Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:04-CV-043-BG.
July 21, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE WITH PREJUDICE
On this day came to be considered Defendant Roy Hensley's motion for summary judgment filed on February 17, 2005. Having considered all relevant arguments and evidence, this court is of the opinion that Defendant Hensley's motion for summary judgment should be and is hereby granted.
I. Procedural History
On July 21, 2004, the court dismissed Bass' claims against all Defendants except those against Defendant Hensley. On that date the court also ordered Hensley to file an answer to Bass' complaint and Hensley filed his answer and request for a jury trial on August 20, 2004. Thereafter, on September 16, 2004, before the court entered its scheduling order, Bass filed a response to Hensley's answer and a motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Bass' motion for summary judgment without prejudice on October 22, 2004, because the motion was filed prematurely. Bass did not file another motion for summary judgment and did not file a response to Hensley's motion for summary judgment.
II. Statement of the Case
Plaintiff Daniel D. Bass is an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) at the Preston E. Smith Unit (Smith Unit). Defendant Hensley was the Smith Unit Medical Department Complaints Coordinator during the time period relevant to this lawsuit. Bass appears pro se and in forma pauperis and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Eighth Amendment violations. He contends that Hensley was deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs because he refused to respond to and ignored his complaints that the Smith Unit dental department refused to replace a partial denture that he lost. He seeks only injunctive relief; he asks that he be provided with appropriate dental care and a partial denture.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The court's task in considering a summary judgment motion is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A trial is unecessary and summary judgment is appropriate when there are no factual issues that might affect the outcome of a trial. Id. at 248. Disagreements over facts that are irrelevant and that would not affect the ultimate outcome of a trial will not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. Thus, the court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement" that must be decided by a jury or whether the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251.
IV. Grounds for Dismissal
Hensley contends that Bass' claims must be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1). This section provides that a court must dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis if at any time the court determines that the plaintiff's claim is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. A court may find a complaint to be frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either fact or law or if there is no realistic chance of ultimate success. Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1989). Dismissals may be based on an investigation of the plaintiff's allegations, Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), and on evidence obtained from authenticated prison records, Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995).
The court held a hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter at which Bass testified regarding his allegations. The court's dismissal is based on Bass' testimony from the Spears hearing along with authenticated records provided by TDCJ-ID and the summary judgment evidence provided by Hensley.
V. Discussion
Bass' complaints against Hensley concern a partial denture that was made for him in the spring of 2002 at the Dick Ware Unit (Ware Unit) prior to his incarceration at the Smith Unit. The authenticated records show that on March 28, 2001, approximately seven months after his incarceration began at TDCJ-ID, Bass sent a request to the Ware Unit dental department asking to begin a dental treatment plan and to have his front lower teeth repaired. In the fall of 2001 a dental plan was initiated and Bass underwent treatment at least once per month. At that time, Bass was missing one tooth on the front and bottom ridge of his mouth. The Ware Unit dentist recommended that a partial denture be made to replace the missing tooth. He also recommended extraction of tooth No. 26, which was next to the space of the missing tooth. According to the authenticated records, the tooth was extracted because it was decayed and non-restorable. According to Bass, however, the dentist extracted the tooth because he believed that it would make the partial denture look and fit better in Bass' mouth.
Regardless of the reason for extracting tooth No. 26, Bass consented in writing to the extraction on December 12, 2001. Thereafter, the dentist made a partial denture to fit in the space of Bass' missing front teeth. Bass claims the denture was defective and did not fit properly at the time he received it. He claims the dentist at the Ware Unit attempted to repair the denture by filing and bending the denture plate to the correct size. The dentist apparently filed the denture plate to a point where it was very thin. According to Bass, the dentist warned him that the denture would eventually break but assured him that he would make him another denture if that happened.
As the dentist predicted, the denture plate broke about three months later. Rather than making a new denture, the dentist made a new dental plate for the denture. Again, he adjusted and filed the plate to make it fit Bass' mouth correctly and warned Bass that the denture would likely break again and told him that if "this one gives you anymore trouble or breaks again, we will make another because this one might be defective."
A few months later in August of 2002, Bass was transferred from the Ware Unit to the Smith Unit where he continued to wear the denture, apparently without problems, until it broke while he was eating on May 5, 2003. He claims that he reported the broken denture to the dental department immediately and the authenticated records show that on that date an appointment was scheduled for May 12, 2003. Sometime between the time Bass first reported that the denture broke on May 5, 2003, and his appointment on May 12, 2003, the denture was lost. At his appointment Bass learned of the severe consequences that would attend his losing the denture; he was told that if he had not lost the denture it could have been repaired and, further, that a new TDCJ-ID policy allowed prison dentists to make new dentures only when "medically necessary." Thus, Bass' request for a new denture was denied.
Bass did not accept the denial. He made formal requests for a new denture to the dental department in an "Inmate Request to Official" on May 18, 2003, and on June 6, 2003. Thereafter, he directed his requests to Defendant Hensley.
On July 21, 2003, in a formal complaint notice referred to as an "I-60," Bass related to Hensley the chain of events that led to him being denied a new denture. He told Hensley about his problems with the denture after it was first made for him; that the dentist at the Ware Unit adjusted and repaired the denture and told him that another denture would be made for him if his denture broke again; how the denture broke and how he lost the denture; and that despite the promises of the dentist at the Ware Unit, the dental department at the Smith Unit refused to make him another denture. He complained that no one ever told him that he would be required to produce the broken denture in order to have a replacement denture made and stressed that the denture would not have been out of his mouth and he would not have lost it had it not been defective in the first place. Bass wrote another I-60 to Hensley the following day.
Hensley responded to Bass' complaints by telling him that he was ineligible for a replacement denture under new TDCJ-ID policy and that the records did not show that he was promised a new denture by the Ware Unit dentist. This was the extent of the communication between Bass and Hensley.
On August 7, 2003, Bass was called to the dental clinic for a dental consultation with Dr. George Blakely, D.D.S., to discuss his dental treatment at the Ware Unit and the complaints in his I-60s to Hensley. Dr. Blakely explained that the (then) current TDCJ-ID policies disallowed the replacement of his partial denture at that time. Thereafter, Bass wrote grievances to prison administration.
Bass' allegations do not demonstrate that Hensley violated the Eighth Amendment. In the context of claims such as that brought by Bass, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when (1) the alleged deprivation is sufficiently serious and (2) the prison official knew of the deprivation but disregarded it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The court's inquiry is "whether the prison official, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health." Burleson v. Tex. Dep't. of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 589 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843)).
The first part of the inquiry requires an objective determination as to whether the medical condition at issue is "sufficiently serious" and the prison official's act or omission resulted in the denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The second inquiry requires a subjective determination as to whether the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health and safety. See id. at 837.
Bass' allegations, together with his admissions and evidence in the authenticated records, show that neither the objective nor the subjective inquiry may be answered in his favor. First, Bass has not alleged that any omissions on Hensley's part resulted in the denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." He has merely alleged that he has a "huge ugly gap in [his] teeth"; that he cannot bite with his front teeth; and that it is difficult to eat. Although he alleges that he suffered from pain at the Ware Unit after he was fitted with his partial denture and before it was properly adjusted for his mouth, he does not allege that he suffers from pain or any other medical condition as a result of no longer having the partial denture.
Courts have recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires that prisoners be provided with adequate dental care. See, e.g., Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, courts have specifically found that refusing to provide a prisoner with dentures may constitute deliberate indifference but only when the lack of dentures results in a serious medical condition. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003); Hunt, 865 F.2d 198; Petrazzoulo v. United States Marshals Serv., 999 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. New York 1998). Further, the need for dentures per se does not constitute a serious medical need. Farrow, 320 F.2d at 1245. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the need for dentures put his health at risk and created significant health concerns; cosmetic concerns are insufficient. Compare Farrow, 320 F.3d 1235, and Hunt, 865 F.2d 198 with Petrazzoulo, 999 F. Supp. 401.
The plaintiff in Farrow was successful in stating an Eighth Amendment violation by alleging that prison officials ignored his repeated requests for dental care and dentures. 320 F.3d 1235. The plaintiff had only two lower teeth and was forced to continue in that condition for at least 15 months before he was provided with dentures. Id. at 1244. During that time, he suffered a number of medical and dental conditions that created a serious medical need. Id. at 1244. He experienced severe soreness and swelling in his gums, was forced to improvise a soft food diet for himself that enabled him to eat with his tongue and the upper part of his mouth, lost weight, and suffered from cuts and bleeding in his mouth that were caused from his lower teeth slicing into his upper gums. Id. at 1239. The plaintiff made the defendant aware of his serious medical needs on a number of occasions but, as the court found, the defendant delayed providing the plaintiff with dentures for a considerable period of time despite his knowledge of the serious conditions the plaintiff suffered without them. Id. at 1246-48.
The plaintiff in Hunt also stated an Eighth Amendment violation by alleging that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to serious dental needs that resulted from a lack of dentures. In that case, the plaintiff lost his upper and lower dentures during a prison riot. 865 F.2d at 199. The loss of his dentures resulted in bleeding and infected gums and broken teeth. The plaintiff also alleged that he suffered pain and weight loss as a result of his inability to eat properly and claimed that his requests for a soft food diet were denied. Id. The plaintiff alleged that prison officials were aware of his condition but refused to provide him with dental care or to prescribe a soft food diet until new dentures could be made for him. Id. at 200.
The plaintiffs in Farrow and Hunt stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim because they (1) alleged serious medical conditions and (2) alleged that prison officials were aware of the serious conditions and disregarded them. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1246; Hunt, 865 F.2d at 201.
In this case, Bass has done neither. He has not alleged and the evidence does not show that he suffered from a serious medical condition that was ignored. The authenticated records show and Bass conceded at the Spears hearing that after he lost his partial denture, he continued to receive routine dental care, including examinations, cleanings, and x-rays. In fact, the records show that he was a patient in the dental clinic on at least nine occasions between August 2003 and April 2004. The records of Bass' visits to the dental clinic are significant not only because they demonstrate that he received adequate dental care but because they demonstrate that he did not suffer serious medical consequences from not receiving a replacement denture. Specifically, there is no indication in the records that the lack of a partial denture caused Bass pain or otherwise resulted in conditions that were harmful to his dental or medical health. Unlike the plaintiffs in Farrow and Hunt, there is no indication that Bass ever complained of pain, bleeding gums, an inability to eat, or of weight loss. There is likewise no such indication in the records from the medical treatment Bass received after losing his dentures.
Finally and significantly, there is an absence of such allegations in Bass' written complaints to Hensley. The extent of Bass' complaints regarding the consequences of not having a partial denture was that he had a gap in his front teeth and was unable to bite with his front teeth. Rather than alerting the defendant to any serious medical condition as did the plaintiffs in Hunt and Farrow, Bass primarily complained of and emphasized to Hensley his frustration with the events that led to him losing the partial denture and with the TDCJ-ID policy that disallowed a replacement of his lost denture. Thus, even if Bass suffered from a serious medical need, he did not make Hensley aware of such a need. An Eighth Amendment violation arises only when the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This did not occur in this case.
As a final note, in determining whether a denial of medical care amounts to deliberate indifference, the "essential test is one of medical necessity and not one simply of desirability." Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). Bass may want a replacement partial denture for cosmetic purposes but the evidence does not show that a replacement is medically necessary to treat a serious medical need. Governments are obligated to provide medical care to inmates, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; however, the Constitution does not require prisons to provide inmates with the kind of medical attention that judges would wish for themselves, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1150 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated in part as moot, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). Prison officials are required to provide adequate medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 533. This was done in Bass' case.
For the reasons above and for the reasons stated in Defendant's motion and brief, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendant Hensley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is, therefore,
ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted and this civil rights complaint be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
Any pending motions are denied as moot.
This is a consent case assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) with authority to enter judgment. Any appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). Dismissal of this action does not release Bass or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation to pay any filing fee previously imposed. See Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1997).
A copy of this order shall be sent to any party appearing pro se, to any attorney of record, to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID, Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas 78711, and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77372-0629.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.