Opinion
24A-JC-1067
11-25-2024
In the Matter of M.P., A Child in Need of Services, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner A.P., Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anne M. Lowe Fugate Gangstad Lowe, LLC Carmel, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court The Honorable Holly M. Harvey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 57C07-2310-JC-540.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anne M. Lowe Fugate Gangstad Lowe, LLC Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] A.P. ("Father") appeals the denial of his motion to correct error, which challenged the adjudication of his child, M.P. ("Child"), as a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") and the placement of Child outside his home. Identifying sufficient evidence supporting the CHINS order and the placement decision, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Child was born in March 2013 and adopted by Father and A.M. ("Mother") when she was two years old. From early childhood, Child presented significant behavioral issues, which included "hitting, kicking, spitting, [and] biting . . . parents, teachers, teachers' aides, classmates, and social workers." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 185. Child was diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder and classified as emotionally disabled through an Individualized Educational Program at school.
[¶3] Father and Mother divorced in 2019, and Mother died in late 2021, with Father becoming Child's sole caregiver. Father and Child lived in Terre Haute, where Child received therapy from 2019 until June 2020, at which point her therapist opined therapy was no longer necessary. After a school incident in spring 2021, Child briefly resumed therapy. Around that time, Father and Child moved to Bloomington. In November 2021, Child's behavior at school led to a brief hospitalization. Thereafter, Father "declined to set her up for . . . therapy," believing it would "take her out of school" and "the best thing was some kind of continuity, some times of normalcy[.]" Id. at 188. Father opted to manage Child's care through medication oversight from her primary care physician.
[¶4] Father engaged in physical discipline to manage Child's most severe behaviors, with the frequency of this type of discipline varying from multiple times per day to multiple times per week. When engaging in physical discipline, Father typically used a spatula to swat Child's bottom. During a morning drive to school on September 25, 2023, Father was angry with Child due to her refusal to complete her homework. Because Father could not discipline Child with a spatula at the time, Father instead struck Child on her upper shoulder. Father claimed that Child then bit him, so he decided to turn the car around, running over concrete parking barriers that damaged his car. While still angry, Father squeezed Child's upper arms as an additional means of discipline. Father's actions resulted in bruising on Child's arms. Child later reported bruising to her teacher, stating that she "didn't feel safe." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 46. At that point, the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") became involved, removing Child on October 3, 2023, and filing a CHINS petition. DCS documented bruising on Child, who was interviewed at Susie's Place.
[¶5] Father immediately sought Child's return and requested in-home services, arguing that Child needed stability due to her Reactive Attachment Disorder. The trial court determined that Child should remain outside the home for a cool-down period during the investigation. Child initially resided with a teacher's aide. At Father's request, Child was placed with a family from church. Child later moved to foster parents who had provided her respite care.
[¶6] A fact-finding hearing was scheduled for February 2024. Ahead of the hearing, Father requested special findings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). DCS also informed the trial court that Father had been charged with Level 5 felony battery in connection with the September 2023 incident involving Child. At the fact-finding hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of two video recordings: (1) Child's interview at Susie's Place and (2) Father's conversation with an investigating police officer. The fact-finding hearing also included Father's testimony about his use of corporal punishment. As to the September 2023 incident, Father admitted he was angry when disciplining Child. Father said he squeezed Child's shoulders because of the seriousness of her behavior.
[¶7] The trial court took the matter under advisement and later entered a written order adjudicating Child a CHINS. In its written order issued on March 4, 2024, the trial court found that Father had "rationalized the use of corporal punishment" and, despite Child's documented emotional disability and special needs, "repeatedly utilize[d] [this] method of discipline to curb the very behaviors that he [was] trying to stop in [Child]." Id. at 47, 50. The trial court's findings reflected particular concern that, without DCS involvement, Father "would not have considered an alternative to discipline for [Child] that did not involve spanking[.]" Id. at 48. On March 25, 2024, the trial court entered a dispositional decree. Therein, the court increased Father's visitation time and authorized Father to attend church with Child. The trial court also directed DCS to "immediately address the steps that need to be met in order for [Child] to be placed back with [Father]." Id. at 50. On April 3, 2024, Father filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] Father appeals following the denial of his motion to correct error. In general, we review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. In re K.B., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1001 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). In moving to correct error, Father challenged aspects of the underlying CHINS adjudication. As to the CHINS adjudication, because the trial court entered special findings pursuant to Father's timely written request, our review focuses on whether the evidence supported the findings and the findings supported the judgment. See In re Marriage of Gertiser, 45 N.E.3d 363, 369 (Ind. 2015). We will not set aside the trial court's findings or the judgment "unless clearly erroneous[.]" Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). "'Clear error' is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 363 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), trans. denied. Specifically, a finding is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence supporting the finding, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it does not follow from the findings. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). On appeal, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. See T.R. 52(A). Further, we give particular deference to trial courts in family law matters, mindful of their unique position to observe the witnesses and hear the testimony. See Madden v. Phelps, 152 N.E.3d 602, 610 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
I. CHINS Adjudication
[¶9] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2(a), which states as follows:
Father also challenges the trial court's CHINS adjudication under an alternative statute, Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4. However, because we identify sufficient evidence supporting the CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2(a), we need not address any alternative basis for the judgment.
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[¶10] DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. When determining whether a child is a CHINS, the trial court "should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when [the case] is heard." In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014)). "Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them." Id. at 581. Further, if a CHINS case involves physical discipline, a court must be mindful of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-15, which states that our CHINS statutes "do[] not . . . [l]imit the right of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child."
A. Serious Endangerment
[¶11] Father challenges the determination that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously endangered, focusing on a parent's right to engage in physical discipline. Father directs us to Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008), where a criminal defendant claimed parental privilege as a defense to battery. Although Willis arose in the criminal context, the case highlights the scope of a parent's right to engage in "reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior." 888 N.E.2d at 180. There, our Supreme Court identified factors bearing on whether a parent's use of force was reasonable, and therefore, within the parental privilege. See id. at 182. Those factors include (1) "the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child"; (2) "whether the force . . . [was] reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command"; and (3) "whether [the force was] disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm." Id. (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 150 (Am. Law Inst. 1965)).
[¶12] Although Father claims his use of physical discipline was reasonable under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding otherwise. The evidence indicates that, despite Child's documented emotional disability and recognized need for "intensive services to assist [her] in regulating her behavior," Father routinely resorted to spanking Child with a spatula "to curb the very behaviors that he [was] trying to stop in [Child]." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 47, 50. On one occasion, this disciplinary approach led to substantial bruising. There was evidence that Father had been angry when disciplining Child, who reported that she was fearful of Father. Under the circumstances- and particularly in light of Child's emotional disability-we identify sufficient evidence that Child's physical or mental health was seriously endangered.
B. Necessity of Court Intervention
[¶13] Father also challenges the trial court's determination that court intervention was necessary. The trial court found that, without the CHINS case, Father "would not have considered an alternative to discipline for [Child] that did not involve spanking[.]" Id. at 48. The trial court's findings also reflected concern that, despite Child's emotional disability and past hospitalization, Father did not re-engage therapeutic services and continued to resort to physical discipline without insight about its impact on Child. On appeal, Father maintains that his decision to forgo therapeutic services reflected reasonable parental judgment. Father also directs us to his testimony expressing his willingness to discontinue physical discipline. Father argues that, in the proceedings below, DCS seems to have misinterpreted his legal arguments about permissible corporal punishment as an indication that Father intended to use corporal punishment in the future.
[¶14] In some cases, we have reversed CHINS adjudications due to scant evidence supporting the necessity of court intervention. For example, in Matter of E.K., we identified several key factors warranting reversal, including no evidence of prior excessive discipline, no history of concerning marks or bruises, and the fact that DCS never sought to remove the child. 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). Here, however, the evidence indicated that Child had a substantial emotional disability, known to Father well before DCS intervention. Until the CHINS case-and despite Child exhibiting disruptive behaviors that at one point led to hospitalization-Father had not prioritized therapeutic services for Child to help with her emotional regulation and inform a disciplinary approach.
[¶15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child was a CHINS due to the prospect of excessive physical discipline that would not be curbed without the court's coercive intervention.
To the extent Father challenges other findings related to the CHINS adjudication, we need not address those findings because they amount to surplusage. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (regarding an erroneous finding as "merely harmless surplusage" when "there [was] evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment[.]"), trans. denied.
II. Placement
[¶16] Father also challenges Child's continued placement outside his home, arguing that the trial court should have returned Child to his care and ordered in-home services. Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6(a) addresses a trial court's authority to enter a dispositional decree, specifying that "[i]f consistent with . . . the best interests of the child," the dispositional decree must be "least disruptive of family life" and "impos[e] the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian[.]" Father appears to challenge whether the trial court complied with this statute. Focusing on the impact of removal on 2 Child, Father asserts that Child's Reactive Attachment Disorder requires stability, and the record indicates that, after removal from his care, Child exhibited increased use of profanity, academic difficulties, and renewed physical aggression at school. Father suggests it was in Child's best interests to return to his care, arguing that removal "likely caused additional trauma" and "in-home services [were] the most suitable option[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 22.
[¶17] The trial court's placement decision appears to account for Father's concerns. Indeed, although the court declined to immediately reunify Father and Child, the court directed DCS to "immediately address the steps that need to be met in order for [Child] to be placed back with [Father]." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 50. The court also increased visitation and authorized Father's church attendance with Child. In general, Father's arguments assume that he was ready to be a safe and effective caregiver. However, the trial court's approach to placement balanced Child's need for stability against her need for physical and emotional safety, ultimately ensuring that Father demonstrated changes in his parenting techniques before resuming full-time care. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the court erred in declining to immediately return Child to Father's care.
Conclusion
[¶18] There is sufficient evidence supporting the CHINS adjudication, and Father has not identified error with respect to Child's ongoing placement outside his care.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Judges Bailey and Bradford concur.