Opinion
3:24-CV-901-TLS-AZ
12-20-2024
RODNEY B. ARMOUR, JR., Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN JUDGE
Rodney B. Armour, Jr., a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas petition in connection with his conviction in Case No. 02D05-1304-FA-16 in the Allen Superior Court. According to the petition, he was sentenced to twenty years of incarceration but was released on parole. He was then detained on a parole violation, but he has not received a hearing after one year. Armour specifically challenges his continued detainment without a parole violation hearing and the calculation of his sentence. Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the Court must dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Exhaustion of State court remedies is not a statutory requirement for habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but “federal courts nevertheless may require, as a matter of comity, that such detainees exhaust all avenues of state relief before seeking the writ.” United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991). Judicially-created common-law exhaustion applies when Congress has not clearly required exhaustion via statute. Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2004). To exhaust, a habeas petitioner must “assert his federal claim through one complete round of state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings. This means that the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 2004).
Under Indiana law, individuals may challenge parole revocation or sentence calculations by filing the appropriate petition in State court. See, e.g., Willet v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1274, 1278 (Ind. App. 2020); Harrison v. Knight, 127 N.E.3d 1269, 1271 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019); Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 742-43 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008); Mills v. State, 840 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). According to the electronic docket for the State courts, Armour has not challenged his parole revocation or sentence calculation at any level of the State courts. Therefore, the Court finds that Armour has not exhausted his available State court remedies.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the electronic dockets for the Indiana courts, which are available at https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/. See Fed.R.Evid. 201.
When dismissing a habeas corpus petition because it is unexhausted, “[a] district court [is required] to consider whether a stay is appropriate [because] the dismissal would effectively end any chance at federal habeas review.” Dolis v. Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). Armour presents claims that arise under Section 2241 rather than under Section 2254, so the statute of limitations set forth in Section 2244(d)(1) does not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (applying the limitations period to petitions “by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court”); Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]risoners who seek to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence must satisfy the procedural requisites of § 2254 or § 2255 . . ., but persons challenging detention that is not pursuant to a judgment, or challenging the execution of their sentence, need not.”); Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no statute of limitations applicable to a federal prisoner's filing a section 2241 petition.”); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If we were to allow White to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, he would not be subject to the one-year statute of limitations provision of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).”). Because dismissing this case will not effectively end Armour's chance at habeas corpus review by rendering his claims untimely, a stay is not appropriate for this case.
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the Court must consider whether to grant or deny a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability when the court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable (1) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling and (2) whether the petition states a valid claim for denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, there is no basis for finding that jurists of reason would debate the correctness of this procedural ruling or for encouraging Armour to proceed further in federal court until he has exhausted his claims in State court.
For these reasons, the Court:
(1) DISMISSES without prejudice the petition [ECF No. 1] pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases because the claims are unexhausted;
(2) DENIES Rodney B. Armour, Jr., a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; and
(3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED.