Opinion
B321453
12-07-2023
BELLA ALL NATURAL, INC., et al. Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents, v. MAYELI ALONSO, Defendant, Cross- complainant and Appellant.
Arya Law Center and Brian T. Stuart for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Thakur Law Firm and Pamela Tahim Thakur for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents Bella All Natural, Inc. and Daisy Najely Cabral Salazar.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 18STCV08265 Laura A. Seigle, Judge. Affirmed.
Arya Law Center and Brian T. Stuart for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Thakur Law Firm and Pamela Tahim Thakur for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents Bella All Natural, Inc. and Daisy Najely Cabral Salazar.
EVENSON, J.[*]
Mayeli Alonso appeals from the judgment awarding damages to Bella All Natural, Inc. for breach of contract. Alonso's appeal raises a single question: whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's damages calculation. We find that there is and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mayeli Alonso is a celebrity and social media influencer. In November 2017, she entered into a contract to provide marketing and promotional services to Bella All Natural, Inc. (Bella), a vitamin supplement and beauty supply company owned by Daisy Najely Cabral Salazar (Cabral). Under the contract Alonso was to promote Bella's products on social media two times per week for a period of six months, commencing in February 2018 and concluding in August 2018 (a total of 72 social media posts); in exchange, Bella would pay Alonso $1,322,000.
Bella paid Alonso the full amount in advance. However, Alonso stopped promoting Bella's products on social media after having completed just 60 of the 72 agreed-upon posts. Alonso also made negative comments on social media about Bella.
On December 13, 2018, Bella and Cabral sued Alonso for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, slander and libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Alonso filed a cross-complaint, alleging breach of contract among other claims.
The matter proceeded to a court trial in January 2022. On March 29, 2022, the court issued a statement of decision rejecting each claim in the complaint and cross-complaint save one: Bella's cause of action against Alonso for breach of contract. On that claim, the court found that Alonso breached the contract by failing to complete the agreed-upon number of social media posts.
Bella had argued in the trial court that it was entitled to three categories of damages: lost profits, increased advertising costs, and out-of-pocket payments that Bella had made to Alonso. The court found that Bella was damaged in the amount of its out-of-pocket payments for 12 social media posts that Alonso never delivered. Specifically, the court found that Bella had paid $1.322 million for 72 social media posts. Alonso had produced 60 posts, failing to complete 12 posts (16.6 percent of the total). "That means Bella All Natural paid for marketing appearances that Alonso did not deliver. 16.6% of $1,322,000 is $220,333." Accordingly, the court awarded Bella breach of contract damages in the amount of $220,333. The court rejected Bella's other theories of damages.
The court entered judgment in favor of Bella on April 27, 2022. Alonso timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
Alonso contends that the trial court's calculation of damages was not supported by substantial evidence. We review a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment under a highly deferential standard of review. Substantial evidence review "has three pillars. First, we accept all evidence supporting the trial court's order. Second, we completely disregard contrary evidence. Third, we draw all reasonable inferences to affirm the trial court. These three pillars support the lintel: we do not reweigh the evidence." (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581-582.) "If substantial evidence supports factual findings, those findings must not be disturbed on appeal." (Id. at p. 582.) Where, as here, the appellant challenges a trial court's findings of fact, "the appellate court's power begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence- contradicted or uncontradicted-to support the trial court findings. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor." (Ibid.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Damages Calculation
The court calculated Bella's damages in the amount of $220,333 based on Bella's payments to Alonso for services Alonso did not deliver. The award was supported by substantial evidence. Cabral's testimony established that Bella paid Alonso $1.322 million for 72 videos, and Alonso failed to deliver 12 of those videos. Applying the ratio of undelivered videos (12 out of 72) to the $1,322,000 payment, the court found that Bella had paid $220,333 for services that Bella never received, and it calculated Bella's damages accordingly.
Alonso does not contest the accuracy of "the court's finding regarding the number of videos." Instead, she contends that the damages award must be reversed because the testimony of Bella's owner, Cabral, and Bella's expert, Jules Kamin, demonstrated that it would be "impossible" to calculate Bella's damages with specificity. This argument rests upon a misreading of the record. Cabral's testimony on cross-examination displayed confusion about certain Bella financial documents but did not establish the impossibility of calculating damages. Kamin's testimony was entirely unrelated to the out-of-pocket payments addressed in the court's damages award. Kamin testified that Alonso caused Bella to lose profits, and in the testimony cited by Alonso he stated it would be "impossible" to specify how much lost profits are attributable to Alonso's breach of contract as opposed to Alonso's public disparagement of Bella. Under the substantial evidence standard of review we do not reweigh the evidence to determine if excerpts from the trial testimony warrant a different result; instead, we "accept all evidence supporting the trial court's order" and "completely disregard contrary evidence." (Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581-582.) The trial testimony cited by Alonso is not actually "contrary evidence" to the court's finding regarding Bella's damages; even if it were, we would be bound to disregard it. (Ibid.)
At oral argument, Alonso's counsel contended that the trial court's damages calculation was wrong because under the contract Alonso was required to produce an additional "full story video" that Alonso also failed to produce. This argument suggests that Bella may have suffered additional damages, but in any event it is forfeited because it was not addressed in the opening brief. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 ["issues not addressed as error in a party's opening brief with legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited"].)
The premise underlying Alonso's argument is that the court should have measured Bella's damages based on the market value of the videos she had contracted to produce, or Bella's lost profits, and not Bella's actual expenditures. Alonso contends that Bella should not recover anything because Bella failed to prove market value or lost profits. That contention, however, is unavailing.
Civil Code section 3300 provides that the measure of damages for a breach of contract is "the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." The aim of contract damages is to "put the injured party in as good a position as he or she would have been had performance been rendered as promised." (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 848.) Thus, it has long been the rule that "[a] plaintiff who sues for breach of a contract upon which he has advanced money and received nothing in return may recover as damages the money so paid." (Hamilton v. Baker-Hansen Mfg. Co. (1917) 176 Cal. 569, 571; see Redwood Fibre Products Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co. (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 505, 511 [same].)
The trial court's award of damages properly accounts for payments Bella made to Alonso for which Bella "received nothing in return." (Hamilton v. Baker-Hansen Mfg. Co., supra, 176 Cal. at p. 571.)
In the respondent's brief, Bella requests sanctions against Alonso for a frivolous appeal. We deny that request because any request for sanctions must be timely made by separate motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b).) In her reply brief, Alonso requests that this court strike portions of the respondent's brief, alleging the brief misrepresents certain facts and contains factual assertions irrelevant to the appeal. That request, too, is denied. A motion to strike must be made by separate motion (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54), and in any event this court does not rely on any of the representations to which Alonso objects.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Bella's request for sanctions and Alonso's motion to strike portions of Bella's respondent's brief are denied. Bella is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: SEGAL, Acting P. J., MARTINEZ, J.
[*] Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.