Opinion
CV166013380S
08-30-2016
Susan Bates v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #102
John W. Pickard, J.
The plaintiff, Susan Bates, filed an amended complaint against the defendant, Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company, alleging breach of contract under the terms of her insurance policy. On April 5, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (#102) on the ground that the plaintiff failed to file suit within the time limitation provided for in the policy and required by statute. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff owned real property located at 369 Lake Road in New Preston, which was insured by the defendant, Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The insurance policy was considered an " all-risk" policy and was effective from June 21, 2013 to June 21, 2014. On or about April 4, 2014, the insured premises suffered water damage that resulted from a winter freeze. The plaintiff filed a timely claim for compensation of the loss with the defendant under the policy. The defendant accepted coverage under the policy; however, it decided to only make a partial payment towards the damage incurred. On February 11, 2016, the plaintiff brought this action alleging a breach of contract under the policy terms. The insurance policy contains a provision limiting the time within which an action may be brought against the defendant to one year after the date of loss.
On April 5, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (#102), arguing that the plaintiffs action was brought beyond the time permitted by the policy, which was modified by the time limitation provided for in General Statutes § § 38a-307 and 38a-308. In support of its motion, the defendant attached various exhibits including the affidavit of Andrew Sarsfield, the claims examiner who determined the value of the plaintiff's loss, the plaintiff's insurance policy, and a draft of Public Act 14-175. The plaintiff submitted an objection and memorandum in opposition to the motion (#109) on May 26, 2016, with drafts of Public Acts 09-164 and 12-162 as supporting exhibits. The defendant filed a reply brief (#110) on June 14, 2016, and the plaintiff's filed a sur-reply (#111) on June 24, 2016. The matter was heard at short calendar on June 27, 2016.
DISCUSSION
" Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 313, 87 A.3d 546 (2014). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 319-20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
" Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313. " Issues of insurance coverage and contractual disputes are particularly appropriate for summary judgment because the meaning of the insurance contract presents questions of law unsuitable for jury resolution." Edelman v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 93-0533463-S, (December 11, 1997, Aurigemma, J.) (21 Conn.L.Rptr. 107), aff'd, 53 Conn.App. 54, 728 A.2d 531, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 918, 733 A.2d 229 (1999).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff's action was brought beyond the time permitted by the policy, as modified by the General Statutes. The defendant asserts that the policy requires that suit be commenced within one year of the date of loss and that the time limitation provision in the policy was modified to eighteen months by General Statues § § 38a-307 and 38a-308. The plaintiff counters that the one-year time limitation found in the policy is invalid as a matter of law, because it is not in accordance with the eighteen-month statutory requirement. In the absence of a valid contractual provision, the plaintiff asserts that the time limit in the policy reverts back to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-576(a). In reply, the defendant argues that the suit limitations period mandated in § 38a-308(b) is incorporated into the policy and expands the time limitation to eighteen months.
General Statutes § 38a-307 dictates the standard form for fire insurance policies in Connecticut. In April 2014, at the time of the plaintiff's loss, § 38a-307 included the following provision for suit on a policy: " Suit. No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within eighteen months next after inception of the loss."
General Statutes § 38a-308 provides in relevant part:
General Statutes § 52-576(a) provides in relevant part: " No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues . . ."
In the present case, the " Suit Against Us" provision in the insurance policy provides that: " No action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is started within one year after the date of loss."
At the time the policy was issued and at the time of the loss, § § 38a-307 and 38a-308 included an eighteen month time limit for bringing suit on a policy. Section 38a-308(b) applies to all-risk policies and instructs that all risk policies are not required to comply with the standard form requirements of § § 38a-308(a) and 38a-307, provided that they incorporate " the time period for when a suit or action for the recovery of a claim may be commenced" from the standard form fire insurance policy. The standard form limits the time period in which a suit can be brought on a policy to eighteen months. As a general rule, " [t]he Connecticut Supreme Court has long held that a contractual condition in an insurance policy requiring an action to be brought with[in] a particular time period is a part of the contract . . . [and] is valid and binding upon the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Charter Oak Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6012621-S, (May 4, 2012, Robaina, J.) (54 Conn.L.Rptr. 19). " [C]ontracting parties are free to adopt an unambiguous contract provision limiting the time in which an insurance claim must be filed . . . and . . . when they do so, failure to comply with the terms therein bar[s] recovery." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Voris v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 297 Conn. 589, 600, 999 A.2d 741 (2010). " Since a provision in a fire insurance policy requiring suit to be brought within one year of the loss is a valid contractual obligation, a failure to comply therewith is a defense to an action on the policy unless the provision has been waived or unless there is a valid excuse for nonperformance; and such a condition requiring suit to be brought within one year does not operate as a statute of limitations. . . . This condition is a part of the contract so that it controls the rights of the parties under the contract and, hence, such rights must be governed by the rules of law applicable to contracts." (Citations omitted.) Monteiro v. American Home Assurance Co., 177 Conn. 281, 283, 416 A.2d 1189, 1190 (1979).
The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff filed suit beyond the one-year limitation in the policy. There is no contradictory language in the policy that would render suit provision susceptible to multiple interpretations, thus the policy provision is unambiguous. The parties dispute whether the statutory eighteen-month limitation period applies to the plaintiff's policy. But, regardless of whether or not the statutory limitation applies, the plaintiff did not commence her action within eighteen months. The loss the plaintiff experienced occurred on April 4, 2014, and the plaintiff did not bring this action until February 11, 2016. Consequently, the plaintiff's action is untimely under both the contractual and statutory limitation.
For a more detailed analysis of § § 38a-307 and 38a-308 statutory construction and contract interpretation of property insurance policies, see the Superior Court decision in Holmes v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America , Superior Court's, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6032368-S, (April 16, 2015, Wilson, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 268).
The plaintiff argues that this court should follow a line of uninsured motorist cases holding that if a time limitation in an insurance policy is not in accordance with the statutory limitation, the policy reverts back to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in § 52-576(a). The plaintiff fails, however, to make the connection between uninsured motorist cases and cases involving property insurance policies. Moreover, the legislative history of the uninsured motorist statute illustrates that the legislature specifically contemplated a scenario where an insurance policy provided for less time to bring suit than what was prescribed by statute. " [I]f a contract provides for a period of time less than the three years which is permissible under this statute . . . the . . . provision that is less than three years, would . . . be invalid and we would resort to the six year statute of limitations for regular contract actions in those cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn.App. 806, 813, 768 A.2d 950 (2001) (quoting 36 H.R. Proc. Pt. 8, 1993 Sess., pp. 2752, remarks of Representative Staples). The legislative histories for § § 38a-307 and 38a-308 do not include any similar contemplation or demonstrate intent to resort to the six-year statute of limitations if a policy is non-conforming. The plaintiff's reliance on these cases is misplaced, because the uninsured motorist statute is separate and distinct from the property insurance statutes. The plaintiff failed to file suit within the time specified by the policy and § § 38a-307 and 38a-308, and therefore, her action is untimely.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
(a)(1) No policy or contract of fire insurance shall be made, issued or delivered by any admitted or nonadmitted insurer or any agent or representative thereof, on any property in this state, unless it conforms as to all provisions, stipulations, agreements and conditions with the form of policy set forth in section 38a-307 . . . (b) Any policy or contract that includes . . . coverage against the peril of fire and substantial coverage against other perils need not comply with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, provided: (1) Such policy or contract shall afford coverage, with respect to the peril of fire, not less than the substantial equivalent of the coverage afforded by said standard fire insurance policy; (2) . . . the following provisions in said standard fire insurance policy are incorporated therein without change: (A) Mortgagee interests and obligations, (B) the definitions of actual cash value and depreciation, (C) the time period for when a loss is payable after proof of loss, and (D) the time period for when a suit or action for the recovery of a claim may be commenced; (3) such policy or contract is complete as to all of its terms without reference to any other document; and (4) the commissioner is satisfied that such policy or contract complies with the provisions hereof . . . (Emphasis added.)