Opinion
24A-JC-01170
12-06-2024
In the Matter of E.W. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and A.W. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT RONALD JAMES SEVERT WALLACE LAW FIRM ROCKVILLE, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA DAVID ELIAS COREY SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Morgan County Circuit Court The Honorable Matthew G. Hanson Trial Court Cause No. 55C01-2309-JC-000344
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT RONALD JAMES SEVERT WALLACE LAW FIRM ROCKVILLE, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA DAVID ELIAS COREY SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
DeBoer, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] On appeal from an Order adjudicating E.W. ("Child") to be a child in need of services ("CHINS"), A.W. ("Mother") claims that the trial court's CHINS finding was clearly erroneous because the coercive intervention of the court was no longer necessary at the time of the fact-finding hearing. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Mother is the biological parent of Child, who was fourteen years old at the time of the CHINS adjudication. Child was diagnosed with oppositional defiance disorder ("ODD") and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") at the age of nine. At some point, Mother married B.W. ("Wife") and Mother and Child lived with Wife and her three children.
[¶3] In November 2022, Mother became aware of an improper relationship between Child, age 12, and Stepbrother, age 16. Mother did not observe the children doing anything physical, but "when [she] would walk into the room one of the kids would jump from where they were sitting" and she could tell the kids were doing something they were not supposed to be doing. Tr. Vol. 2 at 16. To address what they believed was an inappropriate physical relationship, Mother and Wife "separated the kids" by "rotat[ing]" Stepbrother and Child out of the house "[s]o they weren't at that house at the same time for about a month." Id. The couple also "sat down with each other and talked to them separately and then together." Id. The Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") became involved in November 2022 and spoke with Mother, Wife, and the children, but did not remove Child. In fact, DCS's 2022 assessment indicated that Mother and Wife had "handled" the inappropriate relationship. Id. at 18. Mother understood DCS's investigation was ongoing but would not allow Child to be forensically interviewed without Mother present. Mother did not believe Child needed any counseling services at that time.
[¶4] In July 2023, Mother filed a petition for dissolution against Wife. The following month, Mother filed a petition for a protective order against Stepbrother on behalf of Child, which included a written statement from Child that Stepbrother had put his "hand in my shorts and I took his hand out. There was kissing and hand holding. He put his hands in my pants a few times after that." Ex. Vol. 1 at 10. The petition for the protective order reflected that the incident occurred in early October 2022, and "the last time it happened" was November 21, 2022. Id at 5. Mother and Wife later reconciled and Mother withdrew the divorce and protective order petitions; however, Mother filed for a divorce from Wife a second time in March 2024.
[¶5] On or around September 19, 2023, DCS Family Case Manager Melissa Woodruff ("FCM Woodruff") became involved with the family after investigating a report of an improper physical relationship between Child and Stepbrother. Around this time, DCS discovered the protective order Mother had filed in July 2023, containing Child's written statement. FCM Woodruff interviewed Mother and Wife and Mother admitted the stepsiblings had engaged in an inappropriate physical relationship; however, Mother again refused to allow Child to be forensically interviewed. Child was removed from the home and from Mother's custody on September 22, 2023.
[¶6] Three days later, DCS filed a verified petition alleging Child to be a CHINS based on Child's sexual encounters with Stepbrother, Mother's knowledge of these encounters and her active interference with DCS investigations, which included Mother refusing to allow Child to be forensically interviewed on multiple occasions, and Mother preventing Child from receiving appropriate treatment. The petition asserted Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-3. The next day, the trial court approved DCS's request for Child to be removed from Mother's care.
[¶7] At the fact-finding hearing, Mother agreed Child needed services. Mother testified that the protective order petition she filed on Child's behalf in August 2023 was "not the truth," but before she could elaborate, the court informed Mother she could "possibly [be] facing perjury charges" because she signed the petition under oath. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. The trial court advised Mother of her rights and, after speaking with her attorney, Mother asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about the protective order. Mother testified that Child qualified for medical benefits through the Veterans Administration ("VA") and Mother had scheduled Child for a psychological services appointment through the VA for a date shortly after Child was removed from the home. However, Mother provided no verification or documentation of this appointment.
[¶8] After Child was removed from the home, she underwent an assessment at Centerstone and was diagnosed with ODD, ADHD, and PTSD. Danielle Becknell, a therapist at Lifeline Youth and Child Services, provided therapy to Child. Becknell reported that their sessions involve processing what is "going on at school," including Child's "issues with falling asleep in school and confrontations with one specific teacher," and working on dialectical behavioral therapy skills to help Child manage the "intense emotions that she struggles with." Tr. Vol. 2 at 37. Their treatment involved appropriate behavior modeling and "behavior modification beginning with addressing . . . the thoughts and emotions behind the behavior so that [Child] can restructure her cognitive [] abilities and then view things in a healthier way." Id. at 41. Child struggled with nightmares impacting her sleep and reported having "auditory and visual hallucinations accompanied by homicidal and suicidal ideations" since the age of 10. Id. at 39. Becknell testified that Child characterized her relationship with Mother as "horrible and that her mother is jealous and vindictive." Id. at 40. Child also expressed she fears Mother and she attempts to delete anything on her phone that "will cause her mother to be upset and yell at her." Id. Becknell testified that Child did not exhibit ODD behaviors, issues with authority, and argumentative behaviors in the placement home. Becknell informed the court that delaying treatment for three years under Child's circumstances is problematic because "behaviors become more cemented and it becomes more difficult to address those behaviors than if they are addressed early on." Id. at 41. Becknell opined that Child needs ongoing services to address her trauma, ADHD, and homicidal and suicidal ideations. Child admitted to Becknell there had been a physical relationship with Stepbrother but was hesitant to give Becknell details about the relationship and the trauma associated with it.
[¶9] On March 27, 2024, the trial court issued its Order adjudicating Child to be a CHINS. The trial court determined that until the protective order was discovered, DCS had "no evidence, other than the statements from the mothers when assessed the year prior in 2022, that any sort of inappropriate relationship was occurring." Appellee's App. 2 at 17. The trial court considered the sworn protective order petition to be true and expressed "grave concerns" that the protective order petition was used as a "sword" in Mother's marital separation with Wife. Id. at 18. The trial court was "grave[ly] concern[ed]" that Mother "clearly knew" about the extent of the step-siblings' inappropriate physical relationship "as far back as the 2022 assessment" and "essentially ignored" and "downplayed [the relationship] at the time for the benefit of DCS and that is clearly why [DCS] did not take further action." Id. at 18. The trial court determined "a sex offense did occur between the step-siblings" but Mother "did nothing to help [Child] in 2022 after knowing this information and essentially concealing the depth of the sexual contact when confronted by DCS." Id. at 1819.
"[I]n civil proceedings, a court can draw a negative inference from a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 47 (Ind. 2019).
[¶10] Regarding Child's need for services, the trial court concluded Child "needed help perhaps when she was nine" and received her original diagnoses, and "when very serious sexual acts were committed against her, help was even more needed and clearly was not coming from [Mother]." Id. at 19. Mother instead refused to have Child "interviewed forensically to determine the extent and breadth of the sexual abuse in the fall of 2023." Id. at 17. While Mother "claim[ed] to have set up an appointment finally in September of 2023 for [Child]," the trial court was "unconvinced of the veracity of that." Id. at 19. The trial court concluded that Mother failed to protect and supervise Child, and that "these sexual events, along with the child's existing issues with mental health, [were] the root cause[s] of her problems" and "clearly impair[ed] or seriously endanger[ed] the physical and mental condition of the child." Id. In adjudicating Child to be a CHINS, the trial court found that "[w]ithout coercive intervention, the child will receive no aid from her mother[.]" Id.
[¶11] On April 18, 2024, the trial court held a hearing and issued a dispositional order awarding DCS "wardship of the child, with responsibility for supervision, care and placement." Appellant's App. 2 at 24. The trial court found it to be "in the best interests of the child to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child because [] of the allegations admitted and the child need[ed] protection that cannot be provided in the home." Id. at 28. The trial court also ordered Mother to participate in various reunification services.
Discussion and Decision
[¶12] Mother argues that the coercive intervention of the trial court was not required because she took appropriate steps to protect Child from harm; thus, the trial court's determination that Child was a CHINS was clearly erroneous.
The State argues that Mother waived her challenge to the trial court's determination that Child was a CHINS by failing to cite to legal authority to support her argument. While we agree that Mother's single page, five-paragraph analysis is not adequately supported by legal authorities and references to the record as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8), we will address Mother's contention on its merits.
[¶13] In a CHINS proceeding, "the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code." In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). "When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility." In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). "Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Id. at 578. Where, as here, a trial court enters sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon, "we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment." In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). We review any "remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which a judgment 'will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. "A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or 'if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.'" D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578 (quoting Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262 (Ind. 1997)).
[¶14] Here, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. To meet its burden under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, DCS was required to prove:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
In other words, "[t]he statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion." Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024).
[¶15] The purpose of a CHINS inquiry is to "protect children, not punish parents." In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). To that end, the coercive intervention element of a CHINS determination "guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families 'where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,' not merely where they 'encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.'" S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Lake Cnty. Div. of Family Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994)) (emphasis in original). To avoid punishing parents for past mistakes that have been corrected, trial courts "should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard." D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (holding that while coercive intervention may have been required early in the CHINS process, the factual findings "certainly did not show that Parents needed such intervention by the time of the fact-finding hearing months later," as the parents had satisfactorily completed all required services) (internal quotations omitted). DCS "must prove not only that one or the other of the parents suffers from shortcomings, but also that the parents are unlikely to meet a child's needs absent coercive court intervention." Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. denied. "[A] court need not wait until a tragedy occurs before entering a CHINS finding[.]" Id.
[¶16] Here, Mother admits Child needs services and does not challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding the seriously impairing or endangering nature of the Child's physical and mental condition. Mother only argues that the coercive intervention of the trial court was not necessary because Mother took "appropriate actions to rectify the situation," including separating Child and Stepbrother in 2022, filing for divorce, and enrolling Child in therapy through the VA prior to the fact-finding hearing. Appellant's Br. at 8. However, to the extent Mother's argument asks us to reweigh the evidence and judge her credibility, her request is impermissible. See D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577-78. Mother's argument also misses the mark because the coercive intervention element considers whether a child's care, treatment, or rehabilitation needs are unmet and likely to remain unmet without the court inserting itself in the situation to protect the child. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Two of the measures Mother points to-separating Child and Stepbrother and filing for divorce- have no bearing on whether the coercive intervention of the trial court was necessary for Child to get the care and treatment Mother now admits she needs, and the trial court determined she should have received years ago. The court also did not find Mother credible as to the third measure Mother claimed she took to rectify Child's situation, that she set up a therapy appointment for Child in 2024.
[¶17] When a child requires treatment, "the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child." E.K., 83 N.E.3d at 1262. In E.K., father spanked E.K. when he would not calm down from a temper tantrum. Id. at 1259. DCS investigated the allegations, and the parents signed a safety plan whereby they would refrain from physically disciplining E.K., regularly participate in home-based family counseling, and father completed a psychological examination and began taking medications to manage his bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, PTSD, and ADHD. Id. The trial court found E.K. to be a CHINS despite the parents having been "cooperative with DCS since their first involvement with E.K." and not having "ever violated the 'safety plan' they signed." Id. at 1259-60. This Court reversed, holding that "[e]ven if this family needed help to address E.K.'s behavior and Father's mental health, the parents were readily accepting help and there [was] no evidence that they needed to be coerced by a court into accepting such help" at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Id. at 1262.
[¶18] Here, the trial court found that Mother knew the extent of Child and Stepbrother's improper physical relationship in 2022, "failed to take it seriously," "downplayed" the issue to DCS, and did not get Child the services she needed for several years. Appellee's App. 2 at 18. The trial court found that, unlike the parents in E.K., Mother "did nothing to help her child in 2022" and in conjunction with Child's psychological disorder diagnoses at the age of nine, and her nightmares, hallucinations, and homicidal and suicidal ideations since the age of ten, Child needed help "perhaps when she was nine" and "help was even more needed" after "very serious sexual acts were committed against her," but help "clearly was not coming from [Mother]." Id. at 19. Instead of focusing her efforts on getting Child the help she needed, the trial court found that Mother used Child's experience as a "sword" in her marital relationship by filing a protective order petition against Stepbrother in August 2023 and withdrawing the petition upon her reconciliation with Wife. Id. at 18. Mother also repeatedly failed to cooperate with DCS investigations and refused to allow Child to be interviewed forensically to determine the extent of the sexual abuse, including when DCS requested a forensic interview during its September 2023 investigation that resulted in Child's removal from Mother's home.
[¶19] Meanwhile, Child's physical and mental condition was being "clearly impair[ed] and seriously endanger[ed]" by "the refusal and neglect of [Mother] to address these important needs." Id. at 19. Becknell testified Child struggles with "intense emotions" and that behaviors "become more cemented" and are "difficult to address" when treatment is delayed for years; however, in spite of Mother's years-long refusal or neglect to provide or accept treatment for Child, Becknell has made positive post-removal treatment observations that Child is not demonstrating ODD behaviors, issues with authority, and argumentative behaviors in the placement home. Tr. Vol. 2 at 37. Becknell opined that Child needs "ongoing services" to address her trauma, ADHD, and homicidal and suicidal ideations. Id. at 41. Mother agreed that Child needs services and claimed she arranged an appointment for Child through the VA before Child was removed, but the trial court did not believe Mother's uncorroborated testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) ("As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted."). Simply put, the trial court determined "[w]ithout coercive intervention, [Child] will receive no aid from [Mother]." Appellee's App 2 at 19. This conclusion is supported by the evidence and the trial court's findings thereon. In addition, the evidence, unchallenged by Mother, supports the trial court's determination that Child's condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result of Mother's neglect or refusal to provide Child with necessary treatment and care. Thus, the trial court's CHINS determination under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 was not clearly erroneous.
Although the trial court also based its CHINS adjudication on Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3 because it found "a sex offense did occur between the step-siblings," we do not analyze this basis for the CHINS determination because we affirm the trial court on the coercive intervention element, which undergirds both sections and is the sole issue Mother raises on appeal. Appellee's App. 2 at 18.
Conclusion
[¶20] The trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 was not clearly erroneous.
[¶21] Affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.