Opinion
No. 27002-5-III.
April 14, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 06-4-00962-4, Robert D. Austin, J., entered May 16, 2008.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Sweeney, J., concurred in by Kulik, A.C.J., and Korsmo, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Standing is a necessary predicate to a court asserting jurisdiction over parties to a lawsuit. Here, an heir's widow sought to set aside her late husband's disclaimer of any interest in his mother's estate. The court concluded that the widow had standing to do so. We conclude that the widow had no present or future interest in her mother-in-law's estate and, therefore, has no legal standing to assert a claim. We reverse the trial judge's conclusion to the contrary and dismiss the suit.
FACTS
Reva Barnhart died intestate on March 27, 1995. Her children, Janet Barnhart and Morris Barnhart, were the sole heirs of her estate. The court confirmed Janet as the personal representative of Reva's estate. Morris signed a "waiver of claim of inheritance" in January 1998, and Janet filed it with the court.
Morris died on March 1, 2001. His will was never probated. His wife, Kathleen Barnhart, survived him.
Kathleen petitioned to set aside Morris's 1998 "waiver of claim of inheritance" in July 2006. Janet had not yet closed Reva's estate. The trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that laches did not bar the petition. It also concluded that Morris did not validly disclaim his right to inherit from Reva's estate. And the court awarded Kathleen attorney fees.
We accepted discretionary review.
DISCUSSION
Janet argues that Kathleen has no standing to assert a claim of any sort in Reva Barnhart's estate. She notes that Kathleen is not an heir or potential heir of that estate. Indeed, she notes that Kathleen's interest in her husband's estate has not been resolved. Kathleen responds that she has a claim in Reva's estate by virtue of her right to inherit through Morris and that she is, therefore, an "interested" party with standing.
Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Irrevocable Trust of McKean, 144 Wn. App. 333, 339, 183 P.3d 317 (2008). A court lacks jurisdiction to consider a lawsuit if a party lacks standing to bring it. High Tide Seafoods v. State, 106 Wn.2d 695, 701-02, 725 P.2d 411 (1986). A party has standing to raise an issue if that party has a distinct and personal interest in the issue. Paris Am. Corp. v. McCausland, 52 Wn. App. 434, 438, 759 P.2d 1210 (1988). The interest must be present and substantial rather than expectant or contingent. Primark, Inc. v. Burien Gardens Assocs., 63 Wn. App. 900, 907, 823 P.2d 1116 (1992).
Kathleen has no present, personal interest in Reva's estate. In re Estate of Hitchcock, 140 Wn. App. 526, 532-33, 167 P.3d 1180 (2007). Kathleen can claim an interest in Reva's estate only through Morris. But Morris's estate was never probated. The extent of Kathleen's interest in Morris's estate, if any, has not yet been established; her interest in his estate is, then, merely expectant. It is contingent on the probate of Morris's estate. Moreover, any interest Morris would have in Reva's estate would be his separate property. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976 P.2d 102 (1999). Consequently, no community interest vested immediately in Kathleen upon Morris's death. Olver v. Fowler, 131 Wn. App. 135, 145, 126 P.3d 69 (2006), aff'd, 161 Wn.2d 655, 168 P.3d 348 (2007).
Kathleen also has no interest in Reva's estate in any representative capacity. Morris's cause of action to enforce whatever rights he may have to inherit from Reva's estate would pass to his personal representative. RCW 4.20.046(1). Kathleen, however, is not the personal representative of Morris's estate. No personal representative has been appointed because, again, Morris's estate has not been probated.
Kathleen argues, nonetheless, that the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), chapter 11.96A RCW, confers standing on her because it provides that "any party may have a judicial proceeding for the declaration of rights or legal relations with respect to any matter." RCW 11.96A.080(1). A "party," in this case, is "[a]ny other person who has an interest in the subject of the particular proceeding." RCW 11.96A.030(4)(i). Kathleen, however, lacks a present personal or representative interest in Reva's estate. She has no interest in the estate, at least, no legally cognizable interest. She is not, then, a proper "party" under TEDRA.
The trial court erred by concluding that Kathleen had standing to maintain this suit against Reva's estate. We reverse that decision and reverse the award of attorney fees. We deny fees on appeal. RCW 11.96A.150(1).
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KULIK, A.C.J., and KORSMO, J., concur.