Opinion
C.A. No. 460-N.
Date Submitted: September 16, 2004.
September 21, 2004.
Mr. Leonard H. Beck, McCawber Dr., Wilmington, DE.
Ophelia M. Waters, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Carvel State Office Building, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Mr. Beck and Ms. Waters:
This is the Court's decision on the Respondent Attorney General's motion to dismiss Petitioner Leonard H. Beck's request for declaratory judgment that would resolve the Petitioner's question of whether there is a contract between the State of Delaware and its taxpayers with regard to certain aspects of public education. As described below, there is no justiciable controversy. Thus, the Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.
The parties' written submissions sufficiently inform the Court of their contentions. Thus, oral argument is unnecessary.
An actual controversy is a prerequisite to obtaining a declaratory judgment. While this Court is obligated to construe the term "actual controversy" liberally, the Court must not construe it so liberally as to enter the realm of rendering advisory opinions.
See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Bd. of Managers for the Del. Criminal Justice Information Sys., 840 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Del. 2003) ("In order for a court to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction, there must be an `actual controversy': `(1) It must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) It must be a controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.'") (citations omitted).
See Rollins Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Hydronics Corp., 303 A.2d 660, 662 (Del. 1973) ("[T]he term `actual controversy' should be liberally interpreted to give wide scope to the provisions of the [Declaratory Judgment Act] within the purposes thereof.").
See Anonymous v. State, 2000 WL 739252 (Del.Ch. May 10, 2000) (stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 10 Del. C. Ch. 65, is "not to be used as a means of eliciting advisory opinions from the courts") (quoting Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 479 (Del. 1989)); Marshall v. Hill, 93 A.2d 524, 525 (Del.Super. 1952) ("The Declaratory Judgments Act may not be invoked merely to seek legal advice.").
After identifying the parties (the Petitioner and the Respondent Attorney General), the Petitioner's complaint, captioned "Request for a Declaratory Judgment," reads as follows:
3. Delaware State Law Title 14., Chapter 27., School Attendance, paragraphs 2701, 2702, 2722 (b), 2732 (d), 2730 (9), and 2730 (b) `prosecution for criminal contempt of Court,' require that the Legal Guardian must enroll each Youth, and the State will teach each Youth.
4. I ask the Court to decide if this is a contract between the State and her Legal Guardians and Taxpayers.
Thus, the Petitioner's pleading does not allege a single instance of actual harm or controversy. In other words, from the face of Petitioner's pleading, deciding whether, with regard to public education, a contract exists between the State of Delaware and its taxpayers would be a purely academic exercise. Since there is not an actual, live controversy between the parties, the Petitioner's request is non-justiciable. Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted.