Opinion
No. A07-1219.
Filed May 20, 2008.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County File No. 98063932.
Shah Aziz, (pro se appellant).
Lori Swanson, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, J. Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant-inmate challenges a district court's denial of his "Motion to Clarify Terms of Sentence and/or for an Evidentiary Hearing," arguing that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the department of corrections (DOC) requires him to participate in the Intensive Supervised Release (ISR) program. We affirm.
DECISION
Appellant Shah Aziz, currently imprisoned until 2011, was informed by his DOC caseworker that he would be placed in the ISR program at the conclusion of his executed sentence. Appellant argues that only the district court has the authority to impose such conditions of supervised release.
We conclude that appellant is not entitled to a hearing on this matter because the DOC has clear statutory authority to impose ISR requirements on selected inmates. "[E]very inmate shall serve a supervised release term upon completion of the inmate's term of imprisonment. . . ." Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 1 (2006). The commissioner of corrections also has clear statutory authority to maintain legal custody and control over a released inmate. Minn. Stat. § 243.05, subd. 1(b) (2006). This authority includes the discretion to "order that an inmate be placed on intensive supervised release for all or part of the inmate's supervised release or parole term." Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6 (2006); see also Minn. Stat. § 244.13, subd. 1 (2006) (requiring the commissioner to establish a program for those inmates designated for ISR).
We further conclude that this appeal is controlled by Kachina v. State, 744 N.W.2d 407 (Minn.App. 2008). Kachina explained that "[a]lthough the sentence imposed by the district court determines the maximum length of the supervised release period, the court does not set the terms or conditions on which the offender is released." Id. at 409. Recognizing the DOC's clear statutory power to impose such conditions, Kachina cited the supreme court's holding in State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 140-41 (Minn. 2001), that the commissioner's authority to supervise released inmates does not usurp or interfere with judicial sentencing functions. Id. Because the legislature granted the commissioner authority over supervised release, according to Kachina, "the DOC did not exceed its authority in requiring appellant to begin his supervised release term on intensive supervised release." Id.
Affirmed.