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Baylen v. Oxnard Manor, L.P

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 15, 2009
2d Civil B208005 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Ventura No. 56-2007-00306953, Glen M. Reiser, Judge

John L. Supple, Elizabeth A. Burns and Matthew G. Kleiner; Gordon Rees, for Appellants.

Law Office of Gregory L. Johnson, Gregory L Johnson. Lascher & Lascher, a Professional Corporation, Wendy Cole Lascher, for Respondents.


YEGAN, J.

Appellants, Oxnard Manor, LP dba Country Villa Oxnard Manor Healthcare Services and Country Villa Health Services, appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a wrongful death and elder abuse action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).) The trial court concluded that no arbitration agreement was in effect when decedent, a nursing home patient, was injured. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Appellants own and operate Country Villa Oxnard Manor Healthcare Center (Country Villa), a skilled nursing facility. When 90 year old Delfin Baylen, Sr. was admitted to Country Villa in 2005, he was asked to sign separate agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice and elder abuse disputes. Amie Sulit had a power of attorney and signed the agreements on Baylen's behalf.

In 2006, Baylen was hospitalized twice. Each time Baylen was transferred back to Country Villa, appellants had Baylen sign new admission papers and a new arbitration agreement.

The second arbitration agreement, which was signed by Sulit on August 11, 2006, combined the prior arbitration agreements into one agreement. It provided for arbitration of "any dispute as to medical malpractice" but excluded claims involving violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1430, subd (b); 1599.81, subd. (d) [patient may not waive right to sue for violation of Patient's Bill of Rights.])

Third Arbitration Agreement

On September 8, 2006, Baylen was transferred to a local hospital and treated for five days. Upon returning to Country Villa, Baylen was asked to sign admission papers and a new arbitration agreement. Baylen's daughter, Rosalind Evano, signed the paperwork as next of kin.

Several days later, Baylen hit his head and fell. Appellants allegedly failed to notify the family or provide medical attention. Family members were later told that Baylen would " not wake up" and "can hardly open his eyes and mouth." Baylen was transferred to a hospital emergency room and died hours later. Family members asked about the head wound but Country Villa allegedly lied about it.

Respondents, Baylen's heirs and successor in interest, sued for elder neglect, wrongful death, and violation of the Patients' Bill of Rights (Health & Saf. Code, § 1430). Appellants answered the complaint and, about two months later, filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court concluded there was no operative arbitration agreement and denied the motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings.

Discussion

It is well-settled that the party seeking arbitration has the burden of establishing a valid agreement to arbitrate. (Pagarigan v. Libby Care Center, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 298, 301.) A motion to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 411.)

Appellants concede that the third arbitration agreement is not enforceable because Baylen's daughter had no authority to sign it. The act of signing as next of kin did not bind Baylen or his heirs to arbitration. (See Pagarigan v. Libby Care Center, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th p. 303; see Goliger v. AMS Properties, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [execution of health care contract by responsible party did not waive patient's right to jury trial].).)

Back Up Agreement

Appellants contend that the second arbitration agreement was still in effect because the daughter requested a bed hold during Baylen's hospitalization. (Health & Saf., Code, § 1599.79; Cal. Code Regs. tit 22, § 72520.) The trial court found that "even if there was the bed hold, [appellants] treated it as [if ] it was a new admission, and they went through -- jumped through all the hoops they would on a new admission." It was uncontroverted that Country Villa's admission coordinator asked Evano to come in and sign the "admission paperwork."

California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72520, subdivision (a) provides: "If a patient of a skilled nursing facility is transferred to a general acute care hospital as defined in Section 1250(a) of the Health and Safety Code, the skilled nursing facility shall afford the patient a bed hold of seven (7) days, which may be exercised by the patient or the patient's representative."

The trial court characterized the third arbitration agreement as a "novation" that superseded the second agreement. Appellants argue there was no novation because the parties did not agree to extinguish the second agreement in favor of a new contract, i.e., the third arbitration agreement.

"A novation is a substitution of a new obligation for an existing one." (Civ. Code, § 1530.) It is made "[b]y the substitution of a new obligation between the same parties, with intent to extinguish the old obligation." (Civ. Code, § 1531(1); Howard v. County of Amador (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 962, 978.)

As we shall explain, the trial court was right for the wrong reason. (See Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216 [" 'a ruling or decision correct in law will not be disturbed on appeal merely because it was given for the wrong reason....' "].) The request for signatures was not to substitute one arbitration agreement for another but to admit Baylen as a new patient. Appellants could have provided a written statement of admission changes, but instead asked the daughter to sign a new contract of admission and a new arbitration agreement. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1599.651.)

Health & Safety Code section 1599.651 provides in pertinent part: "A person who seeks to be admitted to the same long-term health care facility for which there exists a prior executed contract of admission which was signed by that person, or his or her legal representative, responsible party, or agent, in accordance with this chapter shall not be required to execute a new contract of admission if the person, or his or her legal representative, responsible party, or agent, either prior to or upon readmission, signs a written statement prepared by the facility which lists the modifications to the contract of admission." (Emphasis added.)

The evidence supports a finding of estoppel and waiver. (Evid Code, § 623; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 983 [no single test delineates nature of conduct that constitutes a waiver].) "Equitable estoppel, originally known as estoppel in pais, and also called estoppel by conduct, is simply stated: 'Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.' [Citations.] The doctrine is defensive in nature only, and 'operates to prevent one [party] from taking an unfair advantage of another.' [Citation.]" (San Diego Mun. Credit Union v. Smith (1986 176 Cal.App.3d 919, 922-923;

The trial court concluded that appellants would not have asked Baylen to sign a new arbitration agreement unless appellant considered the second arbitration to be inoperative. This finding is consistent with appellants' answer to the complaint which refers to a "Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement (sixteenth affirmative defense) but not appellant's arbitration agreement. Appellants propounded extensive discovery, noticed respondents' depositions, and did an about face, withdrawing the discovery before the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. (See e.g., Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 205, 212-215[arbitration agreement waived where defendants answered complaint, served discovery, and took plaintiff's deposition].)

The trial court concluded that the prior arbitration agreement does not "rise[] like a Phoenix from the ashes of the prior admission papers...." Waiver is a question of fact and the trial court's finding, if supported by sufficient evidence, is binding on the appellate court. (Saint Agnes Medical Center v. Pacificare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196.)

Stay Request

The trial court also denied a request to stay the action on the Patient Bill of Rights cause of action because arbitration of the wrongful death and elder abuse claims "would risk conflicting rulings." Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), a trial court may, in its discretion, deny a stay where there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 350; Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 393.) We need not here decide whether the trial court erred. Our resolution of the appeal in favor of respondent moots this issue.

The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.

We concur: GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.


Summaries of

Baylen v. Oxnard Manor, L.P

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 15, 2009
2d Civil B208005 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)
Case details for

Baylen v. Oxnard Manor, L.P

Case Details

Full title:TEDDY BAYLEN etc. et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. OXNARD MANOR, L.P…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 15, 2009

Citations

2d Civil B208005 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)