Opinion
362395
10-19-2023
GABY BASMADJIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant, and CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2021-001713-NF
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case arising under Michigan's no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (Auto Club) appeals by leave granted the trial court's May 3, 2022 order on plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine question of fact). We vacate the trial court's orders granting partial summary disposition and dismissing defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest (Citizens). We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
See Basmadjian v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 4, 2023 (Docket No. 362395).
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a September 2020 motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff was allegedly injured. At the time, plaintiff was driving with permission a vehicle owned by her boyfriend. She did not know the vehicle was uninsured. Plaintiff's son, Francis Basmadjian, owned another vehicle that he had registered in Michigan. He periodically kept the vehicle at a home he owned in West Bloomfield (the West Bloomfield home), and had it insured with Auto Club at that address. Plaintiff was not listed on the policy.
After the accident, plaintiff filed claims for no-fault benefits with Auto Club and the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). Importantly, plaintiff filed the claim with Auto Club as a resident relative of Francis. Plaintiff's claim with the MACP was assigned to Citizens.
After neither insurance company paid the claim, plaintiff filed a complaint for payment of no-fault benefits against Auto Club and Citizens. Plaintiff later moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) asserting no genuine dispute of material fact that she was entitled to no-fault benefits from either Auto Club or Citizens. She asked for a declaratory judgment determining which insurance company was the highest priority insurer under the nofault act. Auto Club argued that plaintiff was not covered as a resident relative by Francis's policy because she was not domiciled in the same household as Francis at the time of the accident. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, concluding Auto Club was responsible for plaintiff's no-fault benefits because plaintiff and Francis were both domiciled at the West Bloomfield home. The court also dismissed defendant Citizens from the case with prejudice because Citizens was not the priority insurer.
II. DOMICILE
Auto Club argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it was responsible for plaintiff's no-fault benefits because she was not a resident relative of Francis, and thus, not covered by Francis's insurance policy with Auto Club. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "tests the factual sufficiency of a claim." Id. at 160. "When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Under the no-fault act, "an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle ...." MCL 500.3105(1). A resident relative of the insured is entitled to no-fault benefits as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person's spouse, and a relative of either
domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident ....[MCL 500.3114(1).]
Similarly, Francis's policy with Auto Club defined resident relative as "a person who is domiciled in your household [and] related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, or is your foster child."
In contrast,
a person who suffers accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant of a motor vehicle who is not covered under a personal protection insurance policy as provided in subsection (1) shall claim personal protection insurance benefits under the assigned claims plan ....[MCL 500.3114(4).]
Accordingly, the question here is whether plaintiff was domiciled in the same household as Francis such as to be covered by Francis's Auto Club policy.
Our Supreme Court in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich. 477; 274 N.W.2d 373 (1979), while interpreting MCL 500.3114(1), determined that courts should flexibly interpret the phrase "domiciled in the same household." Id. at 495-496. The Court recognized that many factual scenarios were possible and that the phrase may vary depending on the circumstances. Id. at 496. The Court set forth four factors to aid courts in determining whether a person is domiciled in the same household as an insured:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his "domicile" or "household";
(2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household;
(3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises;
(4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging "residence" or "domicile" in the household. [Id. at 496-497 (internal citations omitted).]
Later, this Court identified additional factors for courts to consider when identifying the injured person's domicile:
(1) the person's mailing address;
(2) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured's home;
(3) whether the insured's address appears on the person's driver's license and other documents;
(4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured's home; and
(5) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance. [Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 272 Mich.App. 410, 415; 726 N.W.2d 73 (2006) (citation omitted).]
These factors are not exclusive, see, e.g., Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich.App. 675, 681-682; 333 N.W.2d 322 (1983), and no single factor is determinative. Cervantes, 272 Mich.App. at 415.
Although this Court is not required to follow cases decided before November 1, 1990, see MCR 7.215(J)(1), a published case decided by this Court "has precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis," MCR 7.215(C)(2). See also Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich.App. 108, 114-115; 923 N.W.2d 607 (2018) (stating that although this Court is not "strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from this Court decided before November 1, 1990," those opinions are nonetheless "considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.").
Regarding domicile, our Supreme Court has explained:
For over 165 years, Michigan courts have defined "domicile" to mean "the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Similarly, a person's domicile has been defined to be" 'that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.' "
* * *
[O]ur common law has recognized that from the time of a person's birth-from childhood through adulthood-a person can only have a single domicile at any given point in time. Indeed, there are few legal axioms as established as the one providing that every person has a domicile, and that a person may have one-and only one-domicile.
* * *
[A] person may have only one domicile, but more than one residence. For purposes of distinguishing "domicile" from "residence," this Court has explained that "domicile is acquired by the combination of residence and the intention to reside in a given place .... If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will establish a domicile." The traditional common-law inquiry into a person's "domicile," then, is generally a question of intent, but also considers all the facts and circumstances taken together. [Grange Ins Co of Mich. v Lawrence, 494 Mich. 475, 493-495; 835 N.W.2d 363, 372 (2013) (citations omitted).]
We first conclude that plaintiff was, as a matter of law, domiciled at the West Bloomfield home at the time of the subject accident. Specifically, plaintiff sold her prior home in 2019 and consistently testified that she lived at the West Bloomfield home at the time of the accident. And all the documentary evidence here supports plaintiff's contention that she lived at the West Bloomfield home. Indeed, plaintiff's utility bills, her social security notice, her application with the MACP, and Auto Club's claim notes all list the West Bloomfield home as her address. Finally, although plaintiff never changed her driver's license to reflect her move to the West Bloomfield home, she sold her prior house in Novi in 2019, thus negating any potential intent to return there that may otherwise be inferred from her keeping this prior address on her driver's license. Admittedly, plaintiff acknowledged that she kept minimal belongings at the West Bloomfield home and stayed there intermittently due to ongoing construction at the home. Nevertheless, plaintiff did reside at the West Bloomfield home around the time of the accident, even if not all of the time, and the evidence here supports her intention at the time to return to and live at the West Bloomfield home as her permanent, principal residence. See Grange Ins Co of Mich, 494 Mich. at 495 ("If the intention of permanently residing in a place exists, a residence in pursuance of that intention, however short, will establish a domicile.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Whether Francis was also domiciled at the West Bloomfield home at the time of the subject accident, however, is not as straightforward. Francis initially lived with plaintiff in Novi before moving to Kentucky for work in 2014. He testified that he always intended to return to Michigan and did not keep substantial belongings in Kentucky, where he rented apartment until November 2020. In 2019, Francis purchased the West Bloomfield home, intending to live there with plaintiff at some point in the future. Before the accident, Francis signed a principal residence exemption (PRE) affidavit for the West Bloomfield home. He identified the West Bloomfield home as his principal residence on the PRE affidavit, and he received mail there. He insured his vehicle at the West Bloomfield home, and left it there much of the time. Francis and plaintiff also have a legal relationship as mother and son, even though nothing shows that either relied on the other for financial assistance. And while Francis denied ever living at the West Bloomfield home due to the construction there, plaintiff said he continued to visit the home, staying for a day at a time when he did not have to work out of state.
At the same time, Francis continued living primarily in Kentucky and retained his Kentucky apartment and driver's license. He seemingly did not have a bedroom at the West Bloomfield home and, apart from his vehicle, did not keep possessions there. He testified that, despite his initial intent, he never slept at the West Bloomfield home due to the construction. When Francis periodically returned to Michigan, he stayed with his fiancee. And at some point, after discussing it with the fiancee-though precisely when is unclear-Francis decided he would not be living together with plaintiff in the West Bloomfield home.
Ultimately, Francis's connection to the West Bloomfield home was tenuous, with his limited contact therewith potentially insufficient to constitute the requisite combination of residence and the intent to reside permanently necessary to establish domicile. But given the conflicting evidence on the issue, we conclude that a question of fact exists regarding whether Francis was domiciled at the West Bloomfield home and, therefore, regarding whether he and plaintiff were domiciled in the same household such as to qualify plaintiff as a resident relative covered by Auto Club's policy. Accordingly, the trial court erred by ruling that Auto Club was solely responsible for plaintiff's no-fault benefits on plaintiff's motion for partial summary
disposition. Because there remains a genuine question of fact whether Auto Club or Citizens was the highest priority insurer, the trial court similarly erred in dismissing Citizens from the case.
We vacate the orders granting partial summary disposition and dismissing Citizens from the case. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Kirsten Frank Kelly, Kathleen Jansen, Thomas C. Cameron