Opinion
# 2016-044-534 Claim No. None Motion No. M-88087
05-16-2016
JEREMIAH C. BEACH v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JEREMIAH C. BEACH, pro se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Michael D. Brown, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Court denied movant's motion for permission to late file claim asserting cause of action for false arrest.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-044-534 |
| Claimant(s): | JEREMIAH C. BEACH |
| Claimant short name: | BEACH |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | None |
| Motion number(s): | M-88087 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE |
| Claimant's attorney: | JEREMIAH C. BEACH, pro se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Michael D. Brown, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 16, 2016 |
| City: | Binghamton |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Movant moves for permission to file and serve a late claim to recover for damages due to, among other things, his allegedly unlawful arrest by New York State Troopers. Defendant State of New York (defendant) opposes the motion. Movant replies.
A motion seeking permission to file and serve a late claim must be brought within the statute of limitations period attributable to the underlying cause of action (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). The applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging false arrest is one year (CPLR 215 [3]) and accrues when the claimant is released from custody (Caminito v City of New York, 19 NY2d 931 [1967]; Salman v Econo Lodge, 303 AD2d 923 [4th Dept 2003]; Danchak v State of New York, 29 AD2d 609 [3d Dept 1967]). Movant asserts that he was arrested on January 17, 2015 and incarcerated at the Chemung County Jail. Although he does not indicate when he was released from custody, the proposed cause of action could not have accrued any earlier than January 17, 2015. Accordingly, this motion mailed on January 4, 2016 is timely (see Matter of Unigard Ins. Group v State of New York, 286 AD2d 58 [2d Dept 2001]).
The Court notes that at the time movant executed the proposed claim he was incarcerated in the Schuyler County Jail (Proposed Claim, ¶ 1).
Having determined that the motion is timely, the Court turns to a consideration of the merits of the motion itself. The factors that the Court must consider under Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) in determining a motion to permit a late filing of a claim are whether:
1) the delay in filing the claim was excusable;
2) defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim;
3) defendant had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim;
4) the claim appears to be meritorious;
5) the failure to file or serve upon the attorney general a timely claim or to
serve upon the attorney general a notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant; and
6) movant has any other available remedy.
Movant alleges that because he is proceeding pro se and is incarcerated, the delay in filing and serving the claim is justified. He also notes that his public defense attorneys would not assist him in commencing an action. Movant's ignorance of the requirements of the Court of Claims Act, his lack of counsel for this matter, and the mere fact of his incarceration are not adequate excuses for his delay in timely serving a notice of intention or timely filing and serving a claim (see Matter of Sandlin v State of New York, 294 AD2d 723 [3d Dept 2002], lv dismissed 99 NY2d 589 [2003]; Plate v State of New York, 92 Misc 2d 1033 [Ct Cl 1978]). Accordingly, this factor weighs against movant.
Although movant has provided an affidavit in support of this motion, he addresses the issue of delay only in his proposed claim.
The three factors of notice of the essential facts, an opportunity to investigate and the lack of substantial prejudice are frequently analyzed together since they involve similar considerations. Defendant concedes that it had notice, an opportunity to investigate, and that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense. Accordingly, these three factors all weigh in favor of movant.
Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Michael D. Brown, dated Apr. 5, 2016, in Opposition to Motion, ¶ 9.
Another factor to be considered is whether movant has any other available remedy. Movant is seeking damages for his allegedly unlawful arrest by the New York State Police. As defendant appropriately concedes, the Court of Claims is the proper forum for this action. This factor also weighs in favor of movant.
id.
The issue of whether the proposed claim appears meritorious is the most crucial component in determining a motion under Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), since it would be futile to permit a meritless claim to proceed (Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1, 10 [Ct Cl 1977]). In order to establish a meritorious claim, a movant must demonstrate that the proposed claim is not patently groundless, frivolous, or legally defective, and that there is reasonable cause to believe that a valid claim exists (id. at 11). There is a heavier burden on a party moving for permission to file a late claim than on a claimant who has complied with the provisions of the Court of Claims Act (see id. at 11-12; see also Nyberg v State of New York, 154 Misc 2d 199 [Ct Cl 1992]).
In order to set forth a cause of action for false arrest, movant must show (1) that defendant intentionally confined him, (2) that he was conscious of the confinement, (3) that he did not consent to the confinement, and (4) that the confinement was not otherwise privileged (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). There is no dispute that the first three elements have been met in this case. The only contested issue is whether movant's detention was the product of an unlawful arrest, or in other words, an arrest without probable cause. There is a presumption that a warrantless arrest and imprisonment is unlawful (see id.), but "[t]he existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to [a cause of action for false arrest]" (see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]). Where "there is no real dispute as to the essential facts underlying the arrest or the proper inferences to be drawn from those facts" (Stratton v City of Albany, 204 AD2d 924, 926 [3d Dept 1994]), the Court may determine probable cause as a matter of law (Saunders v County of Washington, 255 AD2d 788, 789-790 [3d Dept 1998]).
Probable cause has been defined as "such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe that [movant] had committed the [crime]" (Smith v County of Nassau, 34 NY2d 18, 25 [1974]; see also Orminski v Village of Lake Placid, 268 AD2d 780, 781 [3d Dept 2000]).
In his proposed claim, movant alleges that "Trooper John A. Jones and his partner acted upon a libel complaint filed by . . . Trooper Trevor Wallner," when they took movant into custody, and "then later charged, arrested, and imprisoned [him] for an offense [he] did not committ [sic]." Movant has attached to his proposed claim a copy of the criminal information executed by Wallner (the Information). The Information charges movant with a violation of Penal Law § 120.00 (1) (Assault in the Third Degree). Wallner states in the Information that on January 10, 2015, movant "intentionally cause[d] physical harm to Jillian Sloan by throwing her to the ground, outside the [Town Tavern] and stomping on her left side below her ribs, causing severe pain and a large contusion in the shape of a shoe print." Wallner indicates that he had based his allegations on Sloan's supporting deposition.
Proposed Claim, ¶ 2.
Id.
Notice of Motion filed January 7, 2016, at 10.
Movant has also provided a copy of Sloan's supporting deposition in which she states that on January 10, 2015, she was at the Erin Town Tavern and learned that movant had been harassing her brother Cody. She confronted movant and slapped him across the face. Sloan notes that when she went outside the bar later that evening, movant followed her. She states that he called her a "fucking bitch and said how dare [she] put [her] hands on [him]." She claims that movant then pushed her to the ground and before she could get up, he stomped on her left side below her ribs. Sloan indicates that the next morning, she was in severe pain and observed that she had a large bruise which resembled a shoe print on her left side. She notes that the bruise was still visible as of January 16, 2015 when she provided the supporting deposition.
Id. at 9.
Movant is in essence arguing that the Information was false because he did not commit the crime, and therefore the officers lacked probable cause for his arrest, making it unlawful. Movant's contention is without merit. It is well-settled that "a sworn statement of an identified member of the community attesting to facts directly and personally observed by him [or her] is of itself sufficient to support a warrantless arrest" (People v Bailey, 295 AD2d 758, 759 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 533 [2002] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). As is relevant to the charge against movant, "[a] person is guilty of assault in the third degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person" (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]). A physical injury is defined as an "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10 [9]), and an assailant's "intent to cause injury may be inferred from his [or her] actions . . . as well as from the severity of the victim's injuries" (People v Terk, 24 AD3d 1038, 1039 [3d Dept 2005]).
Based upon Sloan's sworn statement, movant intentionally pushed her to the ground and then stomped on her hard enough to leave a bruise in the shape of his shoe and to cause her severe pain. The amount of force movant used to cause this bruise, which was still visible approximately one week later, supports an inference that he intended to cause a physical injury. It is also evident that movant did in fact injure Sloan as she suffered severe (substantial) pain. Sloan's supporting deposition set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of the crime of assault in the third degree. Because there is a heavier burden on a movant seeking permission to file and serve a late claim than on a claimant who has timely filed and served a claim, movant's conclusory allegation that he did not commit the crime is insufficient to create a question of fact as to the existence of probable cause. The essential facts underlying movant's arrest are not in dispute and clearly "would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe that [movant] had committed the [crime]" (Smith, 34 NY2d at 25). Accordingly, the Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest movant as a matter of law. Thus, the issue of merit weighs against movant.
The Court notes that any evidence concerning the disposition of the criminal charge is conspicuously absent from the motion papers.
"[W]here 'the excuse offered for the delay is inadequate and the proposed claim is of questionable merit' "(Matter of Robinson v State of New York, 35 AD3d 948, 949-950 [3d Dept 2006], quoting Matter of Perez v State of New York, 293 AD2d 918, 919 [3d Dept 2002]), denial of a late claim application is appropriate (see Matter of Gonzalez v State of New York, 299 AD2d 675 [3d Dept 2002]). Although four of the six statutory factors weigh in movant's favor, the crucial issue of merit weighs against him. Accordingly, movant's motion for permission to file and serve a late claim asserting a cause of action for false arrest is denied in its entirety.
In his proposed claim, movant asserts that he suffered damages consisting of mental abuse, job loss, slander, defamation of character, and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the US Constitution. To the extent that movant is seeking to impose causes of action for slander and/or defamation, his failure to set forth the particular words complained of verbatim is fatal (see Besicorp, Ltd. v Kahn, 290 AD2d 147, 150 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 601 [2002]; Gardner v Alexander Rent-A-Car, 28 AD2d 667 [1st Dept 1967]). Moreover, to the extent that movant is asserting a violation of the Federal Constitution, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to consider Federal Constitutional claims, including civil rights violations brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see e.g. Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 184-185 [1996]). Accordingly, the factor of merit would also weigh against movant with respect to these proposed causes of action and late claim relief would be denied for the same reason. --------
May 16, 2016
Binghamton, New York
CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read on movant's motion: 1) Notice of Motion filed on January 7, 2016; Affidavit of Jeremiah C. Beach, sworn to on December 31, 2015, and attachments. 2) Affirmation in Opposition of Michael D. Brown, AAG, dated April 5, 2016, and attached exhibit. 3) Movant's Reply filed April 11, 2016.