Opinion
No. 14-04-00867-CR
Memorandum Opinion filed November 15, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 405th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03CR3199. Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices FOWLER, EDELMAN and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Roderick Allen Batiste appeals a conviction for aggravated assault on the grounds that the trial court erred by (1) denying him access to jury records kept by the district attorney's office and used by the State during the jury selection process; (2) denying appellant's motion for a psychiatric examination; and (3) failing to exclude the testimony of a witness for the State regarding an extraneous offense. We affirm. Appellant's first issue contends that the court erred in denying his oral motion for access to the information in the State's database, which appellant alleges to contain data regarding panel members' prior jury service, including how they voted in previous criminal jury trials. The State responded that the records were privileged work product and, without commenting, the court denied appellant's motion. As a preliminary matter, because appellant did not develop a record of what, if anything, was contained in the alleged database, we have no basis to decide whether it was subject to any privilege or otherwise immune from disclosure. In addition, the State generally has no obligation to furnish defense counsel with information it has in regard to prospective jurors. See Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Here, appellant asserts that the State had an unfair advantage through its possession of such information because defense counsel is traditionally barred from questioning venire members about prior criminal jury experience, particularly verdicts rendered or punishment assessed. However, appellant cites no authority that any such advantage is grounds to require disclosure. Moreover, a review of the case law does not suggest that it is improper to ask jurors about their previous verdicts, but only that it is within the trial court's discretion whether to allow such questions. Because appellant's first issue thus fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's request to examine any jury service records possessed by the State, it is overruled. Appellant's second issue argues that the trial court erred by conducting only a cursory hearing on his motion for a psychiatric examination to determine his competency. We review such a ruling for abuse of discretion. Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 627 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have a sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against the person. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). On a suggestion by a party or the court that a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the trial court determines by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant is incompetent. Id. art. 46B.004(a), (c). If, after such an inquiry, the trial court determines that such evidence exists, it shall order an examination to determine whether the defendant is incompetent. Id. art. 46B.005(a). In this case, at the hearing on appellant's motion for a psychiatric examination to determine his competency, the only evidence appellant offered was his own testimony that he was taking psychotherapeutic medications to control anxiety attacks and other symptoms. Conversely, appellant testified that: (1) he was able to talk to his lawyer about the charges against him and answer his lawyer's questions; (2) he understood what he was charged with; and (3) he was able to identify the parties involved in the hearing and he understood the process of the trial. Because appellant thus failed to provide some evidence that would support a finding that he was incompetent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for a psychiatric examination. Accordingly, appellant's second issue is overruled. Appellant's third issue challenges the trial court's admission of evidence of an extraneous offense that appellant contends was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony describing this offense included impermissible hearsay evidence and was uncorroborated. This evidence was offered during the punishment phase of the trial, where extraneous offense evidence is admissible to the extent the trial court deems it relevant to sentencing and the offense is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by the defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479, 480-81 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Because appellant's third issue cites no legal authority that the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of a single witness cannot satisfy this requirement, it affords no basis for relief. Accordingly, it is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Appellant pled guilty, and a jury assessed punishment of 80 years confinement.
See Bolden v. State, 634 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (finding no abuse of discretion in not allowing appellant's counsel to question venire members about their previous verdicts even though the information was allegedly possessed by the prosecutor); Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (noting that where prosecutor had records of prior jury service and verdicts rendered, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel from asking potential jurors about their previous verdicts because some "limitation on voir dire is necessary or many trials would never end").
Appellant described his symptoms as follows: "My peripheral vision I have-I don't know what it is yet, but I see things. If there was a dot on the wall or a mark on the wall, I would-I can swear I see this thing moving or a bug's crawling on me." However, in response to his counsel's question regarding whether the medication was causing him an inability to assist at trial, he stated, "Without the medication I stay up searching, looking for things. It's the only thing that allows me to rest."
The trial court permitted the State to present testimony concerning this offense to the jury after determining that the State had made a threshold showing that it could prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.