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Benefield v. Warden

United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana
May 2, 2024
6:23-CV-01802 SEC P (W.D. La. May. 2, 2024)

Opinion

6:23-CV-01802 SEC P

05-02-2024

SOPHIA ANDREA BENEFIELD #6475 v. WARDEN


TERRY A. DOUGHTY, JUDGE.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Carol B. Whitehurst, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before this Court are the original and amended petitions for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 by pro se petitioner Sophia Andrea Benefield, an inmate in the custody of Louisiana's Department of Corrections, on December 14, 2023. Docs. 1, 3. Petitioner attacks her November 9, 2022, conviction in the16th Judicial District Court, St. Marin Parish for manslaughter and subsequent thirteen-year sentence she is serving. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of the Court. For the following reasons it is recommended that the petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).

I. Background

On November 9, 2022, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter. Doc. 1, p. 1. She was sentenced to a term of thirty years, with all but thirteen years suspended. Id.

Petitioner did not file an appeal. Doc. 3, p. 2.

On December 14, 2023, the instant petition was filed in this Court, including Petitioner's request to stay and abey the petition while she seeks state post-conviction relief. Doc. 3, p. 12.

II. Law and Analysis

a. Rule 4

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed.

b. Limitations

This petition was filed after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Therefore, the court must apply the provisions of AEDPA, including the timeliness provisions. Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 8/9/1999); In Re Smith, 142 F.3d 832, 834, citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Title 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A) was amended by AEDPA to provide a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of applications for writ of habeas corpus by persons such as petitioner, who are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. This limitation period generally runs from “...the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review...” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A).

Nothing in the record before the court suggests that any State created impediments prevented the filing of the petition. Further, nothing in the record suggests that petitioner is relying on a constitutional right newly recognized by the United States Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Therefore, the limitations period should not be reckoned as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) or (C).

However, the statutory tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction relief was pending in state court is not counted toward the limitation period. Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). Any lapse of time before the proper filing of an application for post-conviction relief in state court is counted against the one-year limitation period. Villegas, 184 F.3d 467, citing Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 197 (5th Cir.1998). Federal courts may raise the one-year time limitation sua sponte. Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. For AEDPA purposes, petitioner's judgment of conviction and sentence “became final by ... the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review” [28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A)], thirty days following November 9, 2022 (the date that petitioner was sentenced), or on December 9, 2022. Under §2244(d)(1) petitioner had one year from that date, or until December 9, 2023, to file his federal habeas petition.

See La. C.Cr.P. art. 914(b)(1) which provides, “The motion for an appeal must be made no later than [t]hirty days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken.”

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until December 14, 2023, the petition is time-barred by the provisions of the AEDPA. Although Benefield's delay was not lengthy, "the magnitude of [a petitioner's] tardiness" is not a proper consideration in determining the timeliness of a federal habeas application. See Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (missing the AEDPA deadline by even one day nevertheless renders a federal petition untimely); see also In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 2007) (authorization to file a successive habeas application denied because it was filed one day too late).

c. Equitable Tolling

The AEDPA's one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling but, only in “rare and exceptional cases.” Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1074 (1999); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must “examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently rare and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling” (quoting Davis, 158 F.3d at 811)). As recently noted by the Supreme Court, “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [the petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).

Neither unfamiliarity with the legal process (whether the unfamiliarity is due to illiteracy or any other reason), ignorance of the law, nor even lack of representation during the applicable filing period merits equitable tolling. See Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 291 (5th Cir.1999). Here, petitioner has neither pled, nor alleged any circumstances to qualify for, equitable tolling under § 2244(d)(1). “Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1057 (2000), (quoting Rashidi v. American President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1996) (emphasis supplied). The pleadings do not suggest that petitioner was “actively misled”, nor do they suggest that he was prevented in any way from asserting his rights.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because petitioner's claims are barred by the one-year limitation period codified at 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the District Judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See, Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Unless a Circuit Justice or District Judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. Within fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation, the parties may file a memorandum setting forth arguments on whether a certificate of appealability should issue. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A courtesy copy of the memorandum shall be provided to the District Judge at the time of filing.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED.


Summaries of

Benefield v. Warden

United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana
May 2, 2024
6:23-CV-01802 SEC P (W.D. La. May. 2, 2024)
Case details for

Benefield v. Warden

Case Details

Full title:SOPHIA ANDREA BENEFIELD #6475 v. WARDEN

Court:United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana

Date published: May 2, 2024

Citations

6:23-CV-01802 SEC P (W.D. La. May. 2, 2024)