSES | $238,380.32 |
| ½ OF SEPARATE PROPERTY USED FOR CUSTOMARY LIVING EXPENSES | $119,190.16 |
|---|---|
| TOTAL REIMBURSEMENT DUE: | $119,190.16 |
THEREFORE, ACCORDINGLY,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that judgment is rendered herein in favor of [Mr.] Benoit and against [Ms.] Benoit in the full sum of $119,190.16, which sum is made due and executory herein.
Following the signing of this judgment, on June 2, 2020, Ms. Benoit filed a request for written reasons for judgment, and on June 16, 2020, she filed a motion for new trial. On July 9, 2020, the trial court issued extensive written reasons for judgment with regard to the issues litigated at trial. Within the written reasons for judgment, the trial court noted that the April 16, 2020 judgment provided the "incorrect amount" for several of Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claims.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting extension of legal deadlines, both Ms. Benoit's request for written reasons and motion for new trial were timely. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1917(A) and 1974.
The first incorrect amount concerned Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for one-half of his separate property used to repay a loan from Ms. Benoit's mother for a car that was repossessed. The trial court noted that the judgment provided for reimbursement in amount of $4,459.91 rather than $4,159.99, which was one-half of $8,319.97—the amount reflected in the evidence. The next incorrect amount noted was Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for his uncompensated labor that increased the value of Ms. Benoit's separate property. The judgment provided reimbursement for the full value of Mr. Benoit's labor in the amount of $10,000.00 instead of one-half the increase in the value of Ms. Benoit's separate property. The last incorrect amount noted was the amount of Mr. Benoit's separate property that was used to purchase new appliances for Ms. Benoit's separate property. This error was noted by the trial court in both its determination of the amount of Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for the use of his separate property to benefit Ms. Benoit's separate property and in its offset that of that expense in determining Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for the use of his separate property to pay the ordinary and customary living expenses of the parties during the marriage. The judgment provided for reimbursement in the amount of $2,637.50, which was one-half of Mr. Benoit's separate property, rather than the full amount of $5,275.00. In addition, it was noted that the full amount of the reimbursement claim and the offset was actually $5,2 95.72 rather than $5,2 75.00, and further, that Ms. Benoit did not owe this reimbursement claim since Mr. Benoit was able to enjoy use of the appliances.
The trial court's written reasons notes that the April 16, 2020 judgment contained the incorrect amount of $4,459.00 for this reimbursement claim; however, the April 16, 2020 judgment actually provides for reimbursement in the amount of $4.459.91.
At the conclusion of the written reasons, the trial court stated that "[d]ue to calculation errors contained in the first judgment, a new judgment shall be prepared and signed accordingly." On July 29, 2020, after the trial court's written reasons for judgment were issued, but before a new judgment correcting the "calculation errors" was signed, the presiding judge of the trial court, Judge Hunter Greene, Division D of the Family Court of East Baton Rouge Parish, voluntarily recused himself. The reason cited for the recusal was that Ms. Benoit, a licensed Louisiana attorney, qualified to run for judge in Division D against Judge Greene in the 2020 judicial election. Following Judge Greene's recusal, this matter was re-allotted to Judge Charlene Day, Division C of the Family Court of East Baton Rouge Parish. On September 16, 2020, Judge Day, as the presiding judge of the trial court, signed an amended judgment, which was purportedly in accordance with Judge Greene's previously issued written reasons for judgment. This amended judgment provided:
We take judicial notice that the 2020 judicial election was held on November 3, 2020 and that the qualifying period for this election was July 22-24, 2020. See https ://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsandVoting/PublishedDocuments/ElectionsCalendar2020.pdf. As such, the grounds giving rise to Judge Greene's voluntary recusal did not arise until after he issued his written reasons for judgment.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that the following assets ... are allocated to [Mr.] Benoit:
* * *
d. The ... IRA valued at approximately $11,553.91
e. All right, title[,] and interest in and to Eagle ....
* * *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that the November 2015 personal injury settlement pursuant to the Petition for Damages filed by Mr. and [Ms.] Benoit for the personal injuries of [Mr.] Benoit, loss of consortium, and loss of support in the amount of $333,644.29, after the deduction of attorney fees and costs, constituted the separate property of [Mr.] Benoit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that [Ms.] Benoit is owed a reimbursement of $2,500.00 for one-half of any attorney fees she incurred, and [Mr.] Benoit is owed $17,020.00 in reimbursement claims for attorney fees, uncompensated labor, ... the use of his separate property to pay community debts, and the use of his separate property for the benefit of [Ms.] Benoit's separate property, with a net reimbursement owed to [Mr.] Benoit in the amount of $14,520.00. However, since this net reimbursement owed by [Ms.] Benoit to [Mr.] Benoit is in excess of community property received herein by [Ms.] Benoit, [Ms.] Benoit does not owe this reimbursement to [Mr.] Benoit for these claims.[ ]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED [,] AND DECREED that [Mr.] Benoit is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $133,339.30, as one-half of the separate property of [Mr.] Benoit used by the parties for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, and thus judgment is rendered herein in favor of [Mr.] Benoit, and against [Ms]. Benoit, for the full sum of $133,339.30.
See La. C.C. art. 2365.
A hearing on Ms. Benoit's previously filed motion for new trial was held on September 29, 2020, and on October 8, 2020, the trial court signed a judgment denying Ms. Benoit's motion for new trial. Ms. Benoit now appeals.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Ms. Benoit raises several assignments of error, essentially contending that the trial court erred in: (1) signing the September 16, 2020 amended judgment; (2) classifying all of the proceeds from Mr. Benoit's personal injury lawsuit as Mr. Benoit's separate property; (3) awarding Mr. Benoit reimbursement for one-half his separate funds that were used to pay community obligations and to pay the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage; (4) classifying Mr. Benoit's attorney fees that he incurred in the divorce proceedings as a community obligation and awarding Mr. Benoit reimbursement for one-half of the amount of his attorney fees; (5) determining that Mr. Benoit's uncompensated labor in installing new floors in Ms. Benoit's separate property increased the value of that property and in awarding Mr. Benoit reimbursement with respect to that claim; and (6) finding that Eagle had no value and allocating that asset to Mr. Benoit.
III. LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. The Amended Judgment
On appeal, Ms. Benoit contends that, following Judge Greene's recusal, it was erroneous for Judge Day to sign the amended judgment. Ms. Benoit argues that since Judge Day did not hear the evidence at the trial of the partition and was not a "successor" judge as provided by La. R.S. 13:4209, she had no authority to sign the amended judgment unless she granted a new trial. Ms. Benoit also argues that the amended judgment substantially altered the original judgment and that such substantial alterations to the judgment could only be done by granting a new trial. Thus, Ms. Benoit contends that since the trial court denied Ms. Benoit's motion for new trial, the amended judgment was absolutely null.
1. Judge Day's Authority to Sign the Amended Judgment
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1911(A) provides that every final judgment shall be signed by the judge, except as otherwise provided by law. See also Employers National Insurance Company v. Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Board, 95-1756 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So.2d 309, 311. A judgment signed by a judge who did not preside over the trial is fatally defective and does not constitute a final judgment. Employers National Insurance Company, 672 So.2d at 312 ; Herrmann v. Hernandez, 2010-2337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/10/11), 2011 WL 3242298 *1. The term "the judge," as used in La. C.C.P. art. 1911 is interpreted to mean the judge before whom the case was tried; a judgment signed by another judge is invalid. Davies v. Johnson Controls, 36,086 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 3/14/02), 810 So.2d 1281, 1282.
However, La. R.S. 13:4209 provides:
A. In all cases heard and taken under advisement of the district judge or judges of the city courts, if the judge before whom a case is tried dies, resigns, or is removed from office, or if his term expires before rendering his judgment in the case, his successor in office shall decide the case from the evidence in the record, if all of the testimony is in writing. If it is a case in which the testimony has not been reduced to writing, the succeeding judge shall decide the case from a statement of the facts, if one is found in the record, or if the parties to the suit agree upon a statement of facts. If the testimony is not in the record, and there is no statement of facts, the case shall be tried de novo.
B. (1) In cases which are heard and in which judgment is rendered, but not signed, whether the case was taken under advisement or not, if the judge who rendered the judgment dies, resigns, or is removed from office, or if his term expires before signing judgment in the case, his successor in office shall have the authority to sign a judgment which conforms with the judgment rendered.
(2) If a prior judge has stated an affirmative intent to sign a judgment and failed to do so for whatever reason, the successor judge is empowered to sign the judgment.
Citing La. C.C.P. art. 1911, Ms. Benoit argues that since Judge Greene was the judge that heard the evidence concerning the community property partition and was the judge that issued written reasons for judgment, Judge Greene was the only judge with authority to sign a judgment of partition. Ms. Benoit further argues that the exception set forth in La. R.S. 13:4209 empowering a "successor" judge to sign a judgment was not applicable since Judge Greene did not die, resign, get removed from office, or have his term expire; rather, he recused himself. Thus, Ms. Benoit claims that since Judge Day was not a "successor" judge empowered to sign the amended judgment, the only way for her to sign a judgment of partition was to grant a new trial and review the evidence. Since Ms. Benoit's motion for new trial was denied, Ms. Benoit contends it was erroneous for Judge Day to sign the amended judgment. We find no merit to this argument.
This issue has already been addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Henry v. Sullivan, 2016-1867 (La. 11/18/16), 206 So.3d 858, which granted supervisory writ and vacated this Court's decision in Henry v. Sullivan, 2016-0564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/16/16), 203 So.3d 501. In Henry, a custody trial was held before Judge Dawn Amacker, and Judge Amacker rendered oral reasons for judgment. Prior to the signing of the judgment in accordance with the oral reasons, one of the parties hired a new attorney, prompting Judge Amacker to recuse herself. The matter was then re-allotted to Judge Mary Devereux, who, citing La. R.S. 13:4209, signed a judgment in accordance with Judge Amacker's reasons. In doing so, Judge Devereux reasoned that if the prior judge rendered reasons, but had not yet reduced a judgment to writing, the "successor" judge had the authority under La. R.S. 13:4209 to sign a judgment that conformed to the judgment rendered. Henry, 203 So.3d at 502.
On appeal, this Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the judgment signed by Judge Devereux was not a final judgment. Henry, 203 So.3d at 504. This court reasoned that the authority granted under the provisions of La. R.S. 13:4209 applied only when one judge succeeds to the office or seat of another judge and not when a judge inherits a case from another judge. Noting that Judge Amacker did not die, resign, get removed from office, or have her term expire, but instead, she recused herself and that Judge Devereux had inherited the case, this Court held that Judge Devereux was not a "successor judge" for purposes of La. R.S. 13:4209. Henry, 203 So.3d at 503-504. Thus, this Court held that the judgment signed by Judge Devereux was not a final judgment over which this Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction. Henry, 203 So.3d at 504.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in granting supervisory writ and vacating the judgment of this Court, found:
The plain language of La. R.S. 13:4209(B)(2) provides, "[i]f a prior judge has stated an affirmative intent to sign a judgment and failed to do so for whatever reason, the successor judge is empowered to sign the judgment." [emphasis added]. In the instant case, Judge Amacker, through her oral reasons, clearly manifested an affirmative intent to sign a judgment in favor of relator. Therefore, Judge Devereux, in her capacity as successor judge, is empowered to sign the judgment. Any other result would be contrary to the statutory intent as well as the interests of judicial economy.
Henry, 206 So.3d at 858.
In this case, Judge Greene's written reasons clearly indicated an affirmative intent to sign a new judgment when he stated that "[d]ue to calculation errors contained in the first judgment, a new judgment shall be prepared and signed accordingly." Judge Greene then recused himself prior to signing that new judgment and this matter was re-allotted to Judge Day. Therefore, we find that Judge Day, in her capacity as successor judge, was empowered to sign an amended judgment correcting any calculation errors in the original judgement.
2. Modifications Made to the Original Judgment by the Amended Judgment
Next, with respect to the amended judgment, Ms. Benoit also contends that it was improperly signed because it did not merely correct errors in calculation; rather, it substantially altered the terms of the original judgment. Thus, Ms. Benoit claims that the amended judgment is absolutely null. We agree.
The amendment of a judgment is governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1951. At the pertinent time herein, La. C.C.P. art. 1951 provided as follows:
We recognize that La. C.C.P. art. 1951 was amended by 2021 La. Acts, No. 259, § 2, eff. August 1, 2021, to allow judgments to be amended to correct deficiencies in the judgment's decretal language.
On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not its substance, or to correct errors of calculation. The judgment may be amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all parties at least five days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received.
Thus, a judgment may be amended by the court where the resulting judgment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448, 450 (La. 1978). However, an amendment to a judgment which adds to, subtracts from, or in any way affects the substance of the judgment, is considered a substantive amendment. Suprun v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 2009-1555 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/30/10), 40 So.3d 261, 268. Substantive amendments to judgments can be made only by consent of the parties or after a party has successfully litigated a timely application for new trial, an action for nullity, or a timely appeal. Villaume, 363 So.2d at 451 ; Suprun, 40 So.3d at 268. Otherwise, a trial court lacks authority to make any modifications of substance to a final judgment. Bourgeois v. Kost, 2002-2785 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692, 696. When the substance of a judgment has been improperly amended, the amended judgment is annulled and set aside, and the original judgment is reinstated. Sanderford v. Mason, 2012-1881 (La. App. 1st Cir 11/1/13), 135 So.3d 745, 749 ; see also McGee v. Wilkinson, 2003-1178 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 552, 554-555.
In reviewing the provisions of the original judgment alongside the provisions of the amended judgment, we note the following changes to the original judgment were made by the amended judgment: (1) the total amount of the personal injury settlement proceeds classified as Mr. Benoit's separate property was changed from $330,644.29 to $333,644.29; (2) the total reimbursement claims owed by Ms. Benoit to Mr. Benoit for attorney fees, uncompensated labor, the 2018 tax refund, the use of Mr. Benoit's separate property to pay community debts, and the use of Mr. Benoit's separate property for the benefit of Ms. Benoit's separate property was changed from $39,117.41 to $17,020.00, resulting in the net reimbursement owed by Ms. Benoit to Mr. Benoit being changed from $36,617.41 to $14,520.00; (3) the reimbursement claim owed by Ms. Benoit to Mr. Benoit for one-half of the separate property of Mr. Benoit used by the parties for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage was changed from $119,190.16 to $133,339.30; and (4) the total amount of the judgment rendered in favor of Mr. Benoit and against Ms. Benoit was changed from $119,190.16 to $133,339.30.
We note that both judgments provided that Mr. Benoit owed reimbursement to Ms. Benoit in the amount of $2,500.00, such that the total or net reimbursement owed by Ms. Benoit to Mr. Benoit was offset by the amount of Ms. Benoit's reimbursement claim.
We recognize that both the original and the amended judgments provided that Ms. Benoit did not owe this net reimbursement to Mr. Benoit because it was in excess of the community property received by Ms. Benoit. See La. C.C. art. 2365.
These changes made by the amended judgment to the original judgment were not merely changes in the "phraseology" of the judgment or to "correct errors of calculation." Rather, the changes made by the amended judgment resulted in an increase of $14,149.14 in the total amount that Ms. Benoit owed to Mr. Benoit in reimbursement for Mr. Benoit's separate funds used to pay community obligations for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage and for which she was ultimately cast in judgment. Furthermore, these changes were not based on a determination that the amount of reimbursement owed was erroneously calculated, but rather on the trial court's determination that some of the amounts listed for the reimbursement claims in the original judgment were actually incorrect. Thus, we find that the amended judgment made substantive changes to the original judgment.
$133,339.30 - $119,190.16 = $14,149.14.
As previously set forth, substantive changes to a judgment can only be properly made by consent of the parties, through the granting of a motion for new trial, through an action for nullity, or through an appeal. There is no dispute that the substantive changes to the original judgment by the amended judgment were not obtained through an appeal or an action for nullity. Further, the record reflects that the trial court denied Ms. Benoit's motion for new trial, which was filed in response to the original judgment, and a judgment denying that motion for new trial was signed on October 8, 2020. Thus, the substantive changes to the original judgment were not accomplished by means of a new trial. Therefore, we must determine whether the substantive changes to the original judgment by the amended judgment were made pursuant to the consent of the parties.
Ms. Benoit maintains that she did not consent to amend the judgment and points out that the amended judgment was not a stipulated judgment and was not based on the consent of the parties. However, Mr. Benoit contends that Ms. Benoit consented to the amendment of the original judgment because she signed the amended judgment. We find no merit to Mr. Benoit's contention.
We agree that the amended judgment does in fact reflect that Ms. Benoit signed the amended judgment. Her signature appears at the end of the amended judgment, along with the signature of counsel for Mr. Benoit, following the phrase "Respectfully submitted." However, we do not construe Ms. Benoit's act of affixing her signature on the submission line, along with counsel for Mr. Benoit, as indicative of her consent to substantively alter and amend the original judgment. "Consent" is defined as "permission for something to happen or agreement to do something." New Oxford American Dictionary Online. The amended judgment does not reflect anywhere, on the four comers of the document, that it was based on the consent, agreement, permission or stipulation of either party. Rather, the beginning of the amended judgment specifically states that it was rendered "[c]onsidering the [w]ritten [r]easons for [j]udgment issued on July 9, 2020." And, the trial court's written reasons for judgment specifically ordered that "a new judgment shall be prepared and signed accordingly." Thus, the signing and submission of the amended judgment by Ms. Benoit and counsel for Mr. Benoit was clearly based on the order of the trial court, not the consent of the parties. Furthermore, the record before us does not reveal any evidence of Ms. Benoit's consent, permission, or agreement to make substantive amendments to the original judgment. To the contrary, the record overwhelmingly establishes that Ms. Benoit did not agree with the trial court's rulings regarding Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claims or the amounts thereof, much less that she agreed to increasing the amount of those claims and the amount to which she would be cast in judgment. Thus, we cannot say that Ms. Benoit consented to the substantive changes to the original judgment by the amended judgment.
For these reasons, we find that substantive changes to the original judgment were made by the amended judgment without following any of the proper procedural avenues in which to make such changes. As such, we must conclude that the amended judgment was improperly signed, that the amended judgment is a nullity, and that the original judgment must be reinstated. See Sanderford, 135 So.3d at 749. Therefore, we vacate the September 16, 2020 amended judgment and reinstate the April 16, 2020 judgment.
B. Personal Injury Lawsuit
Ms. Benoit next contends that the trial court erred in classifying all of the proceeds from the settlement of the personal injury lawsuit as Mr. Benoit's separate property. It is undisputed that the proceeds were received during the existence of the community as a result of Mr. Benoit's involvement in a motor vehicle accident, that the funds received were deposited into a bank account in the name of Eagle, and that all of the funds were thereafter spent by the parties within three years. Ms. Benoit contends that since she was also a plaintiff in the lawsuit, some of the proceeds should have been classified as her separate property. Alternatively, she contends that all of the proceeds should be classified as community since "the entire settlement award [was] used for expenses of the community or to compensate for the loss of community earnings."
Louisiana Civil Code article 2344 provides:
Damages due to personal injuries sustained during the existence of the community by a spouse are separate property.
Nevertheless, the portion of the damages attributable to expenses incurred by the community as a result of the injury, or in compensation of the loss of community earnings, is community property. If the community regime is terminated otherwise than by the death of the injured spouse, the portion of the damages attributable to the loss of earnings that would have accrued after termination of the community property regime is the separate property of the injured spouse.
The record reflects that Mr. Benoit was involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 15, 2014, and on March 27, 2015, a petition for damages was filed. Therein, Mr. Benoit sought damages for the personal injuries that he sustained, including, but not limited to injuries to his neck, back, right elbow, and right knee. Ms. Benoit was also named as a plaintiff, claiming that as a result of Mr. Benoit's personal injuries, she suffered damages for loss of society, loss of consortium, and loss of support.
Following a mediation that was held on October 22, 2015, a settlement was reached. The parties agreed to settle all claims in exchange for the payment of $600,000.00, and a "Mediation Settlement Agreement" was prepared and signed by both Mr. Benoit and Ms. Benoit. The mediation agreement did not contain a specific breakdown for any of the damages, and further, it did not indicate that any part of the settlement was for lost wages, loss of consortium, or loss of society. After attorney fees and other costs were deducted, the net amount received as a result of the lawsuit was the sum of $330,644.29.
At trial, Mr. Benoit specifically testified that he did not lose any work as a result of the accident. As a result of the accident, Mr. Benoit testified that he had seven ruptured discs and injuries to his elbow and wrist, which developed into tendonitis in both his elbow and wrist. Mr. Benoit also stated that he still has some pain from the accident and atrophy in his leg. Ms. Benoit admitted that Mr. Benoit lost no work as a result of the accident. Ms. Benoit stated that other than the date of the accident, "Mr. Benoit had been basically drunk most of the time." Other than Ms. Benoit's "guess" that of the net amount received ($330,644.29), her claims or damages were worth $50,000.00-S75,000.00, Ms. Benoit offered no other evidence regarding her loss of consortium or loss of society claim.
The trial court, in its written reasons for judgment, rejected the argument that any portion of the settlement was to compensate the community for Mr. Benoit's lost earnings or wages. In doing so, the trial court noted that the parties did not claim any portion of the settlement funds on their personal income tax return and that the evidence established that Mr. Benoit continued working after the accident and did not lose any work as a result of the accident. As to Ms. Benoit's claim that some of the settlement funds were for her loss of consortium claim, the trial court found Ms. Benoit failed to produce any evidence supporting this claim. Therefore, in accordance with La. C.C. art. 2344, the trial court found that the funds received from the personal injury settlement were Mr. Benoit's separate property. Based on our review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination in this regard.
C. Eagle Lawn Service
Ms. Benoit next contends that the trial court erred in determining that Eagle had no value and in allocating that asset to Mr. Benoit. Ms. Benoit contends that since Eagle owned movable assets, including equipment, trailers, and a truck, those assets should have been valued and allocated between the parties.
Both parties testified under oath that in 2012, they filed for bankruptcy, and in those proceedings, they both signed a statement under oath that Eagle, including its assets, had no value. At trial, Mr. Benoit stated that Eagle had no intrinsic value or equity and that it had no employees. Mr. Benoit testified that he had recently lost one of his accounts and that he had just rebid his biggest property and was waiting to hear whether that contract would be renewed. Mr. Benoit testified that most of his equipment was stolen, except for two pieces of equipment that he purchased with funds from the personal injury settlement. Ms. Benoit offered no evidence establishing that Eagle had any other value or that its assets (other than those purchased with Mr. Benoit's separate property) had any value.
The trial court, in its written reasons for judgment, recognized that Eagle was formed during the community and that before the parties separated, Ms. Benoit managed the financial matters of the business, while Mr. Benoit performed the operational matters. The trial court noted that after the parties separated, Mr. Benoit took over managing the financial aspects of the business. The trial court also noted the parties filed for bankruptcy and the documents they both signed under oath stated that Eagle's value at the time was $0.00. The trial court found that after the bankruptcy, the testimony and evidence at trial revealed that Eagle was not sustaining itself and that the parties were only able to get by financially with the help of Mr. Benoit's personal injury settlement. Further, the trial court stated that while the bank statements indicated that Mr. Benoit purchased over $40,000.00 worth of equipment for Eagle with his settlement money, both parties testified that almost all of the equipment was later stolen. Therefore, the trial court concluded that it could not even attribute the value of the equipment to Eagle. Accordingly, the trial court valued Eagle at $0.00, and based on our review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination in this regard. Lastly, the trial court also noted that Eagle would not exist but for Mr. Benoit's labor or efforts—both in its operation and management. Therefore, the trial court allocated Eagle to Mr. Benoit, and we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion with regard to this allocation.
D. Mr. Benoit's Reimbursement Claims
1. Community Obligations Satisfied With Separate Property of Mr. Benoit
Next, Ms. Benoit contends that the trial court erred in determining that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for the use of his separate property to satisfy community obligations. The trial court found that all of the funds received from the personal injury settlement were deposited into Eagle's bank account and that other than a few large expenditures, those funds were used directly by the parties to pay for their personal expenses and to pay community obligations. Thus, the trial court determined that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of those funds.
Ms. Benoit does not dispute that the all of the funds were deposited into Eagle's bank account, that all of the funds were spent by the parties, and that the funds were used, in part, to pay expenses of the community. Rather, she contends that once the settlement proceeds were deposited into the account of Eagle, those funds became the property of Eagle, or alternatively became community property, and thus, should not have been included in Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claims for the use of his separate property to pay community obligations. We find no merit to her arguments.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2360 provides that "[a]n obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation." All obligations incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community property regime are presumed to be community obligations, unless the obligation incurred was not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse. See La. C.C. art. 2361 and 2363.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2365 provides:
If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.
* * *
The liability of a spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to the value of his share of all community property after deduction of all community obligations. Nevertheless, if the community obligation was incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance, or education of children of either spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the spouses, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse regardless of the value of that spouse's share of all community property.
The evidence at trial established that on November 12, 2015, the settlement proceeds in the amount of $330,644.29 were deposited into Eagle's bank account. On November 19, 2015, the sum of $8,319.97 was transferred from that account to Ms. Benoit's mother to repay a loan, which was for Mr. and Ms. Benoit's car that had been repossessed. In addition, that same date, a check was written to Mr. Benoit's father for $20,000.00 to repay a loan from Mr. Benoit's father for the parties’ living expenses. Thus, the trial court found that Mr. Benoit's separate funds were used to pay community obligations in the amount of $28,319.97 and that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of that amount or $14,159.99. Notably, the trial court found that Mr. Benoit was entitled to this reimbursement regardless of the value of Ms. Benoit's share of community property. In other words, the trial court found that Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim in this regard was not subject to the limitation set forth in La. C.C. art. 2365.
The trial court then noted that Mr. Benoit used settlement funds to pay on two students loans, which were his separate obligation, in the total amount of $4,616.00; that approximately $42,522.07 of the settlement funds were used to purchase two pieces of equipment (a trailer and a lawnmower) for Eagle; that $5,295.72 was used to purchase new appliances for Ms. Benoit's home; and that an IRA was purchased for $11,531.91. Other than these large expenditures, the trial court found that the remainder of the funds received from the personal injury settlement were "used ‘for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance, or education of children of either spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the spouses.’ "
In reaching this determination, the trial court stated that "looking through Eagle[’s] ... bank statements ... it [is] painfully clear that the parties were indeed using the settlement proceeds for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage. The fact that the money was put into the business bank account does not change the fact that the parties were using the money from that account to live. Withdrawals from this [account] were used to pay for groceries, household utilities, tuition, student loans, and numerous retail purchases from places like Kendra Scott and QVC."
Therefore, the trial court determined that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the remainder of the settlement funds that were used to satisfy community obligations incurred for ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage. In accordance with La. C.C. art. 2365, the trial court concluded that Mr. Benoit was also entitled to this reimbursement regardless of the value of Ms. Benoit's share of community property. Based on our review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination in this regard.
Notably, both parties testified that the settlement funds were depleted by 2018. Ms. Benoit's testimony established that they "definitely needed the money from the [settlement] to supplement the income" from Eagle, and she admitted that the parties were "living off the settlement." Ms. Benoit further testified that after the receipt of the settlement, "we were finally able to take some of that money and do some things for the kids that we were never able to do. Like, go out to eat or take them to the movies, or try to do something to kind of help them bring some joy to their life because they really did not have any, before that time."
Mr. Benoit's testimony established that the settlement proceeds were received in November 2015 and that that the entire lump sum was deposited into a joint account with Ms. Benoit, which was titled in the name of Eagle. Mr. Benoit testified that all of the parties’ bank accounts were titled in the name of Eagle, that they had no other bank accounts, and that the Eagle accounts were used to pay for all of their expenses, including household bills. Mr. Benoit explained that the funds in the Eagle account from the settlement were to pay household expenses, including COSTCO, Sam's Club, Piccadilly, Target, Amazon, Paypal, and CVS. Mr. Benoit then testified that other than a few large expenditures, the remainder of the settlement funds were used to pay for the parties’ living expenses. Mr. Benoit also testified that the parties’ daughter's tuition and expenses were paid out these accounts. All of the bank statements for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 were offered into evidence.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court's determination that other than the purchase of lawn mower equipment, appliances for Ms. Benoit's home, the payment of Mr. Benoit's student loans, the purchase of the IRA, and the repayment of loans to Mr. Benoit's father and Ms. Benoit's mother, the parties spent the remainder of Mr. Benoit's personal injury settlement on their living expenses, which are detailed in the bank statements that were admitted into evidence. Those ordinary and customary expenses were presumed to be community obligations and Ms. Benoit offered no evidence to rebut this presumption. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of that amount, regardless of the value of community property received by Ms. Benoit.
As to the amount of reimbursement awarded, we find the trial court's judgment contains several errors. As set forth above, the trial court's judgment provides for a total reimbursement award of $119,190.16 for one-half of Mr. Benoit's separate property used for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage. The judgment provides that this sum was determined by taking the total proceeds received from the personal injury settlement ($330,644.29) and offsetting several disbursements from that sum. The disbursements set forth in the judgment total $92,263.98; thus the judgment provided that $238,380.32 of Mr. Benoit's separate funds were used for customary living expenses, and that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of that amount, which was $119,190.16. Furthermore, because Mr. Benoit's claim for reimbursement for the use of his separate funds to pay the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage was not limited to the value of the net community property received by Ms. Benoit under La. C.C. art. 2365, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Mr. Benoit and against Ms. Benoit for the sum of $119,190.16.
The trial court's written reasons for judgment noted several of the errors, and the amended judgment set forth the corrected sums for these claims in accordance with the written reasons for judgment. However, because we found that these changes were improper substantive modifications to the original judgment, the amended judgment was vacated. Given that this matter is before us on appeal, under the authority of La. C.C. P. art. 2164, this Court can amend the original judgment to correct the errors detailed herein. See generally Tunstall v. Stierwald, 2001-1765 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 916, 920-921.
We recognize that this amount is a minor calculation error, as $330,644.29 - $92,263.98 = $238,380.31 rather than $238,380.32 as reflected in the judgment.
First, the judgment included the $20,000.00 payment of the loan from Mr. Benoit's father, which was for the parties’ living expenses, and $8,319.00 payment of the loan from Ms. Benoit's mother, which was for the car that was repossessed, as disbursements to be offset from the settlement funds in determining the amount of Mr. Benoit's separate funds that was used to pay for the parties’ ordinary and customary living expenses. However, those sums should not have been included as a disbursement because the trial court found, and we agree, that those community obligations were paid with Mr. Benoit's separate property and were incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage. In conjunction with that same error, the trial court's judgment also provided that Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claim for one-half of those sums was subject to the limitation set forth in La. C.C. art. 2365. Therefore, we will amend the trial court's judgment to remove those disbursements from the calculation of Mr. Benoit's total separate property used for customary living expenses and to remove that reimbursement claim from the limitation set forth in La. C.C. art. 2365.
Furthermore, the judgment also set forth the incorrect amount of the loan from Ms. Benoit's mother in two separate instances. In the reimbursements owed by Ms. Benoit, the judgment set forth that Mr. Benoit was entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $4,459.91 for one-half of his separate funds used to pay the loan from Ms. Benoit's mother, and in the disbursement offset, the judgment set forth that the repayment of the loan from Ms. Benoit's mother was in the amount of $8,319.00. However, the undisputed evidence established that the correct amount of the loan repayment to Ms. Benoit's mother was $8,319.97; thus Mr. Benoit would be entitled to reimbursement for one-half of that amount or $4,159.99. Therefore, we will also amend the judgment to correct these errors.
Lastly, we note that the judgment set forth the incorrect amount for the purchase of appliances for Ms. Benoit's home in two separate instances. In the reimbursements owed by Ms. Benoit and in the disbursement offset, the judgment provides that the sum of $5,2 75.00 was used for the purchase of appliances for Ms. Benoit's home when the undisputed evidence reflects it was in the amount of $5,2 95.72. Therefore, we will also amend the judgment to correct these errors.
We recognize that the trial court denied this claim for reimbursement in its reasons for judgment. However, where there is a conflict between the judgment and the reasons for judgment, the judgment controls. See Delahoussaye, 906 So.2d at 654.
Accordingly, we hereby amend the judgment to provide as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Ms.
Benoit owes reimbursements to Mr. Benoit in the amount of $27,315.72 as follows:
a. The sum of $543.00 representing one-half of the $1,086.00 federal and state income tax refund received by Ms. Benoit;
b. The sum of $5,295.72 representing the sum of Mr. Benoit's separate property used to purchase appliances for Ms. Benoit's separate property;
c. The sum of $11,477.00 representing one-half of the attorney fees incurred by Mr. Benoit in this proceeding to date;
d. The sum of $10,000.00 representing Mr. Benoit's unreimbursed labor for the improvement of Ms. Benoit's separate property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Mr. Benoit owes reimbursement to Ms. Benoit in the amount of $2,500.00 , representing one-half of her attorney fees incurred in this litigation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the net reimbursement owed to Mr. Benoit in accordance with the above is $24,815.72 ($27,315.72-$2,500.00 = $24,315.72). This reimbursement is limited by the value of net community property received by Ms. Benoit, which includes only her movables, furnishings, and vehicle, without value proven at trial, and therefore, this reimbursement claim is limited to $0.00 pursuant to the authority of Louisiana Civil Code article 2365.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Ms. Benoit owes reimbursement to Mr. Benoit in the amount of $133,339.30 for one-half of Mr. Benoit's separate property used for community obligations incurred for the ordinary and customary living expenses of the parties during the marriage, calculated as follows:
$330,644.29 (total personal injury settlement proceeds received for the injuries of Mr. Benoit)
LESS THE FOLLOWING DISBURSEMENTS:
| $2,450.00 | payment on Mr. Benoit's student loan |
| $2,166.00 | payment on Mr. Benoit's student loan |
| $34,485.92 | for purchase of lawn equipment |
| $8,036.15 | purchase of trailer for lawn business |
| $11,531.91 | purchase of ... IRA |
| $5,295.72 | purchase of appliances for Ms. Benoit's separate property |
| $63,965.70 | Total disbursements |
| TOTAL SEPARATE PROPERTY USED FOR COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS INCURRED FOR ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY LIVING EXPENSES | $266,678.59 |
| ½ OF SEPARATE PROPERTY USED FOR CUSTOMARY LIVING EXPENSES | $133,339.30 |
|---|---|
| TOTAL REIMBURSEMENT DUE: | $133,339.30 |
THEREFORE, ACCORDINGLY,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is rendered herein in favor of Benjamin Paul Benoit and against Katherine Reznik Benoit in the full sum of $133,339.30, which sum is made due and executory herein.
2. Other Reimbursement Claims
Ms. Benoit next contends that the trial court erred in classifying the attorney fees incurred by Mr. Benoit during the divorce proceedings as a community obligation and in awarding him reimbursement for one-half of those fees. She also contends that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Benoit reimbursement for his uncompensated labor in installing new flooring in her separate home. However, before we address these two reimbursement claims, we must determine whether these issues present a justiciable controversy or whether they have been rendered moot by the terms of the judgment.
It is well-settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans Through Dept. of Finance, 98-0601 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1193. A justiciable controversy connotes an existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute that involves the legal relations of the parties who have real adverse interests, and upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character. Id. An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been deprived of practical significance or made abstract or purely academic. Id. Stated differently, an issue is moot when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. See In re E.W., 2009-1589 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10, 38 So.3d 1033, 1037. In this case, relative to Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claims for attorney fees and uncompensated labor, the trial court's judgment, as amended herein, sets forth that Ms. Benoit owes reimbursement to Mr. Benoit for the sum of $27,315.72 which included, among other things, Mr. Benoit's reimbursement claims for the "[t]he sum of $11,477.00 representing one-half of the attorney fees [he had] incurred ... in this proceeding" and "[t]he sum of $10,000.00 representing Mr. Benoit's unreimbursed labor for the improvement of Ms. Benoit's separate property." Offsetting the amount that Mr. Benoit owed in reimbursement to Ms. Benoit for her attorney fees incurred in this litigation, the judgment, as amended herein, further provides "that the net reimbursement owed to Mr. Benoit in accordance with the above is $24,315.72 ." The judgment then provides that "[t]his reimbursement is limited by the value of net community property received by Ms. Benoit, which includes only her movables, furnishings, and vehicle, without value proven at trial, and therefore, this reimbursement claim is limited to $0.00 pursuant to the authority of [ La. C.C. art.] 2365."
We note that this sum of reimbursement did not include Mr. Benoit's claim for reimbursement for the use of his separate property to pay the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, which was discussed hereinabove.
The trial court noted, in its reasons for judgment, that this value was incorrect. More specifically, the trial court found that Mr. Benoit's uncompensated labor increased the value of Ms. Benoit's separate home by $10,000.00, which would entitle him to reimbursement for one-half that value (or $5,000.00). See La. C.C. art. 2368. However, because we find that the terms of the judgment have rendered this issue moot, we decline to address any errors or discrepancies in the amount of this reimbursement claim.
Although the trial court determined that Ms. Benoit owed Mr. Benoit reimbursement for one-half of his attorney fees and for his uncompensated labor, the trial court noted that La. C.C. art. 2365 limited Ms. Benoit's liability for such reimbursement to the net value of community property that she received. Since no value for the community property received by Ms. Benoit was established at trial, the trial court determined that she had no liability for these reimbursement claims. Or, as stated in by the trial court in its written reasons for judgment, since "[t]he value of the community property that [Ms.] Benoit received was not proven at trial[,] ... she does not owe any reimbursement to Mr. Benoit for these categories." Thus, judgment was not rendered against Ms. Benoit for either of those two reimbursement claims.
Although Ms. Benoit seeks a ruling from this Court regarding the correctness of the trial court's determinations on those two reimbursement claims, regardless of whether the trial court was legally or factually correct, we find the result of the judgment would be the same—that is, Ms. Benoit does not owe any reimbursement to Mr. Benoit for these two reimbursement claims. Thus, any ruling by this Court on those issues would have no practical effect and would not provide any relief. As such, we must conclude that these two issues are moot and we decline to address the merits of her arguments in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the September 16, 2020 amended judgment of the trial court is vacated and the April 16, 2020 judgment of the trial court is reinstated. The April 16, 2020 judgment is amended, as set forth hereinabove, and as amended, the April 16, 2020 judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the parties—one-half to the appellant, Katherine Reznik Benoit, and one-half to the appellee, Benjamin Paul Benoit.
AMENDED JUDGMENT VACATED; ORIGINAL JUDGMENT REINSTATED; ORIGINAL JUDGMENT AMENDED AND AFFIRMED, AS AMENDED.
McClendon, J., concurring.
Based on the unique and convoluted factual and procedural history of the case before us, I concur in the result reached by the majority.