Opinion
CV174008753S
11-22-2019
Joe Baltas (Inmate #339650) v. Commissioner of Correction
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Chaplin, Courtney M., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Hon. Courtney M. Chaplin, J.
The petitioner, Joe Baltas, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief for alleged inappropriate classification in administrative segregation. The respondent filed its return on September 6, 2017, therein raising the defense of failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s claim on September 5, 2019. On September 11, 2019, the court heard argument on the respondent’s motion to dismiss on the trial date, prior to the presentation of evidence and denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court proceeded with trial in this matter. At trial, the petitioner presented the testimony of three witnesses: Lt. Andrew Tolmie; Warden Henry Falcone (Retired); and Deputy Commissioner Monica Rinaldi. The respondent presented no evidence. The petitioner submitted a posttrial brief on October 15, 2019. The respondent submitted a posttrial brief on October 25, 2019. In its posttrial brief, the respondent argued that the petitioner’s claim is moot because there is no dispute that the petitioner is no longer in administrative segregation.
"The judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respondent, dismiss the petition, or any count thereof, if it determines that: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the petition, or a count thereof, fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted; (3) the petition presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or proffer new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior petition; (4) the claims asserted in the petition are moot or premature; (5) any other legally sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition exists." Practice Book § 23-29.
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the [non-moving party] cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ..." Naier v. Beckenstein, 131 Conn.App. 638, 643, 27 A.3d 104, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 910, 32 A.3d 963 (2011). When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, "a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Citation omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410-11, 722 A.2d 271 (1999). "The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone ... Where, however ... the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts ... the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). "Because subject matter jurisdiction implicates the authority of the court, the issue, once raised, must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the case ..." (Citation omitted.) State v. Fowler, 102 Conn.App. 154, 158, 926 A.2d 672, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 922, 933 A.2d 725 (2007).
"Mootness ... implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the [trial] court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties ... Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties ... A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citation omitted.) Paulino v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn.App. 154, 160, 109 A.3d 516, 521, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 912, 116 A.3d 310 (2015). "To qualify under th[e] exception, an otherwise moot question must satisfy the following three requirements: First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature, must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original.) Gainey v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn.App. 377, 383, 186 A.3d 784 (2018).
In oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the respondent raised the issue of the petitioner’s current classification and his current locus of custody. The respondent averred that the petitioner is no longer in administrative segregation and that the petitioner no longer being held in Connecticut. In oral argument, the petitioner stated to the court that he is no longer in administrative segregation. This is pertinent to the resolution of this matter because the relief sought by the petitioner is his release from administrative segregation. As there is no factual dispute that the petitioner is no longer in administrative segregation by his own concession to the court, the court finds that there is no actual case or controversy at issue in this matter. Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction, 178 Conn.App. 191, 194-95, 174 A.3d 860 (2017) (dismissal of appeal premised on mootness when inmate held in administrative segregation transferred to another state and no longer held in administrative segregation; no practical relief possible). Therefore, the petitioner’s claim is moot as it there is no actual case or controversy at issue because the petitioner is no longer in administrative segregation.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29(4).