Opinion
Index No. 65112/2024
07-30-2024
In the Matter of the Application of Erica R. Winter and ALLISON L. FROST, Petitioners, v. Lindsey M. Luft, in her capacity as Village Clerk for the Village of Pelham Manor, New York; the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF PELHAM MANOR, NEW YORK; and the WESTCHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, comprised of its Commissioners, Tajian M. Nelson and Douglas A. Colety, Respondents.
FOR PETITIONERS: Feinberg, D'Avanzo et al. FOR MANOR RESPONDENTS: Murtagh, Cossu et al. FOR COMMISSIONER NELSON: Menz Bonner et al. FOR COMMISSIONER COLETY: Perillo Hill, LLP
Unpublished Opinion
FOR PETITIONERS: Feinberg, D'Avanzo et al.
FOR MANOR RESPONDENTS: Murtagh, Cossu et al.
FOR COMMISSIONER NELSON: Menz Bonner et al.
FOR COMMISSIONER COLETY: Perillo Hill, LLP
HON. LINDA S. JAMIESON, Justice.
The following papers numbered 1 to 7 were read on these motions:
Paper Number
Order to Show Cause, Petition and Exhibits 1
Notice of Motion, Affidavit and Exhibits 2
Memorandum of Law 3
Affirmation in Response 4
Memorandum of Law in Response 5
Verified Answer, Objections in Point of Law, Motions to Dismiss & Affirmative Defenses 6
Although Commissioner Colety styles his responsive papers as "motions to dismiss," the Court notes that he has not actually filed such a motion, but merely a set of responsive papers.
Reply Affirmation and Exhibits 7
There are two motions before the Court in this proceeding arising out of petitioners' efforts to change the date of the Pelham Manor (the "Manor") general village election, which presently occurs in March, to the date of the general election on Election Day in November. The first motion is filed by petitioners. It seeks (1) to have the Court declare valid a petition seeking a referendum to move the Manor's general village election from the third Tuesday in March to the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November ("Election Day"); and/or (2) directing the Manor's Clerk, Lindsey M. Luft (the "Clerk") to immediately transmit a certified copy of the text of such referendum and a statement of the form in which it is to be submitted to the Westchester County Board of Elections (the "Board") and otherwise comply with Election Law § 4-108; and/or (3) directing the Board to place such referendum on the November 5, 2024 ballot for residents of the Manor; and/or (4) directing the Manor's Board of Trustees (the "Trustees") to take any action required of it by law to effectuate the holding of said referendum. The second motion, filed by respondents the Clerk and the Trustees (the "Manor respondents"), seeks to dismiss the petition.
The following facts are not in dispute. In June 2024, petitioners circulated a petition to change the Manor's general village election from March to November. The petitioners obtained 801 signatures, which they presented to the Clerk on July 1, 2024. On July 5, 2024, the Clerk rejected the petition on several bases.
According to the letter that she sent to petitioner Winter, the Clerk said that (1) "village residents are not authorized to initiate legislative action by petition. This authority lies with the Board of Trustees. Voter initiatives are limited to the specific questions set forth in New York Village Law § 9-912(2). The petition introduces topics that go beyond such questions and therefore misled its signatories as to what matters can be the subject of a referendum. Accordingly, I consider each signature to the petition to be invalid because the signatory was presented with misleading information." In support of this proposition, the Clerk cited Opinion 96-18 of the New York State Comptroller, which states that "a referendum may not be submitted unless there is express statutory authority for a referendum;" (2) "Village Law § 9-912(2)(d) allows the public to vote on: 'Whether or not the month of the general election should be changed.' The petition goes beyond the statute by proposing a formula for determining the specific date for future Village elections (i.e. 'the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November.'). Section 9-912(2)(d) of the Village Law does not authorize the voters to determine the specific date within the month that the Village election is held;" (3) "the petition demands that the referendum be conducted on November 5, 2024. If a valid petition is filed requesting that a referendum be held on a day other than the date of a regular or special village election, Village Law § 9-912(1) requires that such referendum be held between 30 and 60 days after the petition is filed. The petition does not request that the referendum be held at the next regular village election which will occur on March 18, 2025 or that the Village conduct a special election. Its precise request is that the referendum be held 'at the next General Election to be held on Tuesday, November 5, 2024.' The 'General Election' to which the petition refers is the upcoming federal election, not an upcoming Village election, regular or special. Even if the petition were valid, its demand for a vote on November 5, 2024 date violates the 'between 30 and 60 days' rule of the statute since November 5, 2024 is more than 60 days after the petition was filed;" (4) "the proposition proposes to define the terms of office for elected officials [sic] 'the term of office of each elected Village officer currently holding office [be] extended so as to terminate at noon on the first Monday in December in the year in which their term of office would otherwise expire, upon which date the term of office of any subsequentlyelected Village Officer will commence.' Determining the terms of office cannot be fixed by a vote of the public. This subject is expressly outlined in Election Law § 15-104(2);" (5) "the petition requests that the referendum be conducted by the Westchester County Board of Elections. There is no legal authority that allows the County Board of Elections to conduct a Village of Pelham Manor referendum. Rather, Election Law § 15-124 makes village clerks the village's election officers. As such, they are responsible for conducting all village elections (including referenda). The petition cites Election Law § 4-108 as authority for the Westchester County Board of Elections conducting the referendum. That section only applies to villages which have already delegated the conduct of their elections to the local County Board of Elections. The Village of Pelham Manor has not done so;" (6) "the petition further requests that if the proposition passes, future Village elections be conducted by the Westchester County Board of Elections. NY Election Law § 15-104(1)(c) only allows the Board of Trustees to determine whether the Village's elections should be run by a County Board of Elections;" and (7) "I reviewed each sheet of the petition and uncovered technical deficiencies. These deficiencies also form a basis for my rejecting the petition."
It appears that the Manor respondents have abandoned this argument, since Village Law § 9-912(1) plainly states that while a "board of trustees may, upon its own motion," it" shall," upon the petition of certain electors, cause a proposition on certain enumerated topics to be submitted at regular or special village election. (Emphasis added).
Once she received this letter, petitioner Winter commenced this proceeding, on July 8th. The Court scheduled a conference and oral argument on July 11, 2024, at which counsel for petitioners and respondents appeared, as well as counsel for the Board. Thereafter, the two Commissioners differed in their opinions about the petition, and each retained counsel. The Court had a second conference and oral argument on July 23, 2024. This Decision and Order follows.
The Court notes at the outset that it has long been settled that a court should not "thwart the wishes of the voters and discourage the efforts of public officials by declaring some minor step omitted in the statutory procedure fatal, or by overstressing the importance of some technical defect" in evaluating a petition such as the one before this Court. Crell v. O'Rourke, 88 A.D.2d 83, 86, 452 N.Y.S.2d 262, 265 (2d Dept.) (substantial compliance adequate), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 702 (1982). See also Gaughan v. Mohr, 77 A.D.3d 1475, 1477, 909 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (4th Dept. 2010) ("We thus conclude that respondents abused their ministerial authority in rejecting the referendum question from the ballot" by "overstressing the importance of some technical defect"); Millar v. Tolly, 252 A.D.2d 872, 873, 675 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (3d Dept. 1998) ("Any attempt to prevent a permissive referendum should be viewed with utmost circumspection since the right to petition the government is deeply rooted in our democracy."); Long v. Town of Caroga, 219 A.D.3d 1075, 1077, 194 N.Y.S.3d 832 (3d Dept. 2023) (same).
The Court in Long also observed that "A town clerk has a statutory duty to accept and 'file all... papers required by law to be filed in his [or her] office' (Town Law § 30[2]). As relevant here, such duty includes the authority to perform a ministerial examination of a referendum petition and to reject its filing if said petition is insufficient on its face. The distinction between ministerial and judicial acts is that where the law prescribes the rule to be followed so as to leave nothing to the exercise of judgment or discretion, the act is a ministerial act, but where the act involves the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether the duty exists, the act is judicial." Id. at 1077-78, 194 N.Y.S.3d at 835.
The Court begins with the last issue raised by the Clerk in the letter, the unnamed "technical deficiencies." In their motion to dismiss, the Manor respondents add a new ground for invalidating the petition: they argue that the Statement of Witness is improper, according to Election Law § 6-132(2). A review of that section shows that it is specifically tailored to designating petitions, which this certainly is not. Instead, the applicable statement form is set forth in Village Law § 9-902(8). A review of that section shows that the witness statement used in the petition is actually in the exact form required by the applicable statute. This ground for rejecting the petition is thus meritless.
For example, it requires that the witness statement sets forth the witness' party affiliation.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, even if this ground had had merit, the Clerk failed to raise it in her letter to Winter. The Manor respondents are thus estopped from raising it now. See, e.g., Figel v. Dwyer, 75 A.D.3d 802, 804, 907 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (3d Dept. 2010) ("The absence in respondent's cursory letter decision of any mention of the statutory factors or the grounds for the denial precludes meaningful review of the rationality of the decision.... To the extent that respondent submits, for the first time in its opposition to the CPLR article 78 petition, a rationale for the decision, it may not be considered"); Streety v. Annucci, 203 A.D.3d 1509, 165 N.Y.S.3d 189, 194 (3d Dept. 2022) ("There is no question that such a 'cursory letter decision,' which... offers no discussion of the grounds for the denial, precludes meaningful review of the rationality of the decision."); Courtenay v. Graziano, 173 A.D.3d 1016, 1018, 105 N.Y.S.3d 457, 460 (2d Dept. 2019) ("a review 'is limited to the grounds presented by the agency at the time of its determination') (emphasis in original).
The Court next turns to the issue of whether the petition goes beyond what is permitted by Village Law § 9-912 in stating that
We, the undersigned, duly qualified electors of the Village of Pelham Manor in the State of New York, respectfully petition that the following proposed act or resolution to change the date of the General Village Election for the Village of Pelham Manor from the third Tuesday in March to the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November(to coincide with the date of the General Election, as defined in New York State Election Law § 8-100), and to fix a date by which successor Village Officers' terms of office shall commence(pursuant to New York State Village Law § 15-104[2]), be submitted to a vote of the qualified electors of the Village of Pelham Manor for their approval or rejection, as provided by law, at the next General Election to be held on Tuesday, November 5, 2024, and that such referendum be conducted by the Westchester County Board of Elections (in accordance with New York State Election Law § 4-108):
Shall the General Village Election of the Village of Pelham Manor be held annually on the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November and be conducted by the Westchester County Board Elections, with the term of office of each elected Village Officer currently holding office extended so as to terminate at noon on the first Monday in December in the year in which their term of office would otherwise expire, upon which date the term of office of any subsequently-elected Village Officer will commence?
Petition for Referendum.
The parties agree that Village Law § 9-912 defines what questions may be asked. It states, in relevant part, that
1. The board of trustees may, upon its own motion, and shall, upon the petition of at least two hundred electors in villages containing a population of five thousand or more; by at least one hundred fifty electors in villages containing a population of at least three thousand and less than five thousand; and by at least one hundred electors in villages containing a population of one thousand and less than three thousand; and in villages containing a population of less than one thousand, by electors numbering at least ten percent of the number of voters registered for the last general village election, cause a proposition on any of the questions set forth in the following subdivision to be submitted at a regular or special village election as such elections are defined in the election law. If such petition request the holding of a referendum at a time other than at such regular or special village election, such petition must contain twice the number of signatures otherwise required. If such petition does not request the holding of such a referendum, such question shall be submitted at the next regular or special village election for officers, held not less than thirty days after the filing of such petition. If such petition requests the holding of a referendum at a time other than at such regular or special village election, such referendum shall be held no less than thirty, nor more than sixty, days after the filing of such petition.
2. The questions which may or shall be submitted as propositions upon petition or motion of the board of trustees, as hereinbefore provided, are:
(a) Whether or not the area of the village should be diminished.
(b) Whether or not the village should be reincorporated.
(c) Whether or not the name of the village should be changed.
(d) Whether or not the month of the general village election should be changed.
The parties agree that the relevant subsection of Village Law § 9-912(2) is subsection (d), "Whether or not the month of the general village election should be changed." The Manor respondents assert that "Not one of these proposed items [sought by the petition] is permitted by Village Law §9-912, which specifically sets forth and limits those questions which may or shall be submitted as propositions upon petition."They criticize the petition on several bases.
First, they argue that the petition "includes a formula for determining the specific date for future Village elections, which is clearly not authorized under the Statute, which only allows the proposition to be 'whether or not the month of the general village election should be changed.'" While it is true that the only applicable question which may be submitted is "whether or not the month of the general village election should be changed," the Manor respondents' position would result in an absurd result; electors would not know what month was sought (and for the question about changing the name of the village, what would the new name be? For the question about diminishing the area of the village, what would be new area be? Surely electors should know whether they will no longer be residing in that village?). Given that the Second Department has explained that courts "must interpret a statute so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law," Ryder v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 836, 837, 821 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (2d Dept. 2006), the Court finds that a more reasonable interpretation is that the question may - and should - tell electors what the new proposed date would be.
Petitioners contend that "other related statutes provide clarity, and specifically provide that a proposition may change 'the date' of the general village election (see Election Law § 15-104[1][a] ['The general village election shall be held on the third Tuesday in March except in any village which presently elects, or hereafter adopts a proposition to elect, its officers on a date other than the third Tuesday in March' (emphasis added)]; see Election Law § 15-104[2] ['A proposition changing the date of the general village election shall not become effective...' (emphasis added)])."
The issue of when the referendum could occur is an important one. Petitioners assert that Village Law § 9-912(1) provides that it should occur "at the next 'regular' election, which... is the November general election." In contrast, the Manor respondents contend that the "term 'regular village election', although not defined in the Election Law, 'is intended to refer to the general village election,'" which should be March 18, 2025. In support of their position, the Manor respondents cite to Opinion of the State Comptroller 93-2, issued on February 8, 1993. This Opinion states, in relevant part, that "The term 'regular village election' is not defined in the Election Law. The Election Law, however, does define 'general village election' as the annual or biennial election for village officers (Election Law, § 15-102[1]). It is evident from the legislative history that the term 'regular village election' as used in section 9-912 is intended to refer to the 'general village election.'" 1993 WL 224741, at *1.
The Court does not find this Opinion persuasive, for two reasons. First, the copy of the Opinion submitted as an exhibit by the Manor respondents states at the top, in bold font, that "This opinion represents the views of the Office of the State Comptroller at the time it was rendered. The opinion may no longer represent those views if, among other things, there have been subsequent court cases or statutory amendments that bear on the issues discussed in the opinion." This opinion was rendered in 1993. Ten years later, a New York State Supreme Court Justice issued a Decision and Order in a case that disagreed with this opinion. This is a "subsequent court case" that bears "on the issues discussed in the opinion," and thus "may no longer represent those views."
The Court finds it curious that at oral argument on July 23rd, counsel for the Manor respondents took issue with the fact that petitioners were relying on case law from 2003, criticizing them for citing 20-year-old cases, when they were relying on a Comptroller Opinion from a decade before that.
Second, and more importantly, the Court finds very persuasive the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, in the case of Nardecchia v. Abate, Index # 15693/2003. In his oral Decision and Order in that action, Justice Dillon stated that the phrase "at a regular or special village election as such elections are defined in the election law" does not mean 'at the next 'regular village election' or 'special village election' but instead speaks to the next 'regular' election or 'special village election' and I think the statute is a little bit ambiguous in terms of what was meant by the Legislature by the term 'regular' election." He continued, "In determining how to construe this the courts must construe the legislation in ways that are reasonable, appropriate and practical. I find that there is a difference in terminology between 'regular election' on the one hand and 'general village election'." He concluded that
the fact that the Election Law has one definition of 'general village election' speaking to the March timeframe, strikes me as being distinct from the use of the language found in Village Law 9-912 of 'regular' election. And further under section 9-910, the statute does not talk about the regularly scheduled 'village' election which might refer to the March date. Instead it speaks to the next 'regular' election which could by this interpretation include a November date. So based upon my construction of the statute, I am inclined to believe that when the Legislature made reference in Village Law Section 9-912 to the next regular election, it would not necessarily have restricted them only to the general election in March every couple of years as described in Election Law Section 15-104. But that if I were to construe Section 9-912 as narrowly as the respondents would like, I think we would not be achieving what the Legislature intended at the time of the enactment of this statute, to have a vote in a village twice in the same month. Once at the regular election in November and then later on in the same month for a special election. It would seem to be more practical and reasonable if the Legislature meant that if we could double up these tasks that we do so. That either by a special village election or at the next regular election which in this case would be 5 November 4th of 2003.
The Court agrees with Justice Dillon that the correct reading of the statute is that the referendum could be held at either a "regular election" or at a "special village election," or, since here the petition contained "twice the number of signatures otherwise required," it could be "at a time other than at such regular or special village election." In other words, petitioners were well within their rights to seek to hold the referendum on the date of the general election held on Election Day, November 5, 2024. Notably, according to Commissioner Nelson's affirmation, and unrebutted by Commissioner Colety (or anyone else), "The Westchester County Board of Elections has conducted November elections arising out of referenda to change village election days from March to November several times since at least 1998. Such elections include the Village of Mamaroneck in 1998, the Village of Ardsley in 2003, the Village of Elmsford in 2003, the Village of Hastings-on-Hudson in 2022, and the Village of Tuckahoe in 2022," all of which have occurred on Election Days. The Court thus rejects the Manor respondents' argument that "[p]etitioners' erroneous interpretation of Village Law §9-912 (1) relies upon a tortured construction to interpret the term 'regular' to mean the November general elections."
Although the petition did contain 801 signatures, which would allow the referendum to occur at "a time other than at such regular or special village election," the Court notes that this would be problematic because to do so requires that the referendum be held between 30 and 60 days after filing the petition, pursuant to Village Law § 9-912(1). Yet Election Law § 4-108(1)(b), as of November 17, 2023, "at an election conducted by the board of elections," requires that the clerk of any political subdivision transmit a certified copy of the text of the referendum "at least three months prior to the general election at which such" referendum is to be submitted. Given that the Court interprets "regular election" to mean the election to be held on Election Day, the Court need not attempt to reconcile these two different timing provisions.
Petitioners have submitted to the Court as exhibits the language of all of those referenda. A review shows that with minor grammatical changes, they are all virtually identical to each other and to the language of the referendum at issue here, with one exception, discussed below. The Manor respondents argue that "the proposition seeks to define the terms of office for elected officials" "which is also beyond the scope of the statutory authority for a permissive referendum, as is sought in this case. Village Law§ 9-912 (2) [sic]. Determining the terms of office cannot be fixed by a vote of the public. This subject is expressly outlined in Election Law§ 15-104 (2) [sic]. Again, had the Legislature intended that the proposition could define the terms of office for elected Village officials, it could have said so in the Statute. Since it has not done so, the Court should not go beyond the plain language of the statute to create another question that may be a subject of a petition for referendum."
The Court disagrees, for two reasons. First, as set forth above, all of the referenda listed above contained similar language to provide that no current office holders would be shortchanged any part of their terms. This is because Election Law § 15-104(2) provides that "A proposition changing the date of the general village election shall not become effective until the next election regularly scheduled to be held more than one hundred twenty days following its adoption. Upon the adoption of such a proposition, the term of any village officer elected at the election at which such proposition is adopted or less than one hundred twenty-one days thereafter, and the term of any village officer whose successor is scheduled to be selected more than one hundred twenty days thereafter shall be extended until the date fixed as a result of such proposition for his successor to take office."
Secondly, the Second Department has already reviewed, and approved, this language. In the case of Broda v. Monahan, 309 A.D.2d 959, 960, 767 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dept. 2003), the Court reviewed a "certain proposition for referendum vote by qualified electors of the Village of Dobbs Ferry under which the general village election of the Village of Dobbs Ferry would be held on the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November, and the term of office of each elected village officer currently holding office would terminate at noon on the first Monday in December in the year in which his or her term would otherwise expire." (Emphasis added). The Manor respondents assert that this Appellate Division case is irrelevant and "factually distinguishable" because the Clerk in Dobbs Ferry found the petition "to be in compliance with the requirements of state laws, and certified same to the Board of Trustees. In this case... the Petition for Referendum was rejected as fatally defective and not in compliance with state laws. Thus, the question presented here, which goes to the defects in the Petition For Referendum, and the Village Clerk's determination that such defects rendered the Petition improper and invalid, was never before the trial court in the consolidated cases." Having read Broda carefully, however, the Court observes that while the Clerk did approve the petition in that case (unlike here), the Second Department specifically held that "The petitioners complied with the requirements of Village Law § 9-912, which sets forth the procedures for citizen-initiated propositions to be considered by a vote of qualified electors of a village." Broda v. Monahan, 309 A.D.2d 959, 961, 767 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dept. 2003). The Court thus finds that to the extent that the language in the petition is effectively the same as that in Broda, the "petitioners complied with the requirements of Village Law § 9-912."
The only substantive difference between this petition and the others listed above is that here, the petition includes that the referendum "be conducted by the Westchester County Board of Elections," which does not appear in any of the other referenda. This phrase raises two issues. The first is whether by adding this language, petitioners have gone beyond what is permissible in the statute. The second is more substantive. The Manor respondents contend that it is "beyond the scope of Village Law §9-912 (2) [sic]," because "NY Elect. Law §15-124 makes village clerks the Village's sole election official. As such, the village clerk is solely responsible for conducting all village elections (including referenda)." They further state that "NY Elect. Law §15-104 (1) (c) allows only the Board of Trustees to determine whether the Village's elections should be run by a County Board of Elections, and again is not an appropriate subject for the proposition. Simply put, there is no legal authority that even allows the County Board of Elections to conduct a Village of Pelham Manor referendum."
Beginning with the language issue, the Court finds that although this was not in any of the other petitions, the rationale for including it is the same: it advises electors on the implications of the proposed referendum, so that they have more information rather than less. See generally Application of Grenfell, 269 A.D. 600, 603, 58 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (3d Dept.), aff'd sub nom. In re Grenfell, 294 NY 610 (1945) ("The voters are entitled to know precisely the extent and nature of the proposed changes submitted."). The Court thus finds that there is nothing wrong with informing the electors of who would be conducting the election, so that they fully understand all of the ramifications before they sign the petition.
As for the second issue, the Manor respondents assert that "there is no legal authority that even allows the County Board of Elections to conduct a Village of Pelham Manor referendum." In support of this assertion, they cite to a memorandum of law filed by the Board in Matter of Marxuach-Gusciora v. John T. Pierpoint, Pelham Manor Village Clerk/Manager (Index No. 2586/18), a case in which an Order to Show Cause appears to have been denied (Ruderman, J.) on procedural grounds. The Manor respondents cite the Board's memorandum of law for the proposition that "as described by the County Attorney, to move the Referendum Election to the November General Election under the circumstances present here, would create a logistical nightmare, voter confusion and concomitant disenfranchisement."
A review of the memorandum of law shows that what the Board actually stated was that
As to the Pelham Manor Respondents' position that should the Referendum Petition be validated, the referendum would not be held by the BOE in conjunction with the general election, the fact that Pelham Manor has not turned over its election to the BOE is not dispositive, as the Referendum Petition did not seek a special election. However, should the Pelham Manor Respondents'[sic] opt to conduct the election itself, the BOE notes that two elections with separate ballots could not be conducted in the same polling location. To allow such a situation would create confusion. Therefore, BOE voting locations would not be available for referendum and voters would need to vote in two locations. Furthermore, the BOE voting machines would not be available for a second election conducted on November 6, 2018, by the Pelham Manor Respondent. (Emphasis added).
Commissioner Nelson interprets this 2018 memorandum of law to mean that "if the referendum petition which asked to hold the referendum on November 6, 2018, had been timely filed and timely submitted to the BOE, the BOE had the authority to conduct the referendum election notwithstanding that the Village had not turned over its elections to the BOE." (Emphasis added). Commissioner Colety did not address this memorandum of law in his papers.
In any event, the Court finds that the petition does properly request that the referendum be conducted on Election Day. Research has not revealed any cases (or other references) in which an election held on Election Day was conducted by a Village Clerk, rather than a Board of Elections. The Court thus finds that because the petition requests that the referendum occur on Election Day, that referendum must be conducted by the Board.
The Court has reviewed all of the parties' other contentions, and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, with respect to petitioners' Order to Show Cause, the Court grants it in its entirety. Specifically, it declares the petition to be valid and directs the Clerk to transmit immediately a certified copy of the text of such referendum and a statement of the form in which it is to be submitted to the Board and otherwise comply with Election Law § 4-108. Although redundant, for avoidance of confusion, the Court also grants the request to direct the Board to place such referendum on the November 5, 2024 ballot for residents of the Manor, and directs the Trustees to take any action required of it by law to effectuate the holding of said referendum. The motion filed by the Manor respondents to dismiss the petition is denied in its entirety.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.