Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0297-11T3
04-11-2013
MILAGROS BELTRA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ENRIQUE BELTRA, Defendant-Appellant.
Gilberto M. Garcia, LLC, attorney for Appellant. Cosner Youngelson, attorneys for respondent (Alan G. Cosner and Rebecca A. Hand, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Graves and Espinosa.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-1323-10.
Gilberto M. Garcia, LLC, attorney for Appellant.
Cosner Youngelson, attorneys for respondent (Alan G. Cosner and Rebecca A. Hand, on the brief). PER CURIAM
The parties were married on July 27, 1975, and two children were born of the marriage. Both are emancipated. Defendant Enrique Beltra appeals from an equitable distribution order dated August 5, 2011. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
After thirty-four years of marriage, plaintiff Milagros Beltra filed a divorce complaint, and defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. While the matter was pending, plaintiff died testate on July 10, 2010. The parties' oldest son, Henrique J. Beltra, who is also known as Henry, was named executor of his mother's estate. Henry and his younger brother Juan Beltra are the sole beneficiaries of the estate.
Following plaintiff's death, the trial court permitted her estate to be substituted as plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4:34-1(b). The matter remained in the Family Part for the purposes of determining equitable distribution.
Over the course of a five-day trial, the court heard disputed testimony regarding the existence and value of certain assets allegedly acquired during the marriage, including defendant's possible interest in: several warehouses located around the country; several businesses entities; a condominium located in the Dominican Republic; a vineyard and winery in Argentina; and several unspecified foreign bank accounts. The court found that Henry was not a "totally credible and candid witness," Juan was "less than candid in his testimony," and defendant "was the least credible of all of the witnesses."
Following the trial, the court stated its findings and conclusions in a written decision and entered an order on August 5, 2011, which essentially distributed the assets and liabilities equally and rejected cross-claims for counsel fees. In its decision, the court analyzed the equitable distribution factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. Among other things, the court noted the parties' long-term marriage, defendant's age and good health, the "high standard of living" enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and the future earning capacity of defendant. The court found several factors relevant, including the following:
(1) the lack of cooperation by the defendant in the discovery process; (2) the lack of reliable, credible testimony as to the values of agreed to assets as well as alleged assets owned by the parties; (3) the court believes that defendant made substantial cash contributions toward the purchase of properties in Argentina and the Dominican Republic; [and] (4) the court believes that defendant made substantial deposits of cash generated from his businesses in foreign banks[.]
The court also acknowledged it was unable to identify all of the assets that were eligible for distribution or their value:
[D]ue to the inadequacy of credible testimony, the failure to obtain appraisals, and lack of sufficient proofs, there is no way of determining the present value of all of the martial assets. Similarly, there is no way of determining what all of the marital assets are. . . . [A] review of the respective Case Information Statements . . .In addition, the court found "$973,421 in marital liabilities" consisting of three mortgages and three revolving charges, and "a personal judgment against the defendant and his brothers in the amount of $1,145,158.52, plus interests and costs."
reveals that only the following items are agreed upon:
• East Brunswick [property] $750,000
• Monroe Township [property] $400,000
• Wells Fargo Advisors $50,000
• Capital One $60,000
• 2005 Ford Explorer $11,000
• Wells Fargo KEOGH $223,000
• TD Bank 401 (k) $130,000
The court ordered the properties in East Brunswick and Monroe Township to be sold and the net proceeds of the sales divided equally between the parties. The court also divided the remainder of the stipulated assets and other assets that were not part of the parties' stipulation equally. The court found that "defendant had interests in a number of spin-off businesses" and ordered the equal distribution of defendant's interest in those businesses and related properties.
On December 19, 2011 this court ordered that "[a]ny money realized as the result of the trial court's order shall be paid either into court or into an attorney trust account pending resolution of defendant's appeal."
The court also found that "defendant engaged in purchases of foreign assets with cash payments," but it was precluded from granting relief because of the failure to "include potentially necessary third parties to this litigation." Nevertheless, the court ordered the parties "to equally divide whatever the defendant's interest is in" the Argentine winery and the condominium in the Dominican Republic.
Finally, the court ordered the parties to equally divide the marital liabilities. However, defendant was found solely responsible for the judgment entered against him in connection with "the business dealings of the Beltra brothers." The court additionally awarded plaintiff's estate a credit for defendant's past due pendente lite support.
Our scope of review is limited. The findings of the trial court are "considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Ordinarily, we give deference to the trial court because the judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and determine their credibility. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). However, we accord no special deference to the trial court's legal determinations. Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
The record here is inadequate to support the entry of an equitable distribution order following plaintiff's death. Equitable distribution is a statutory remedy that is available following the entry of "a judgment of divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board or legal separation from a partner in a civil union." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h); see Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 343 (1990) ("[O]rdinarily, equitable distribution of martial assets arises only with the adjudication of divorce."); see also Kay v. Kay, 405 N.J. Super. 278, 283 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 200 N.J. 551 (2010) ("[W]hen one spouse dies during the pendency of an action for divorce, the action is abated and statutory equitable distribution is unavailable."); Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 153 (App. Div. 2002) ("N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h) authorizes the equitable distribution of marital assets only upon the granting of a divorce."); and Castonguay v. Castonguay, 166 N.J. Super. 546, 550 (App. Div. 1979) ("[T]he death of the defendant husband abated the divorce action and any and all claims for equitable distribution.").
In exceptional circumstances, equitable relief may be available in divorce actions following a spouse's death prior to the entry of a final judgment. Equitable remedies including "constructive trusts, theories of quasi-contract and quantum meruit" may be imposed by a court to prevent unjust enrichment or fraud. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 352; see also Kay, supra, 405 N.J. Super. at 286 ("[A]ssuming the truth of the estate's allegations, a constructive trust imposed to address the alleged fraud on the marital estate would prevent unjust enrichment.").
In the present matter, plaintiff alleged in her divorce complaint that defendant had "secreted a great deal of [the parties'] income and wealth" and the estate asserts that defendant dissipated marital assets. Accordingly, on remand the trial court must determine whether exceptional circumstances are present to warrant granting equitable relief to plaintiff's estate. See Kay v. Kay, 200 N.J. 551, 554 (2010) (noting that decedent's estate was seeking to continue claims "raised before death . . . which, in fairness, should not be extinguished lightly or prematurely").
Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APELATE DIVISION