Opinion
Case No. 5D19-3448
12-04-2020
BAXLEY MANOR, LLC, Appellant, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BREVARD COUNTY, Michael L. Bean, Monroe Engineering, Inc., and Steven Monroe, Appellees.
Alexander L. Brockmeyer, of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellant. W. Nathan Meloon, Scott Leo Knox, and Scott Widerman, of Widerman Malek, P.L., Melbourne, for Appellees.
Alexander L. Brockmeyer, of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellant.
W. Nathan Meloon, Scott Leo Knox, and Scott Widerman, of Widerman Malek, P.L., Melbourne, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM. In April 2019, Appellant, Baxley Manor, LLC sued Appellees, Housing Authority of Brevard County, Michael L. Bean, Monroe Engineering, Inc., and Steven Monroe. In that suit, Appellant sought injunctive (Count I) and declaratory relief (Count II) and claimed that it had been unlawfully and adversely affected by zoning changes that reduced the permissible developmental density of Appellant's property. Additionally, Appellant asserted in Counts III and IV, respectively, of the underlying suit that certain Appellees made negligent or intentional material misrepresentations that contributed to the decision to reduce the developmental density. Appellant argues that we should reverse the trial court's order granting Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count I.
In its brief, Appellant only addresses the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings as to Count I, thereby abandoning any issues regarding Count II. See Gold Crown Resort Mktg., Inc. v. Phillpotts , 272 So. 3d 789, 793 n.8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
Appellant claimed that the actions of the Appellees were unauthorized and resulted in a material reduction in the developmental density of its land, meaning that Appellant could no longer build as many units as it previously could have. After entry of the density change order, Appellant pursued administrative review; however, the density change order was affirmed by the Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County ("Board") in September 2018. Once the administrative appeal before the Board was final, Appellant timely pursued one of two exclusive judicial remedies by filing case number 05-2018-AP-048269, a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court in Brevard County as provided by section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (2018).
In the complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, Appellant sought an injunction of limited duration, to stop further development, hearings, and meetings only until the circuit court ruled on its petition for writ of certiorari and declaratory relief in case number 05-2018-AP-048269. In July 2019, Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari in case number 05-2018-AP-048269 was denied by the circuit court and Appellant's petition for second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court's decision was subsequently denied by this Court. Given that the duration of the injunction sought by Appellant expired when the rulings became final in case number 05-2018-AP-048269, we deem this issue to be moot and dismiss the appeal.
DISMISSED.
LAMBERT, EDWARDS, and TRAVER, JJ., concur.