Opinion
A00-31 CV (JWS), [Re: Motion at docket 201].
September 15, 2004
ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 201, defendant Visions International, Inc. ("Visions") seeks an order excluding evidence of certain camp standards and evidence of the sale of assets between Visions and Service Adventures International. The motion has been fully briefed. Oral argument has not been requested, and it would not assist the court.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Matthew Armstrong ("Matthew") is the minor son of plaintiffs Don and Mary Armstrong. While attending an outdoor camp in Mentasta, Alaska, operated by Visions during the summer of 1997, Matthew suffered a seizure. He was treated at the Mentasta Community Health Clinic ("Clinic") by a community health aide. The Clinic was operated by a Native tribal organization pursuant to a contract with the United States under 25 U.S.C. § 450f. Matthew suffered serious brain injury and as a result, he is now incapable of caring for himself.The Armstrongs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., alleging that the United States is liable for negligent failure to provide adequate medical care to Matthew and the Clinic's failure to stock necessary medical supplies and to make adequately trained personnel available. The Armstrongs had previously sued Visions in state superior court. After Visions joined the United States and others as third-party defendants in the state court action, that litigation was removed to this court where it was consolidated into the case at bar. Additional facts are noted below.
III. DISCUSSION
At docket 201, defendant Visions seeks to exclude two categories of evidence. One is evidence relating to the sale of its assets to Service Adventures International. The other is evidence relating to standards adopted by various voluntary associations whose members offer a variety of camping opportunities.
The request to exclude evidence of the asset sale is easily resolved. Such evidence is not relevant evidence under Rule 401of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it does not tend to make "any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action" any more or less probable. It follows that evidence of the asset sale should be excluded pursuant to Rule 402.
The request to exclude evidence of standards adopted by organizations to which Visions has never belonged requires more discussion. Among the issues which the trier of fact must decide in this case is whether Visions breached a duty of care owed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs take the position that consideration of the organizations' standards will assist the jury to determine whether Visions was negligent. Visions contends that the standards are irrelevant, but if relevant should be excluded under Rule 403.
There is no doubt that the standards followed by other organizations which operate camps that are comparable to the camp operated by Visions are relevant. Visions argues that the organizations' standards are not uniform, and that the camps that their members operate differ from the type of camp Visions operated at Mentasta. Visions also points out that the documents containing the standards are in many instances published subsequent to the events giving rise to the litigation. These concerns pertain to the Rule 403 analysis.
Swenson Trucking Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Alaska 1980).
In general, Visions' contentions are factually accurate. Such considerations do reduce the probative value of the evidence. Nevertheless, a jury which will have had little or no experience operating a wilderness camp will need more help ascertaining the duty of care applicable to the operation of such a camp than it would need in fixing the duty of care applicable to the operation of a motor vehicle or a household appliance. In other words, there is a substantial need for evidence of the sort offered by Visions. That said, the court concludes that the weaknesses in Visions evidence to which Visions points-lack of uniformity, lack of congruity of others' operations with Visions' operations, and more recent vintage — do not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Furthermore, cross-examination by defense counsel, together with an appropriate jury instruction, will assure that the jury is not confused or misled. The evidence should not be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons: the motion at docket 201 is DENIED.