Opinion
CV156057156S
02-08-2018
Jason BANDY v. Dean ESSERMAN et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wilson, J.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 15, 2015, the plaintiff, Jason Bandy, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, Dean Esserman, Luiz Cassanova, and the City of New Haven. Counts one and four allege federal claims, which were disposed of in federal court. Counts two and three of the complaint allege intentional infliction of emotional distress against Esserman and Cassanova. The plaintiff alleges the following facts which are common to counts two and three.
On September 23, 2015, this matter was removed to federal court (no. 101.01). On November 9, 2015, Esserman, Cassanova, and the City of New Haven filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. On April 21, 2016, the court, Chatigny, J., granted the motion to dismiss as to counts one and four of the complaint. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over counts two and three against Esserman and Cassanova (no. 127). Counts two and three remain pending in Superior Court (no. 128). Hereafter, the court refers to Esserman and Cassanova, collectively, as the defendants, and individually by name where appropriate.
Esserman was the chief of police for the city of New Haven Police Department (police department), and Casanova was the assistant chief. In May 2008, the plaintiff started his employment with the police department as a police officer. In 2010, however, the plaintiff’s employment with the police department was temporarily terminated due to an incident that occurred in 2009. In 2011, the plaintiff returned to the department after his termination was changed to a suspension. The 2009 incident was stricken from the plaintiff’s employment file, which resulted in the plaintiff not having any discipline actions or complaints from his supervisors regarding his work ethic, behavior, or job performance prior to or after the 2009 incident.
The plaintiff further alleges the following. The defendants continued to refer to and use the incident from 2009 as a pretext for unfounded discipline and retaliatory harassment. Additionally, the defendants singled out the plaintiff and discriminated against him for his tattoos despite the fact that other police officers also had tattoos. In July 2014, the plaintiff was dispatched to several domestic and neighbor disputes that involved Cassanova’s brother. Cassanova’s brother threatened the plaintiff that his job would be at risk if the plaintiff did not act accordingly. In early 2015, the plaintiff received two citizen complaints that were investigated by internal affairs, which found that there was no wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff. Despite internal affairs’ findings, Esserman and Cassanova " bullied and belittled" the plaintiff about the citizen complaints. Compl., Count One, ¶ 26. The plaintiff was ordered to attend meetings with the defendants during which the defendants unreasonably accused the plaintiff of having anger issues. Esserman subsequently ordered the plaintiff to go to anger management counseling.
The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants threatened to make a pattern case against him, and used his alleged anger issue and the incident from 2009 as a basis to make that threat. " On numerous occasions in 2015 the plaintiff was singled out and ordered to [Esserman’s] office for unfounded and pretextual discipline in an effort to establish a history and pattern [case] against the plaintiff." Id., ¶ 32. Cassanova " had expressed his personal opinion numerous times that the plaintiff should not be a police officer and threatened the plaintiff to watch himself or he will be fired." Id., ¶ 20. The plaintiff has also been denied every position that he has applied for, and was informed that the reason for the denials was that the defendants had the final decision making authority and had " refused to grant the plaintiff’s applications given [their opinion that] the plaintiff has a ‘stigma’ within the department/administration and does not deserve to be a police officer [given the] stricken 2009 incident." Id., ¶ 54.
The plaintiff further alleges: " Unknown to the plaintiff for months, the defendants ... and/or other officers at their direction, had knowingly and intentionally issued the plaintiff a defective firearm in 2014." Id., ¶ 35. " The [defendants’] issuance of the plaintiff’s defective firearm was motivated by the defendants’ opinions that the plaintiff should not be employed as a New Haven police officer and does not deserve to be a police officer; the defendants’ desire to make a ‘pattern case’ against the plaintiff; and [the defendants’ goal to further their] efforts to undermine the plaintiff’s performance while on duty." Id., ¶ 36. " The plaintiff was intentionally issued the defective firearm in the defendants’ attempt to put the plaintiff in a situation where he would falter or otherwise fail to handle the situation adequately so as to create a basis to terminate the plaintiff’s employment" Id., ¶ 37. " The plaintiff first learned that he was issued a defective firearm approximately six months after it was issued when he, along with [two other officers], attempted to shoot their firearms in a shooting trailer for police training." Id., ¶ 38. " At no time between when the plaintiff was issued the firearm and when he attempted to use the firearm in the shooting trailer did the plaintiff attempt to fire the firearm given it was department policy to inspect each firearm before issuance and ensure they were in proper working order." Id., ¶ 39. " After completing his training, the plaintiff notified the department and supervisors that his gun was defective and asked that an investigation be performed regarding his defective firearm." Id., ¶ 43. The defendants prevented the plaintiff from learning what was defective with the firearm, and the defendants ordered one of the witnessing officers to fabricate a cell phone video, which purportedly demonstrated that the plaintiff’s gun was not defective, and which the defendants used to demonstrate to the department that the plaintiff was unable to properly use his firearm and was not fit for duty as a police officer. The defendants ordered the witnessing officer to lie about the incident in a memorandum. " The statements in the [witnessing officer’s memorandum] and the images in his cell phone video were fabricated in an effort to conceal the defendants’ intentional issuance of a known malfunctioning firearm to the plaintiff and to cover-up the defendants’ motive to issue the plaintiff a defective firearm." Id., ¶ 47. " The defendants ... have failed and refused to conduct an investigation in good faith regarding the plaintiff’s defective firearm." Id., ¶ 48.
The plaintiff further alleges that " [a]s a result of the defendants’ deliberate and reckless issuance of a defective firearm, the safety of the plaintiff, the department’s officers, and the citizens of New Haven were disregarded and placed in jeopardy." Id., ¶ 51. " As a further result of the defendants’ deliberate and reckless issuance of a defective firearm, as well as the defendants’ and administrations’ willful indifference to the plaintiff’s expressed concerns about finding out what was defective within his gun, the plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation, loss of self-esteem and emotional well-being, and loss of reputation and standing within the police department." Id., ¶ 52.
In count two, the plaintiff alleges the following against Esserman. Count two incorporates by reference the allegations contained in count one. Esserman’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and " was intentional and in reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s rights and safety." Compl., Count Two, ¶ 62. Esserman intended, knew, or should have known that his conduct would cause the plaintiff’s emotional distress. Esserman’s conduct " caused the plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer substantial pain and suffering, loss of sleep, loss of self-esteem, mental anguish, severe anxiety and stress, worry, frustration, continual discomfort, and has therefore caused the plaintiff to suffer damages." Id., ¶ 64.
In count three, the plaintiff specifically alleges the following against Cassanova. Count three incorporates by reference the allegations contained in count one. Casanova’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and " was intentional and in reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s rights and safety." Compl., Count Three, ¶ 66. Casanova intended, knew, or should have known that his conduct would cause the plaintiff’s emotional distress. Casanova’s conduct " caused the plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer substantial pain and suffering, loss of sleep, loss of self-esteem, mental anguish, severe anxiety and stress, worry, frustration, continual discomfort, and has therefore caused the plaintiff to suffer damages." Id., ¶ 68.
On December 9, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts two and three of the complaint, which was accompanied by a memorandum in support. On March 2, 2017, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants’ motion to strike. Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on October 30, 2017.
DISCUSSION
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). " In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
" Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action ... the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).
The defendants argue that the plaintiff has alleged conduct by the defendants which is not severe enough to sustain claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. More specifically, the defendants argue that the defendants’ alleged conduct is not extreme and outrageous as the law requires.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff fails to connect the defendants to the allegations relating to Casanova’s brother and the plaintiff’s tattoos, and, therefore, has insufficiently pleaded claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendants. Since the court concludes that the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the defendants’ intentional issuance of a defective firearm are sufficiently extreme and outrageous to sustain claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress, it need not consider this portion of the defendants’ argument which concerns allegations other than those pertaining to the issuance of a defective firearm.
The plaintiff counters that the defendants’ motion to strike should be denied because a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is fact specific, and that he has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The plaintiff also argues that the defendants’ motion to strike should be denied because the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is viable " notwithstanding [the defendants’] argument that they are preempted as employee grievances." Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, 1. The defendants do not make a preemption argument, and at oral argument, the plaintiff stated that this argument was included because he was not sure about where the defendants would take their argument. Therefore, the court will not consider this argument.
" In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ... [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe ... Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine ... Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury ...
" Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210-11, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
" In the workplace context, the threshold is even higher." Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-06-5001328-S (August 15, 2007, Upson, J.). In Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 757, 768-69, 792 A.2d 552 (2002), our Supreme Court held that " it is clear that [individuals in an ongoing employment relationship] reasonably should expect to be subject to routine employment-related conduct, including performance evaluations, both formal and informal; decisions related to such evaluations, such as those involving transfer, demotion, promotion and compensation; similar decisions based on the employer’s business needs and desires, independent of the employee’s performance; and disciplinary or investigatory action arising from actual or alleged employee misconduct. In addition, such individuals reasonably should expect to be subject to other vicissitudes of employment, such as workplace gossip, rivalry, personality conflicts and the like.
Thus it is clear that individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress, even if significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct in the workplace." Id., 757.
While Perodeau was decided in the context of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, our Supreme Court has applied the reasoning of the court in Perodeau in the context of a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress. See, e.g., Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 528, 43 A.3d 69 (2012) (citing to Perodeau while analyzing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for proposition that individuals in workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress).
Nevertheless, Superior Courts have denied motions to strike claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against supervisors in the workplace, after explicitly adopting the principle set forth in Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (e) (1981), which provides that " [t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may [also] arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." See, e.g., Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-06-5001328-S; Watt v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket CV-95-323572-S (July 31, 1996, Hauser, J.); Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 17, 20, 597 A.2d 846 (1991). In Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., supra, the court explained that " [s]uch position or relation may be that of an employer or supervisor at work ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn.App. 230, 235, 22 A.3d 697 (2011), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant " (1) deliberately misinformed the plaintiff about a directive from his superior, thereby placing him at risk of violating work rules; (2) falsely reported to others, whose identities are unknown to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff engaged in outbursts and irrational behavior; (3) became violently angry at the plaintiff such that he feared for his physical safety; and (4) on one occasion looked] directly at the plaintiff and stat[ed]: Bang. Bang." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Our Appellate Court held that the allegations did not " constitute extreme and outrageous conduct within the scope of the precedents of our Supreme Court and [the Appellate Court]." Id., 237. In a footnote, the court noted that " [c]ourts, however, have allowed claims under circumstances more egregious than those alleged by the plaintiff, specifically those in which the defendant subjected the plaintiff to actual physical violence." Id., 237 n.4.
In the present case, while the plaintiff does not allege emotional distress arising from actual physical violence, his allegations amount to more than a mere threat of physical safety as in Cassotto. The facts of the present case are more readily analogized to those of Dickerson v. Eagle Landing Residential Care, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5002263-S (May 22, 2008, Taylor, J.).
In Dickerson, two African American females, Dickerson and Parker, alleged that a female white coworker, Briscoe, spit in their drinks, which " posed serious threats to the health and well-being of the plaintiffs." Id. Several persons in supervisory positions allegedly knew of the spitting episodes, but did not tell the plaintiffs. In fact, one supervisor, who had observed the spitting, told another coworker not to drink any of the beverages in the refrigerator. Id. That supervisor also told the coworker that she had seen Briscoe diluting beverages that were in the refrigerator with an unidentified liquid, and instructed the coworker not to inform the plaintiffs about these incidents. Id. Briscoe left approximately two weeks after the plaintiffs became aware of the spitting episodes. Id. For those two weeks, the plaintiffs did not know how long the spitting had taken place and no apology was ever given to them. Id. During the time that Briscoe was still employed, there was no action by management to investigate, despite the fact that Dickerson informed a co-owner of her concerns about the spitting episodes observed by the supervisor, and about the supervisor’s failure to inform her or terminate Briscoe’s employment. See id. It was only after Dickerson threatened to get in touch with the labor board that a meeting was held, during which Briscoe terminated her own employment. Id. After the meeting, the plaintiffs were informed that their work hours would be reduced. Id. Working conditions further deteriorated. See id. Dickerson was eventually terminated and Parker left. See id.
" After learning of Briscoe’s spitting behavior in early January 2006, Dickerson began to experience increasing levels of stress and anxiety, which resulted in hair loss, loss of appetite, headaches and other physical symptoms ... When Parker learned of the spitting episodes in January 2006, she also began to experience increased levels of stress and anxiety which resulted in hair loss, lack of sleep, depression, headaches, nervousness and diarrhea." Id. The court in Dickerson concluded that " [t]he allegations in the complaint [indicated] that the defendants, including the owners, administrator and supervisor of the residential homes, knew of Briscoe’s conduct of endangering the health and safety of the plaintiffs and the residents, that [the supervisor] had instructed a non-black employee not to notify the plaintiffs of Briscoe’s conduct of spitting into and diluting some of the beverages, that [the supervisor] knew that Briscoe picked her feet and then cooked food for the residents without washing herself, that the defendants reduced the hours and pay of the plaintiffs and, subsequently, terminated them, constructively or directly. Based upon these allegations of fact, the court [could not] conclude that they [were] legally insufficient as a matter of law. The court [concluded] instead that the allegations ... [were] sufficiently outrageous to survive a motion to strike." Id. Taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the court must for purposes of a motion to strike; see Greysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 322 Conn. 398; the court concludes that the facts in the present case are similar to those in Dickerson.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants were the chief and assistant chief of the police department, and that they controlled whether or not the plaintiff would be recommended for a promotion. The plaintiff also alleges that the police department and supervisors were on notice that he was intentionally issued a defective firearm. Nevertheless, the defendants, police department, and supervisors of the plaintiff failed to adequately investigate the incident. In fact, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants ordered one of the officers who witnessed the incident where the plaintiff first learned that he had been issued a defective gun to fabricate a cell phone video and lie about the incident in a memorandum. The defendants, similar to the defendants in Dickerson, therefore, not only failed to adequately investigate the incident while in their supervisory roles, but also prevented the plaintiff from learning more about the incident (i.e., what was defective with the firearm). Moreover, just as Bricoe’s spitting episodes threatened the safety and well-being of the plaintiffs in Dickerson, the issuance of a defective firearm put the safety of the plaintiff, the department’s officers, and the citizens of New Haven in jeopardy. See Compl., Count 1, ¶ 51. As discussed in Lucuk v. Cook, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-95-0050210-S (February 11, 1998, Corradino, J.) (21 Conn.L.Rptr. 377, 381), " it is true ... that it is important for an officer to keep trusting and good relations with other officers. The officer relies on them for backup and support in cancerous situations and his safety could depend on receiving that support." Not only did the defendants put the plaintiff in a compromised position by intentionally issuing him a defective gun, the defendants kept him in a compromised position by failing to investigate. Without knowing more about the incident, the plaintiff could not trust his supervisors and fellow officers on which his safety could depend.
In their memorandum in support of the motion to strike, the defendants cite Dollard v. Board of Education, 63 Conn.App. 550, 777 A.2d 714 (2001), as a case that is directly on point with the present case. Dollard involved a school psychologist who brought an action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the board of education and her supervisors. Id., 552. Allegedly, " [i]n 1988 and early 1999, the defendants jointly engaged in a concerted plan and effort to force the plaintiff to resign from her position or to become so distraught that they would have a colorable basis for terminating her employment. The defendants carried out their plan by hypercritically examining every small detail of her professional and personal conduct. Specifically, the defendants transferred the plaintiff to a school where she did not want to be assigned and then secretly hired someone to replace her at the school from which she had been transferred. The defendants also publicly admonished the plaintiff for chewing gum, being habitually late, being disorganized and not using her time well. Finally, the defendants unnecessarily placed the plaintiff under the intensive supervision of a friend of [one of the defendants]. The defendants ultimately forced the plaintiff to resign." Id. 552-53. The Appellate Court held, " the [lower] court properly struck the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff did not plead facts that support her allegation that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous." Id., 554.
The court is not persuaded that the present case is on point with Dollard. While some of the facts in Dollard are similar to those in the present case, the allegations that the defendants intentionally issued a defective firearm to the plaintiff and then failed to properly investigate the same renders the present case distinguishable from Dollard, wherein our Appellate Court did not find sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, taking the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint as true, the court concludes that the defendants’ alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support the plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since the only basis for the motion to strike is that the defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous, the defendants’ motion to strike counts two and three of the complaint is denied.
Additionally, during oral argument, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the defendants’ intentional issuance of a defective firearm are implausible under the federal plausibility standard. It has long since been the case that " [i]n ruling on a motion to strike the trial court is limited to considering the grounds specified in the motion." Meredith v. Police Commission, 182 Conn. 138, 140, 438 A.2d 27 (1980). Practice Book (1998) § 10-41 formerly provided: " Each motion to strike raising any of the claims of legal insufficiency enumerated in the preceding sections shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency." " Effective January 1, 2014, [§ ] 10-41 was repealed in its entirety and the following language was added to subsection (b) of the existing [Practice Book § ] 10-39: (b) Each claim of legal insufficiency enumerated in this section shall be separately set forth and shall specify the reason or reasons for such claimed insufficiency. " There is a subtle, but significant, difference in the wording of the two provisions. The mandatory requirement that the motion (as opposed to the supporting memorandum) set forth the reasons for each claimed legal insufficiency has been (apparently purposefully) eliminated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cabot Addison 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6055758-S (December 31, 2015, Sheridan, J.). After carefully reviewing the defendants’ motion to strike and the accompanying memorandum, the court could not find any reference to the federal plausibility standard. The court notes that, in their memorandum in support of their motion to strike, the defendants use the word " incredulously" to describe the plaintiff’s act of alleging that the defendants knowingly issued the plaintiff a non-functioning firearm. However, using a single word in a memorandum hardly amounts to an argument. On the basis of its review of the motion to strike and accompanying memorandum in support, the court concludes that the defendants did not object on the ground of implausibility. However, even if the court considered the implausibility argument, it would not grant the defendants’ motion to strike on this basis because the complaint supports legal conclusions with facts. Under the federal plausibility test, to assert a cause of action, the plaintiff is required to " set forth a plausible basis for belief that [he] may prove his case on the merits at trial." See Edelman v. Laux, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-11-5005710-S (July 26, 2013, Boland, J.). In Bonner v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-15-6058987-S (November 16, 2017, Wilson, J.), this court employed the federal plausibility test, as discussed in Edelman, in granting a motion to strike a claim for fraud. In Edelman, Judge Boland aptly noted: " This plausibility test was first articulated [by Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ], involving the sufficiency of a complaint alleging a conspiracy violative of provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and in that case focused upon the allegations necessary to make plausible a claim of an illegal agreement which would violate that act. " Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Court applied and substantially expanded upon the reach of this new pleading standard in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... [Iqbal] makes clear that while a complaint may not require detailed factual allegations, pleading requirements demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation ... A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do ... Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement ... Iqbal directed trial courts evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings in § 1983 actions to distinguish between the possibility and the plausibility of entitlement to relief. The Court noted, first, that the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice; and, that although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation ... Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss, and determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense ... where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not show [n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief ... " As a preliminary, one might ask how these cases which literally explicate a federal procedural rule are applicable to a state court’s consideration of a motion to strike. A federal motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6) tests whether a pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that is the same function of a motion to strike under Connecticut practice. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a motion to strike is similar in purpose and in practice to the federal dismissal rule ... While there appears to be as yet no Connecticut appellate adoption of the plausibility test with respect to motions to strike, each of our courts has hinted that such an outcome is foreseeable. Citing Iqbal, the Appellate Court in Coleman v. Commissioner of Corrections, 137 [Conn.App. 51, 46 A.3d 1050 (2012)], recognized that plausibility is a worthwhile consideration for a court reviewing a hyperbolic and fact-deficient complaint filed by a person alleging a promiscuous violation of his rights. Citing Twombly, the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the particular pertinence of this pleading requirement to cases filed in courts of this state, given that this is a fact pleading jurisdiction; Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 303 Conn. 205, 213 n.7, 32 A.3d 296 (2011) ]. " Iqbal informs us that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) Edelman v. Laux, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-5005710-S. Thus, in reviewing the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, it cannot be said that the allegations that the defendants intentionally issued the plaintiff a defective firearm in an " attempt to put the plaintiff in a situation where he would falter or otherwise fail to handle the situation adequately so as to create a basis to terminate the plaintiff’s employment," is no more than " an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." The allegations do not tender " naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancements" which " do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." The allegations in the present case are unlike those in Edelman, in which " [b]eyond his assertions that defendants engaged in conspiracy and retaliatory, vindictive, and baseless criminal prosecution, he sets forth no facts upon which those conclusions could be premised ... he sets forth no reason whatsoever that would explain why the many defendants joined together to do him the wrongs he claims, nor how they did so, nor what they might have gained from doing so, etc." (Emphasis added.) Edelman v. Laux, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-5005710-S. Likewise, in Bonner v. New Haven, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-15-6058987-S this court granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s fraud count against the former Corporation Counsel for the city of New Haven and noted, as in Edelman, that under the federal plausibility test the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud were " no more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation ... that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ [and] ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a causeof action [which] will not do’ ... [and which tenders] ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. 662, 678." Unlike in Edelman and Bonner, the plaintiff here, sets forth reasons that would explain why the defendants issued him a defective gun. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that " [the defendants’] issuance of the plaintiff’s defective firearm was motivated by the defendants’ opinion that the plaintiff should not be employed as a New Haven police officer and does not deserve to be a police officer, the defendants’ desire to make a ‘pattern case’ against the plaintiff, and [the defendants’ goal to further] undermine the plaintiff’s performance while on duty." Compl, Count 1, ¶ 36. " The plaintiff was intentionally issued the defective firearm in the defendants’ attempt to put the plaintiff in a situation where he would falter or otherwise fail to handle the situation adequately so as to create a basis to terminate the plaintiff’s employment." Id., ¶ 37. The plaintiff’s allegations also offer a reason for why the plaintiff was unaware that he had a defective gun. " At no time between when the plaintiff was issued the firearm and when he attempted to use the firearm in the shooting trailer did the plaintiff attempt to fire the firearm given it was department policy to inspect each firearm before issuance and ensure they were in proper working order." Id., ¶ 39. Finally, the plaintiff offers an explanation for why the defendants failed to investigate. " The statements in the [witnessing officer’s memorandum] and the images in his cell phone video were fabricated in an effort to conceal the defendants’ intentional issuance of a known malfunctioning firearm to the plaintiff and to cover-up the defendants’ motive to issue the plaintiff a defective firearm." Id., ¶ 47.