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Ash v. Hoag Property Management, Inc.

Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Five.
Nov 13, 2003
No. B157157 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003)

Opinion

B157157.

11-13-2003

HIRAM ASH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HOAG PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Robert Guevara for Plaintiff and Appellant and Hiram Ash, in propria persona. Howard, Loveder, Strickroth & Parker, Michael J. Strickroth, and Kevin A. Day for Defendants and Respondents.


This landlord-tenant case has a complicated procedural history: In October of 1998, appellant Hiram Ash sued The Hoag Company, Inc., Arlyne Reimann, Arlyne Reimann Trust, and Ronald Connors, alleging that they either owned or managed the home he rented in Cudahy. That was case number VC02793. It brought causes of action for premises liability, negligence, breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, infliction of emotional distress, retaliation, abuse of process, unlawful business practice, injunction, and discrimination.

Appellant also sued neighboring property owners, but settled with those defendants.

Respondents have asked us to take judicial notice of the unpublished decision in VC02793 and of the record in that case, and appellant has asked us to take judicial notice of writ petitions in this case and other cases and of specified minute orders in this case. We grant the requests as to the opinion in VC02793 and the specified minute orders in this case. The other requests are denied. We see no prospect that the documents would be relevant to the disposition of any issue on appeal.

Factually, the complaint in VC02793 alleged that appellant had been respondents tenant since June of 1985, in a month-to-month tenancy, and that contrary to their legal duty and express promises, respondents had not provided a quiet, peaceful, and safe environment or adequate maintenance. Among other things, appellant alleged that he was continually bothered by noise from other tenants, who had also smeared oil on his apartment walls, damaged his car, and broken his windows; that in June of 1998, in retaliation for his complaints to respondent and to municipal authorities about illegal activities on the premises, respondents served an eviction notice on appellant; that respondents later voluntarily discontinued the eviction but in September served a new eviction notice; and that respondents had exhibited a pattern of bias, based on appellants status as an unmarried white individual.

Appellant filed VC02793 in the Southeast District. Trial was set for March 30, 2000. Shortly prior to trial, on March 13, appellant moved to transfer the case to another district. Hearing on the motion was set for April 26. On March 30, when the case was called for trial, appellant informed the court that he would not present any evidence, based on his belief that the court did not have jurisdiction over the matter while the motion to transfer was pending. Respondents motion for nonsuit was granted and the case was dismissed.

On April 29, 2000, while the post-trial motions in VC02793 were pending, appellant filed this action, BC229078. He named as defendants Hoag Property Management Co., aka The Hoag Company Inc., Arlyne Beattie Revocable Trust aka Arlyne Reimann Trust, Robert Connors, Susan Thom, and Daniel Thom. This complaint brought the same causes of action as did the complaint in VC02793, except that it did not include breach of contract or premises liability. Factually, appellant again alleged that he had lived in rental premises owned or operated by respondents since 1985, that respondents had failed to maintain the property, that he suffered from the noisy and boisterous behavior of other tenants, and that his car had been damaged and objects thrown at his home. He alleged that respondents had failed to remedy these problems and in fact had reduced the level of service and supervision, and that some of the habitability defects arose after the first complaint was filed, and some after that complaint was dismissed. This new complaint also referenced the 1998 eviction proceedings and additionally alleged that respondents began new eviction proceedings in April 2000.

The case against the Thoms settled prior to trial.

Respondents filed a notice of related cases (Los Angeles Superior Court rule 7.3, subdivision (f)(2)) setting forth the similarities between the two cases in terms of parties, causes of action, and factual allegations. The notice attached a copy of the complaint in VC02793 and the judgment in that case. The court found that BC229078 and VC02793 were related within the meaning of Los Angeles Superior Court rule 7.3, subdivisions (f), and transferred this case to the Southeast District.

BC229078 was tried to the court in August of 2001, while the appeal of VC02793 was pending. The court found for respondents on all causes of action and ordered appellant to pay them $ 2,109 in costs and $46,725 in attorney fees.

Appellant raises numerous contentions of error. We affirm.

Discussion

1. The finding of related cases

Under Los Angeles Superior Court rule 7.3, subdivision (f)(1), cases are related "when it appears that the cases: a) Arise from the same or substantially identical transactions, happenings or events; or b) Require a determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law and/or fact; or c) Are likely for other good reasons to require substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges. (d) Are the same or substantially similar to a prior case in the Superior Court that has been dismissed, either with or without prejudice."

Appellant challenges both the trial courts initial finding that the cases were related and the courts denial of his subsequent motion to vacate that order. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. (Silva v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 301, 304 [venue]; Lucas v. Santa Maria Public Airport Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1028 [Code Civ. Proc., § 1008].) We see none.

As respondents notice of related cases indicated, the complaints in this case and VC02793 raised overlapping and duplicative factual allegations and questions of law concerning respondents treatment of appellant and his rights as a tenant. It would have required substantial duplication of labor if this case was heard by a different judge. For instance, a crucial evidentiary issue in this case concerned the admissibility of evidence of events which took place prior to the verdict in VC02793, an issue which was no doubt facilitated by the fact that the trial judge on this case also presided over VC02793.

The trial court treated appellants motion to vacate the related case order as a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, and denied it on the ground that appellant had presented no new or different facts, circumstances, or law warranting reconsideration. Appellant argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 does not apply unless the order in question is entered after a hearing, and that there was no hearing on the related case motion. He cites no authority for the legal proposition, and we know of none. Nor has appellant pointed to any flaw in the trial courts conclusion that appellant failed to cite any new or different facts, circumstances, or law warranting reconsideration.

2. Evidence of acts or events prior to the date VC02793 was dismissed

Prior to trial, respondents moved in limine to exclude evidence of any act or condition which took place prior to March 30, 2000, the date VC02793 was dismissed. Appellant objected on the ground that evidence about the earlier time period could be necessary to explain the facts of this case. The trial court agreed, and granted the motion with the proviso that the relevance and admissibility of any particular fact or circumstance existing prior to March 30, 2000 would be examined on the merits.

The statement of decision indicates that the court considered only evidence of facts "which had their genesis" between the date VC02793 was dismissed and the date this case was filed. The court made that ruling based on appellants statement, in the second amended complaint, that "this is a different lawsuit resulting from different facts and seeks different relief." The court noted that appellant made the statement in order to avoid abatement and found that the statement was a judicial admission.

Appellant now contends that the ruling on the motion in limine was in error, and also seems to contend that the court erred by failing to consider evidence of matters prior to March 30, 2000 at trial. We cannot reverse on this ground.

As to the motion in limine, appellant raised but one objection, that otherwise-excluded evidence might be relevant to explain matters at issue in this case. The trial court agreed. Appellant has pointed to no instance in which a specific piece of evidence was wrongly excluded, and has thus not established error.

Further, the statement of decision was correct: this matter concerned, and could only properly concern, matters which took place after VC02793. Matters encompassed in that case, which was pending on appeal when this case was tried, were subject to abatement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c).)

Throughout his brief, appellant makes much of the fact that respondents contended that this case and VC02793 were related cases, then asked that evidence in this case be limited to events which took place after VC02793 was dismissed. Appellant finds these positions logically inconsistent. We do not. As filed, this case was related to VC02793. That does not mean that all facts relevant to VC02793 were properly admissible at trial.

3. Contentions concerning discovery

Appellant makes several contentions regarding discovery orders. The rules of appellate review of such contentions are well established: "Management of discovery generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] Where there is a basis for the trial courts ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court. [Citations.] The trial courts determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was `no legal justification for the order granting or denying the discovery in question. [Citations.]" (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.)

Appellants first argument is that the trial court erred in limiting discovery to acts or conditions which took place after the date VC02793 was dismissed. We see no error. As we have seen, this case properly concerned only matters which took place after VC02793. The courts order thus limited appellant to relevant matters, hardly an abuse of discretion.

Appellant also finds error in the trial courts July 2001 order sustaining numerous of respondents objections to his requests for admission and limiting him to 25 requests. In support, appellant makes general arguments concerning his right to full discovery. Such arguments do not establish an abuse of discretion as to any given ruling, and in the absence of specific arguments, we can find none. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)

Finally in this category, appellant finds error in the fact that when, in May of 2001, the trial court denied respondents motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, the court did not also grant his request for sanctions. Appellant contends that under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030, subdivision (l), the imposition of sanctions is mandatory unless the trial court "expressly lists substantial justifications of the losing party." (The minute order here recites only that the request for sanctions was denied.)

In legal support, appellant cites Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, which does not hold that the reasons for denial of a sanctions award must be included in the minute order. We do not believe that to be the law. We note, too, that we have not been provided with a reporters transcript of the hearing on the motion, and thus cannot say that the court failed to state its reasons.

4. Legal issues

Appellant argues that the trial court misunderstood the law of landlord-tenant and that the evidence should have led to a verdict in his favor. Appellant has not, however, identified any error of law requiring reversal.

For instance, appellant contends that the court misunderstood the law on retaliatory eviction, and cites Kemp v. Schultz (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d Supp.13, for the proposition that a tenant may invoke the defense of retaliatory eviction after an oral complaint to the landlord regarding the premises. (Id. at p. 18.) Nothing in the statement of decision indicates that the court thought differently or applied the wrong law. Instead, the court analyzed the evidence on the issue and concluded that the April 2000 eviction notice "was not issued in retaliation against [appellant] for the exercise by him of his right to complain or to seek redress through the courts."

Similarly, appellant argues that his discrimination claim was not based on an allegation of protected class, but on discriminatory treatment based on race, marital status or family status, under California and Federal law. The statement of decision establishes that the trial court understood appellants allegations and made a decision based on the evidence.

Appellants remaining legal arguments are similar. He has not established error.

5. Prevailing party

Appellant contends that he was the prevailing party for purposes of costs and fees. He reasons that the purpose of his lawsuit was to prevent eviction under the April 2000 30-day notice, and that because the notice was withdrawn after the lawsuit was filed, he prevailed. In legal support, he cites cases such as Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, which held that for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, a plaintiff prevails when he gets most or all of what he wanted by filing the action (id. at p. 1443) and California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, which held that for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, a plaintiff is a prevailing party if the lawsuit is a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought. (Id. at p. 741.)

A trial court has wide discretion in determining the prevailing party. (Sears v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158.) Here, whether or not appellants true intent was merely to induce respondents to withdraw the eviction notice, he sued on numerous legal theories and prevailed on none of them. We thus cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that respondents were the prevailing parties.

Appellant also seems to argue that respondents were not entitled to fees because they were not signatories to the lease and because there was no breach of contract cause of action. Respondents motion for an award of fees and costs quotes the lease, discusses the evidence on the status of the parties, and includes extensive legal analysis of the issues regarding an award of fees in this case. Appellants conclusory arguments do not establish that the trial court erred by granting respondents motion.

Appellant seeks leave to separately brief this issue and makes additional arguments on this point in his reply brief. "Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered." (Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 299, 320.) Nor do we see any reason why additional briefing should be ordered on this case, which has already been the subject of extensive briefing.

6. Other contentions

Appellant complains that respondents misled him into suing Hoag Property Management in this case, rather than suing the Hoag Company. He does not explain how the result in this case would have been any different if he had sued the Hoag Company, and thus we find no error. (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 13.)

Appellant complains that respondents were improperly granted leave to file a cross-complaint. The cross-complaint sought a declaration that they were entitled to raise appellants rent on proper notice, so that his rent remained consistent with the rent for similar apartments in the area, and a declaration that they were entitled to end appellants tenancy on service of a 30-day notice to quit. The trial court declared that respondents had the right to terminate appellants tenancy under the procedures set forth in statute. The court did not grant any declaratory relief on the question of rent increases. Appellant has advanced no argument which would show that the court erred in its declaration, or that he was in any way harmed by the ruling. We thus have no reason to reverse on this ground. (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 13.)

Appellant complains that his new trial motion was improperly disregarded. He summarizes some of the proceedings regarding that motion, although his summary is not entirely accurate. For instance, the trial judge did not ignore that fact that the motion included declarations. Instead, the trial judge found those declarations inadequate under Code of Civil Procedure section 658. More importantly, appellant once again does not present citation to the record or case authority which would establish that the trial court erred in its ruling on the motion.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal.

We concur: TURNER, P.J. and GRIGNON, J.


Summaries of

Ash v. Hoag Property Management, Inc.

Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Five.
Nov 13, 2003
No. B157157 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003)
Case details for

Ash v. Hoag Property Management, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:HIRAM ASH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HOAG PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. et…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Five.

Date published: Nov 13, 2003

Citations

No. B157157 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003)