Opinion
No. 11-05-00126-CV
Opinion filed November 2, 2006.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-04-07426-B.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., and McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dessalagn Befekadu, Uchenna Orogbu, Josephat Onyema, George Nwaugha, Victor Onyeujo, and Luz Hortencia Solis (appellants) brought suit for breach of contract against Thurman Permanent A-1, L.L.C., individually and in its capacity as the general partner of Thurman Apartments of Dallas II, L.P.; Thurman Apartments of Dallas II, L.P.; Christon Company; and Dallas Independent School District. The trial court granted Dallas I.S.D.'s motion for summary judgment and severed the school district from the cause of action. The trial court granted Thurman's and Christon's motions for summary judgment on December 10, 2004, and it is from those orders that appellants appeal. We affirm.
In their brief, Thurman Permanent A-1, L.L.C. and Thurman Apartments of Dallas II, L.P. state that any distinction between the two entities for purposes of this appeal are of no consequence. Therefore, we will collectively refer to the two entities as Thurman.
Dallas Independent School District is not a party in this appeal.
Each appellant entered into a lease agreement with Thurman. Christon served as the leasing agent for Thurman. Each lease contained a provision concerning condemnation that provided:
If, during the Lease Term or any extension thereof, all or a substantial part of the Demised Premises are taken for any public or quasi-public use under any governmental law, ordinance or regulation or by right of eminent domain, or are conveyed to the condemning authority under threat of condemnation, this Lease shall terminate and the monthly installments of Rent shall be abated during the unexpired portion of the Lease Term, effective from the date of the taking. . . . Landlord and Tenant shall each be entitled to receive and retain such separate awards and portions of lump sum awards as may be allocated to their respective interests in any condemnation proceeding. The termination of this Lease shall not affect the rights of the parties to such awards.
Thurman sold the property to Dallas I.S.D. under threat of condemnation in March 2004. No condemnation proceedings were ever initiated. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, conveyance under threat of condemnation terminated the lease between appellants and Thurman. Appellants brought suit for breach of contract, and the trial court granted Thurman's and Christon's motions for summary judgment.
In two issues on appeal, appellants first contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the lease provided for appellants to be compensated in the event of termination under threat of condemnation. Next, they argue that the interpretation of the condemnation clause creates a fact issue precluding summary judgment.
Thurman filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. If the movant in a traditional motion for summary judgment establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then the trial court must grant the motion. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991). The trial court must also grant a motion for a traditional summary judgment if a defendant conclusively negates at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). Upon review of a traditional motion for summary judgment, we take as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Id.; Kelly v. LIN Television of Tex., L.P., 27 S.W.3d 564 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
The trial court granted Thurman's and Christon's motions for summary judgment without specifying the grounds upon which it relied in granting the motions. When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied upon for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the summary judgment grounds advanced by the movant are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
The parties to the lease agreed that the landlord and tenant "shall each be entitled to receive and retain such separate awards and portions of lump sum awards as may be allocated to their respective interests in any condemnation proceeding." Appellants claim that Thurman is required to compensate them for the sale of the property to Dallas I.S.D., and they also argue the condemnation provision is ambiguous. The provision states appellants were entitled to receive and retain any separate award allocated to them in a condemnation proceeding. There was no condemnation proceeding. There is undisputed summary judgment evidence that the property was conveyed under threat of condemnation. The condemnation clause is not ambiguous in providing that the tenants were entitled to any separate award allocated to them in a condemnation proceeding. The trial court did not err in granting Thurman's and Christon's motions for summary judgment. Appellant's first and second issues on appeal are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.