Summary
subtracting attorney's fees but retaining administrative costs and fees
Summary of this case from Hernandez-Prado v. StateOpinion
NO. 09-11-00462-CR
01-25-2012
THEODORE ROOSEVELT BELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 98816
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Theodore Roosevelt Bell pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find Bell guilty, but deferred further proceedings, and placed Bell on community supervision for five years. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke Bell's unadjudicated community supervision. Bell pleaded "true" to violating two conditions of his community supervision. The trial court found that Bell violated the conditions of his community supervision, revoked Bell's community supervision, found Bell guilty of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced Bell to twelve years in prison. In its judgment, the trial court assessed $2,452 in administrative fees, which includes $1,000 in court-appointed attorney's fees. In his sole appellate issue, Bell contends that the attorney's fees should be deleted from the judgment because he is indigent and the record is insufficient to show his ability to pay attorney's fees. The State concedes that the record does not demonstrate a material change in Bell's financial circumstances and that the judgment should be modified to delete the attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
A trial court may order reimbursement of court-appointed attorney's fees when the "defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided[.]" Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2011). "A defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings . . . unless a material change in the defendant's financial circumstances occurs." Id. § 26.04(p). A "defendant's financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical elements in the trial court's determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement of costs and fees." Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Because amended sections 26.04 and 26.05 contain no material changes applicable to this case, we cite to the current versions of the statutes.
The trial court determined that Bell was indigent when it appointed trial counsel and later appointed appellate counsel. The record does not demonstrate that Bell had the financial resources to pay the court-appointed attorney's fees and contains no evidence to support a finding that Bell's financial circumstances had materially changed. See id.; see also Roberts v. State, 327 S.W.3d 880, 883-84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.); Barrera v. State, 291 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.). Absent a material change in Bell's financial circumstances that would enable him to pay the attorney's fees, Bell is presumed indigent, and the trial court improperly ordered Bell to pay $1,000 in attorney's fees. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p); see also Roberts, 327 S.W.3d at 884; Barrera, 291 S.W.3d at 518. Accordingly, we subtract the $1,000 attorney's fees from the judgment and modify the judgment to reflect an administrative fee of $1,452. See Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557; see also Barrera, 291 S.W.3d at 518. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
___________________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.