Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. EC045008, Michael S. Mink, Judge.
Robert N. Benjamin, in pro. per., for Cross-Complainant and Appellant.
Marilyn M. Smith for Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
This appeal arises from a civil action in which one of the parties attempted to introduce a claim for quiet title by way of a cross-complaint. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal on the ground that the quiet title claim belonged (if anywhere) in family law court because the property at issue was a marital residence which was then a subject in a pending divorce action. We affirm.
FACTS
A. The Underlying Divorce Action
Robert Benjamin and Linda Benjamin were married in 1989, but the union did not last. (Fam. Code, § 310, subd. (a).) In February 2004, Robert Benjamin and Linda Benjamin separated, and, in April 2004, Robert Benjamin filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. (In re Marriage of Benjamin (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2004, No. BD406071).)
All section references are to the Family Code.
In May 2004, Linda Benjamin executed a written agreement retaining attorney Candace Ladley to provide legal services in connection with the divorce action. At the same time, Linda Benjamin executed a declaration effecting a family law attorney’s real property lien or “FLARPL” to attach to real property located in Glendale. (See § 2033.) On May 19, 2004, Robert Benjamin was personally served with notice of the FLARPL. (Id., subd. (b).) Robert Benjamin did not file an objection to the FLARPL (id., subd. (c)), and, on June 28, 2004, Ladley duly recorded a notice of the FLARPL.
In February 2005, Linda Benjamin executed a substitution of attorney replacing Candace Ladley with Thomas Simpson as her attorney of record in the divorce action. At the same time, Linda Benjamin executed a declaration effecting a second FLARPL to attach to the Glendale property, along with a deed of trust against the Glendale property “[f]or the purpose of securing . . . payment of the sum of $ per retainer agreement . . . .” On March 7, 2005, Simpson recorded the deed of trust.
B. The Separate Civil Action to Collect Legal Fees
In May 2007, before the Benjamins’ divorce action had been concluded, attorney Ladley filed a civil complaint against Linda Benjamin for breach of contract. (Ladley v. Benjamin (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2007, No. EC045008).) Ladley’s civil complaint alleged that Linda Benjamin owed approximately $26,000 for legal services performed by Ladley in connection with the underlying divorce action.
Ladley’s civil complaint also included a cause of action to foreclose the FLARPL which had attached to the Glendale property. (See part A, ante.) Because the cause of action to foreclose the FLARPL implicated all those who had interests of record in the Glendale property, it named as defendants the record owners of the property, Linda Benjamin and Robert Benjamin, along with the Benjamins’ secured lender, Washington Mutual Bank; as well as Thomas Simpson, the beneficiary under the deed of trust which Linda Benjamin had executed in 2005 and which had been recorded in the same year.
C. The Quiet Title Claim in the Civil Action
On June 20, 2007, Robert Benjamin answered Ladley’s cause of action to foreclose the FLARPL which had attached to the Glendale property. On the same day, Robert Benjamin filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for quiet title, cancellation of the FLARPL in favor of Ladley and the deed of trust in favor of Simpson, and declaratory relief. To put it in his own words, Robert Benjamin wanted a judgment declaring that he was “the owner of 100% of the [Glendale] property.”
On July 23, 2007, Ladley answered Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint.
Thomas Simpson took a different tack. On August 15, 2007, Simpson filed a demurrer to Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint. Broadly summarized, Simpson’s demurrer argued that the family law court had priority jurisdiction over all matters involving Robert Benjamin’s and Linda Benjamin’s interests in the Glendale property, and that Robert Benjamin could not litigate his claim to a “100%” interest in the property within the context of Ladley’s separate civil action.
On September 28, 2007, the trial court sustained Simpson’s demurrer to Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint for quiet title and declaratory relief without leave to amend, and entered a judgment dismissing Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint as to Simpson.
Robert Benjamin filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
The trial court’s judgment comes to our court with a presumption that it is correct. For this reason, we will not reverse the judgment unless Robert Benjamin has persuaded us, through cogent arguments consisting of appropriate record references and factual and legal analysis, that the judgment is infected with prejudicial error. (See, e.g., Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 373; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) After reviewing Robert Benjamin’s arguments on appeal, we are not convinced that the trial court’s ruling on Simpson’s demurrer was incorrect.
If we read his pleading correctly, the gist of Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint rested on these assertions: (1) Candace Ladley and Thomas Simpson could not attempt to collect their legal fees (i.e., the legal fees owed by Lisa Benjamin) through any form of enforcement procedure which looked to the Glendale property as the proverbial cash drawer, because (2) he, Robert Benjamin, owned “100%” of the property, meaning that (3) Linda Benjamin owned no interest in the property, and, thus, could not encumber any part of the property to secure payment of her legal bills.
The fundamental problem with Robert Benjamin’s pleading is that the family law court had long-before been vested with priority jurisdiction to render a judgment concerning the respective property rights of Robert Benjamin and Linda Benjamin in the Glendale property. (See § 2010, subd. (e); and see also In re Marriage of Schenck (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1474, 1482-1484.) In other words, the task of determining whether the Glendale property belonged “100%” to Robert Benjamin had been reserved to the family law court in the first instance, at the very moment that Robert Benjamin filed his petition to dissolve his marriage to Linda Benjamin, and no other civil court could take any action which potentially frustrated the family law court’s duty to dispose of the property. (In re Marriage of Schenck, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1482-1484.)
We disagree with Robert Benjamin that he was entitled to declaratory relief on the dispute over whether the FLARPLs and deed of trust related to Linda Benjamin’s liability for legal fees were valid. Although Robert Benjamin is correct that a plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights even when the plaintiff’s pleading shows on its face that the plaintiff is in the wrong (see, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947), he overlooks that it is equally true that declaratory relief requires the existence of an “actual controversy” that is “ripe” for a judicial determination. In other words, an action for declaratory relief is not the appropriate forum for answering abstract or academic questions, and declaratory relief is unavailable in the absence of an actual controversy between the parties which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment, as opposed to an advisory opinion on a hypothetical or potential state of facts. (See, e.g., Newland v. Kizer (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 647, 657-658.)
In the current case, we cannot see that any purpose would have been served – as of the time that Robert Benjamin filed his cross-complaint and Simpson filed his demurrer to the cross-complaint – in addressing the validity of the FLARPLs or deed of trust. Until such time as the family law court resolved the respective interests of Robert Benjamin and Linda Benjamin in the Glendale property, it was premature for any court to address whether Linda Benjamin had properly encumbered any part of the property. Apart from this more general principle, section 2034, subdivision (c), expressly provides that the family law court has jurisdiction to resolve any dispute arising from the existence of a FLARPL. The trial court correctly decided that matters involving the Glendale property belonged in the family law court in the first instance.
II.
This brings us to Robert Benjamin’s contention that the trial court should have stayed his cross-complaint, and not dismissed his cross-complaint. He is incorrect. “After a family law court acquires jurisdiction to divide community property in a dissolution action, no other department of a superior court may make an order adversely affecting that division.” (Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961.) Therefore, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the cross-complaint. (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 398.)
III.
We briefly address one final point. In their briefs on appeal, Robert Benjamin and Simpson have both devoted a significant amount of discussion to the possible ramifications of a settlement agreement and judgment in 2008 in the underlying divorce action. We summarily ignore these discussions. The appeal before us today arises from a judgment of dismissal of Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint which the trial court entered in 2007 in the context of Ladley’s civil action to collect legal fees. We decline to consider matters which occurred in the underlying divorce action in 2008; those matters are beyond the scope of the current appeal. If the settlement agreement and judgment in the divorce action have mooted Robert Benjamin’s cross-complaint, then the parties should request the appeal to be dismissed.
Robert Benjamin’s request for judicial notice of matters in yet another case, (Simpson v. Benjamin (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2007, No. EC046968)) is denied for the same reason.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Thomas L. Simpson is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.