Opinion
# 2015-038-583 Claim No. 124617 Motion No. M-87401
12-09-2015
WILLIAM BARTONv. STATE OF NEW YORK
ARTHUR V. GRASEK, JR., ESQ. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing claim seeking damages for illegal post-release supervision (PRS) granted as a matter of law. Even if claimant has a cause of action for wrongful confinement, and even if the court clerk who added a period of PRS to claimant's sentence and commitment order, and even if the court clerk's actions were ministerial, defendant is entitled to governmental immunity because no special relationship/special duty existed.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-038-583 |
| Claimant(s): | WILLIAM BARTON |
| Claimant short name: | BARTON |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124617 |
| Motion number(s): | M-87401 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | W. BROOKS DeBOW |
| Claimant's attorney: | ARTHUR V. GRASEK, JR., ESQ. |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 9, 2015 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
This claim seeks compensation for periods of time during which claimant was allegedly subjected to unlawful parole supervision and confinement for violations of post-release supervision. Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim. Claimant opposes the motion.
The facts of this matter are wholly undisputed. Claimant was sentenced on June 28, 2001 as a predicate felony offender to a definite term of incarceration of ten years upon a conviction for robbery in the first degree (see Krenrich Affirmation, Exhibit B). A five-year period of post-release supervision (PRS) following claimant's release from incarceration was required by law (see Penal Law § 70.45 [2]), but the sentencing judge did not impose a period of PRS during the sentencing proceeding (see Krenrich Affirmation, Exhibit B, at 6). However, a five-year period of PRS was included on claimant's Sentence and Commitment Order (see id., Exhibit C). Claimant prevailed in demonstrating the illegality of the imposition of PRS in an Article 78 proceeding (see id., Exhibit D). Claimant was under PRS from the date of his release on December 1, 2010 until mid-2014, and was declared delinquent and returned to State incarceration for violations of the conditions of the illegally imposed PRS three times prior to the decision (see id., Exhibit A).
Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim on two grounds. First, defendant contends that the claim fails to state a cause of action for wrongful confinement because the Division of Parole's conduct in regard to claimant's PRS was privileged inasmuch as the Sentence and Commitment Order that included the period of PRS was facially valid (see Krenrich Affirmation, ¶¶ 14-18). Claimant's opposition to the motion does not dispute this, and defendant's argument is meritorious.
The elements of a cause of action sounding in false imprisonment or wrongful confinement are "that the defendant intended to confine the [claimant], that the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged" (Holmberg v County of Albany, 291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]; see Jackson v State of New York, 94 AD3d 1166, 1168 [3d Dept 2012]). The inquiry is not whether the order was substantively correct or legal, but whether it was valid on its face (see Harty v State of New York, 29 AD2d 243, 245 [3d Dept 1968], affd 27 NY2d 698 [1970]). Further, " 'prison officials are conclusively bound by the contents of commitment papers accompanying a prisoner' " (Matter of Murray v Goord, 1 NY3d 29, 32 [2003], quoting Middleton v State of New York, 54 AD2d 450, 452 [3d Dept 1976], affd 43 NY2d 678 [1977] [emphasis in original]). Thus, to the extent that the claim asserts the intentional tort of wrongful confinement due to the imposition of conditions of supervision and the incarceration of claimant by the Division of Parole or by the Department of Correction and Community Supervision (DOCCS) respectively, the claim fails to state a cause of action against defendant because the actions of these agencies was privileged.
In opposition to defendant's motion, claimant argues that liability rests not upon the acts of the DOCCS or the Division of Parole in imposing the PRS as set forth in the Sentence and Commitment Order, but upon the negligence in the performance of ministerial act by a Principal Court Clerk, who added the term of PRS to the Sentence and Commitment Order (see Grasek Affirmation). Defendant asserts that the allegedly negligent acts of the court clerk were performed as a judicial function that is entitled to absolute judicial immunity (see Krenrich Affirmation, ¶¶ 19-21), and alternatively, that defendant is entitled to governmental immunity from liability absent proof that a "special relationship" arose between defendant and claimant that gave rise to a duty to claimant (see id., at ¶¶ 22-26). Claimant responds respectively that the "administrative function [of the court clerk] was not judicial in nature" (Grasek Affirmation, ¶ 2), and that the act of the court clerk was ministerial, not discretionary, and thus, claimant need not prove the existence of a special relationship (see id., ¶¶ 3-6).
The Court notes that this basis for liability was not asserted in Claim No. 124617.
The arguments of counsel as set forth in their affirmations were essentially reiterated and unelaborated upon during a telephone conference on the motion, at which Mr. Grasek and Mr. Krenrich appeared. --------
Defendant argues that no special relationship giving rise to a special duty was created. As stated by the Court of Appeals:
"[A]n agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public . . . Such a duty, we have explained - a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the [claimant] - is born of a special relationship between the [claimant] and the governmental entity"
(McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 199 [2009] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). A special relationship may be formed in one of three ways, only one of which is pertinent here: "when [the governmental entity or agent] voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty" (Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186, 199 [2004]). Although the parties dispute whether the entry of a term of PRS on the Sentence and Commitment Order was a discretionary or ministerial function, that issue is not controlling. Even if claimant persuasively argues that it was a ministerial function (but see Krenrich Affirmation in Reply, Exhibit A [Golden v State of New York, Claim No. 115792, Motion No. M-81761 (Ct Cl, Hard, J., Nov.15, 2012)]), he does not allege nor argue that a special relationship existed here, nor do the facts set forth in the submissions on defendant's motion raise a triable issue of fact related thereto. Thus, defendant did not owe a special duty to claimant, and defendant is not liable to claimant.
Inasmuch as no special duty has been established, the Court need not discuss whether defendant is entitled to judicial immunity for the acts of the Principal Court Clerk.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that defendant's motion number M-87401 is GRANTED, and claim number M-124617 is DISMISSED.
December 9, 2015
Saratoga Springs, New York
W. BROOKS DeBOW
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers considered: (1) Claim Number 124617, filed July 3, 2014; (2) Verified Answer, filed August 7, 2014; (3) Notice of Motion, dated September 25, 2015; (4) Affirmation in Support of Michael T. Krenrich, AAG, dated September 25, 2015, with Exhibits A-F; (5) Affirmation in Opposition of Arthur V. Grasek, Jr., Esq. dated November 11, 2015 (6) Affirmation in Reply of Michael T. Krenrich, AAG, dated November 18, 2015, with Exhibit A.